Unemployment, Unequal Pay and Union Negotiations

失业、同工同酬和工会谈判

• 批准号: 9809014
• 负责人: Michael Wallerstein
• 金额: $ 5.68万
• 依托单位: Northwestern University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1998
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1998-07-01 至 1999-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9809014&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Unemployment; Unequal; Pay; Union; Negotiations

Whether or not centralized wage-setting institutions enhance economic efficiency has been the subject of continuing controversy. On one side are those who believe that centralized bargaining institutions enable wage-setters to incorporate various externalities in their decisions that would be ignored by actors with only local concerns. On the other side are those who believe that centralized wage-setting suffers many of the same informational and incentive failures as central planning. Recently, some have argued that centralized wage-setting worked well in the past but has become less efficient over time. Previous attempts to study the impact of collective bargaining institutions on unemployment have been limited by the absence of reliable measures of institutional variables. Through the efforts of several scholars, a new data set containing time-series data on the organization of unions, employers' associations and wage-setting practices for 16 advanced industrial societies over a 42 year period (1950-1992) has recently been completed. The new data allows the testing of the importance of labor market institutions on the distribution of income and economic performance with much greater precision than previously. Past work by the principal investigator has found a strong impact of wage-setting institutions, particularly of the centralization of wage -setting and the concentration of union membership, on pay inequality. Centralized wage setting institutions and concentrated unions produce relatively flat wage distributions. In the current investigation, the researcher examines the impact of the centralization of wage-setting and union concentration on unemployment.

集中制定工资的机构是否能提高经济效率一直是争议的焦点。一方是那些认为中央谈判机构使工资制定者能够在其决定中纳入各种外在因素的人，而这些外在因素只会被只关心当地问题的行为者忽视。另一派则认为，与中央计划一样，集中式工资制定也存在许多信息和激励失灵的问题。最近，一些人辩称，集中化的工资设定在过去效果很好，但随着时间的推移，效率已经下降。以前研究集体谈判制度对失业的影响的努力因缺乏可靠的制度变量衡量标准而受到限制。通过几位学者的努力，最近完成了一个新的数据集，其中载有关于16个先进工业社会在42年期间(1950-1992年)的工会组织、雇主协会和工资制定做法的时间序列数据。新的数据使劳动力市场机构在收入分配和经济表现方面的重要性得到了检验，其精确度比以前高得多。首席调查员过去的工作发现，工资制定机构，特别是工资制定的集中化和工会会员的集中化，对工资不平等有很大影响。集中的工资制定机构和集中的工会产生相对统一的工资分配。在本次调查中，研究人员考察了工资制定集中化和工会集中化对失业的影响。