Random Allocations, Budget Constraints & Walrasian Equilibrium
随机分配、预算限制
基本信息
- 批准号:9711418
- 负责人:
- 金额:$ 22.33万
- 依托单位:
- 依托单位国家:美国
- 项目类别:Continuing Grant
- 财政年份:1997
- 资助国家:美国
- 起止时间:1997-09-01 至 2001-08-31
- 项目状态:已结题
- 来源:
- 关键词:
项目摘要
Project Abstract This grant funds two projects, one concerning economies with discrete goods and agents with budget constraints, the other dealing with macro policy games. The first is a collaboration with Faruk Gul from Princeton University, and the second with Christopher Phelan from Northwestern University. The first project builds on earlier work with Gul which concerns economies with discrete goods, but without budget constraints, and extends the analysis to economies where the agents face budget constraints. These constraints introduce a new obstacle for the existence of Walrasian equilibria, in addition to the indivisibility problem already present in the previous work. To circumvent this new difficulty, we introduce random allocations, and expand the commodity space to the space of lotteries. We argue that the resulting economy can be viewed as a standard Arrow-Debreu economy with state- contingent commodities. Although allowing for lotteries results in a standard convex economy, and thus the existence of equilibrium is guaranteed, not every equilibrium of this economy can be implemented. It is possible that there is no way of randomly allocating the discrete goods among the agents, so that each agent's (random) allocation coincides with one of his optimal lotteries. Besides competitive markets, we also explore incentive compatible mechanisms, including strategy-proofness, (interim) incentive compatibility, the dynamic implementation of mechanisms (or Walrasian equilibria), and production in this setting. The second project extends earlier work with Phelan concerning a Ramsey tax model. Macro policy games confront the theorist with challenging technical issues. They involve a continuum of consumers and state variables, like capital stock and government debt. Most of the literature has partially adapted the strategic dynamic techniques developed for repeated games, and uses rather crude punishment strategies in drastically simplified models. We combine standard Euler conditions with the dynamic programming techniques for repeated games, to develop a new method for a general class of games with strategically anonymous players. We establish analogues of the self-generation and factorization theorems, which play a central role in the characterization of the equilibrium value set of an infinitely repeated game. Despite the complexity of these macro models, the method we develop afford, as in a repeated game, a complete characterization of the equilibrium value set. Specifically, we are able to study situations in which the first-best government policy cannot be implemented. A main focus of the literature has been whether readily available punishments can credibly sustain the government's optimal policy. Hence, second best solutions have been almost totally neglected. Another issue we address with the current method is the credibility of the punishments being proposed. In our Ramsey tax model, for example, without any institutional constraints, the worst equilibrium has the government taxing capital at 100% in every period, and the consumers saving nothing. This doesn't seem to us a very credible punishment. In the current project we consider the impact of imposing renegotiation-proofness on the government's behavior.
项目摘要 这笔赠款资助了两个项目,一个涉及具有离散商品和预算约束的代理人的经济体,另一个涉及宏观政策博弈。第一个是与普林斯顿大学的 Faruk Gul 合作,第二个是与西北大学的 Christopher Phelan 合作。第一个项目建立在与 Gul 的早期合作的基础上,该项目涉及具有离散商品但没有预算限制的经济体,并将分析扩展到代理商面临预算限制的经济体。除了先前工作中已经存在的不可分割性问题之外,这些约束还为瓦尔拉斯均衡的存在引入了新的障碍。为了规避这个新的困难,我们引入随机分配,并将商品空间扩展到彩票空间。我们认为,由此产生的经济可以被视为具有国家相关商品的标准阿罗-德布鲁经济。尽管允许彩票会产生标准的凸经济,从而保证了均衡的存在,但并不是该经济的每个均衡都能实现。可能无法在代理人之间随机分配离散商品,因此每个代理人的(随机)分配与其最佳彩票之一一致。除了竞争市场之外,我们还探索激励相容机制,包括策略证明、(临时)激励相容、机制的动态实施(或瓦尔拉斯均衡)以及这种环境下的生产。第二个项目扩展了与费兰早期有关拉姆齐税收模型的工作。宏观政策博弈给理论家带来了具有挑战性的技术问题。它们涉及消费者和国家变量的连续体,例如资本存量和政府债务。大多数文献都部分采用了为重复博弈开发的策略动态技术,并在大大简化的模型中使用相当粗糙的惩罚策略。我们将标准欧拉条件与重复博弈的动态规划技术相结合,为具有策略性匿名玩家的一般类博弈开发了一种新方法。我们建立了自生成定理和因式分解定理的类似物,它们在无限重复博弈的均衡值集的表征中发挥着核心作用。尽管这些宏观模型很复杂,但我们开发的方法就像在重复博弈中一样,提供了均衡值集的完整特征。具体来说,我们能够研究最佳政府政策无法实施的情况。文献的一个主要焦点是现成的惩罚是否能够可靠地维持政府的最优政策。因此,次优解决方案几乎完全被忽视了。我们用当前方法解决的另一个问题是所提出的惩罚的可信度。例如,在我们的拉姆齐税收模型中,在没有任何制度约束的情况下,最差的均衡是政府在每个时期对资本征收 100% 的税,而消费者却没有任何储蓄。在我们看来,这并不是一个非常可信的惩罚。在当前的项目中,我们考虑了重新谈判验证对政府行为的影响。
项目成果
期刊论文数量(0)
专著数量(0)
科研奖励数量(0)
会议论文数量(0)
专利数量(0)
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Ennio Stacchetti其他文献
Investment dynamics in electricity markets
- DOI:
10.1007/s00199-009-0508-3 - 发表时间:
2009-11-06 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:1.100
- 作者:
Alfredo Garcia;Ennio Stacchetti - 通讯作者:
Ennio Stacchetti
Strategic Pricing when Electricity is Storable
- DOI:
10.1023/a:1011151409081 - 发表时间:
2001-01-01 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:1.400
- 作者:
Alfredo Garcia;James D. Reitzes;Ennio Stacchetti - 通讯作者:
Ennio Stacchetti
Ennio Stacchetti的其他文献
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{{ truncateString('Ennio Stacchetti', 18)}}的其他基金
The Role of Information in Insider Trading with Stochastic Valuation
信息在随机估值内幕交易中的作用
- 批准号:
0720815 - 财政年份:2007
- 资助金额:
$ 22.33万 - 项目类别:
Continuing Grant
Collaborative Research: Obsolescence of Durable Goods and Aggregate Fluctuations
合作研究:耐用品的陈旧和总量波动
- 批准号:
0241701 - 财政年份:2003
- 资助金额:
$ 22.33万 - 项目类别:
Continuing Grant
Multidimensional Mechanism Design: Theory and Applications
多维机构设计:理论与应用
- 批准号:
9410747 - 财政年份:1994
- 资助金额:
$ 22.33万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
Information and Monitoring in Repeated Agency of PartnershipProblems
重复代理合作问题的信息和监测
- 批准号:
8921840 - 财政年份:1990
- 资助金额:
$ 22.33万 - 项目类别:
Continuing Grant
Topics in the Theory of Optimal Cooperation in Dynamic Games
动态博弈最优合作理论专题
- 批准号:
8709546 - 财政年份:1987
- 资助金额:
$ 22.33万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
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