Topics in the Theory of Optimal Cooperation in Dynamic Games

动态博弈最优合作理论专题

• 批准号: 8709546
• 负责人: Ennio Stacchetti
• 金额: $ 6.61万
• 依托单位: Stanford University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1987
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1987-07-15 至 1989-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=8709546&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Topics; Theory; Optimal; Cooperation; Dynamic

The project contributes to our understanding of economic applications of repeated games. It builds on important new techniques for characterizing repeated games developed by the investigator and it extends surprising and potentially significant results obtained by the investigator about repeated games under imperfect information. The high quality and significance of the investigator's past research show that he has the ability to successfully complete this project. The project consists of two parts. The first part develops an ingenious theory of implicit and explicit contracts. The theory is based on a model in which a principal negotiates a contract with an agent, making the latter's compensation contingent upon output (or some other publicly observable variable) but not upon some choice variable of the agent (perhaps the level of effort or care taken by the agent). Implicit inter-temporal contacts emerge in repeated games when the authorities (the courts) take into account only the output and not the choice variables but the principal can observe the choice variables and can retaliate against an agent who deviates from the implicit agreement. Implicit and explicit contracts are shown to coexist, but the principal will always pay the agent more than the amount called for in the explicit contract, if behavior is efficient. This is original research because this problem has never been rigorously analyzed. The results promise new insights into contracts (Why are non-binding clauses included in contracts?) and the relationship between business cycles and implicit labor contracts. The second part concerns the strategic dynamics of implicit collusion in markets with renewable resource, the so-called "Great Fish War" problem. The investigator shows how previous work can be generalized into a solution for this complicated and important problem.

该项目有助于我们理解经济应用 重复的游戏。 它建立在重要的新技术之上， 描述研究者开发的重复游戏， 扩展了通过以下方法获得的令人惊讶且潜在重要的结果： 不完全信息下重复博弈的研究者。 研究者过去研究的高质量和意义 证明他有能力成功完成这个项目。 该项目由两部分组成。 第一部分开发了一个 巧妙的隐性和显性契约理论。 这个理论是 基于一个模型，在该模型中，委托人与 代理人，使后者的补偿取决于输出（或 一些其他公共可观察变量），但不是基于某种选择 代理人的变量（可能是代理人的努力或注意程度） 代理）。 内隐跨时接触出现在重复的 游戏时，当局（法院）只考虑 输出，而不是选择变量，但主体可以观察到 选择变量，并可以报复偏离的代理人 隐含的协议。 隐式和显式契约被证明是 但是，委托人支付给代理人的费用总是高于代理人。 在明确的合同中要求的金额，如果行为是 高效. 这是原创性的研究，因为这个问题从来没有 经过严格分析。这些结果预示着新的见解， 合同（为什么合同中包含非约束性条款？）和 经济周期与隐性劳动合同的关系。 第二部分是关于隐性共谋的战略动力学 在可再生资源市场，所谓的“大鱼大战” 问题. 调查显示如何以前的工作可以推广 解决这个复杂而重要的问题。