Collaborative Research on Social Exchange and Network Cohesion

这是一个开发和测试网络凝聚力理论的项目，该理论源于对交换网络中的权力和承诺的研究。这一构想通过整合两个先前截然不同的研究项目——网络交换理论和关系凝聚理论——的思想，开辟了新的领域。网络交换理论是一种关于交换关系中的权力的形式化理论，它利用有关网络结构的信息来预测网络中的权力和资源分配。关系凝聚力理论研究了网络背景下的协商交换，并预测结构性权力通过干预情绪-情感过程产生对交换伙伴的承诺。新的网络凝聚力理论通过一个正式的数学模型将两者结合起来，该模型预测了“自利”个人的网络何时演变为“集体导向”的群体。该理论与之前关于二元承诺的研究相一致，并对更大的社会交换网络产生了新的预测。理论上的论点是，某些类型的交换网络产生了全球团结或凝聚力的感觉，超越了任何个人对个人的二元承诺。具体来说，它假设包含高比例平等权力关系的紧密连接网络应该产生互动，从而在所有网络成员之间引发群体感。密集的网络体现了一种结构上的“紧密性”，它实际上确保了所有成员都有相互交换资源的潜力。相对密集的社会结构有较少的派系，允许人们很容易地与大多数或所有其他人互动（高可达性），并且表现出较少的网络位置分层。权力的分配也对个人在社会交往中所经历的团结产生重要影响。关系凝聚理论及其相关研究表明，平等权力关系会产生兴奋或愉悦的感觉，这些情绪使这种关系本身成为一种有价值的对象。基于这些原则，预测网络密度和权力分布的综合效应应该产生超越地方交换关系的“群体范围”的团结感。该理论将在一个完全计算机化的实验环境中进行测试，在实验环境中，人们与合作伙伴就可以兑换现金的利润点池进行谈判。这是一种协商的社会交换形式，有关系的人必须同意利润的分配，否则就什么也赚不到。该理论预测，特定的网络结构将导致相互作用和感知，将成员联系在一起，并将群体作为一个整体。该项目要求进行四个实验，操纵网络密度和权力分配，以确定网络结构如何培养(1)对大群体作为一个独特对象的情感依恋和(2)对其他群体成员的承诺行为。我们将研究两种不同形式的承诺行为：一种具有很少外在价值的象征性姿态（即给予小的象征性礼物）和一种非象征性的金钱自我约束形式（即独裁者游戏中的利润分配）。四个实验将在各种网络配置下测量这两种形式的行为。该项目对群体团结和凝聚力具有更广泛的影响。无论是商业企业中的公司代理人、职业球员与球队老板之间的工资谈判，还是黑市商品的买卖双方，网络关系的结构在很大程度上决定了谁与谁互动，以及权力在多大程度上被用来促进自身利益。网络凝聚力理论预测，在良好的网络结构下，互动和交流将在所有群体成员之间进行分配，利润的分配将趋于平等。结果将是人们体验到温和的日常积极情绪，发展共同体验感和群体认同感，避免机会主义或渎职行为。

This is a project to develop and test a theory of network cohesion that stems from research on power and commitment in exchange networks. This formulation breaks new ground by integrating ideas from two previously distinct research programs, Network Exchange Theory and the Theory of Relational Cohesion. Network Exchange Theory is a formal theory of power in exchange relations that uses information about the network structure to predict power and the distribution of resources in networks. The Theory of Relational Cohesion deals with negotiated exchange in the context of a network, and predicts that structural power produces commitment to exchange partners through an intervening emotional-affective process. The new Theory of Network Cohesion combines the two via a formal mathematical model that predicts when networks of "self-interested" persons evolve into "collectively-oriented" groups. The theory is consistent with previous work on dyadic commitment, and generates new predictions for larger social exchange networks.The theoretical argument is that certain types of exchange networks generate feelings of global solidarity or cohesion, above and beyond any person-to-person dyadic commitment. Specifically, it hypothesizes that densely connected networks containing a high proportion of equal power relations should produce interactions that elicit feelings of groupness among all network members. Dense networks embody a type of structural "closeness" that virtually ensures all members have the potential to exchange resources with one another. Relatively dense social structures have fewer cliques, allow persons to easily interact with most or all others (high reachability), and exhibit less stratification of network positions. The distribution of power also has important consequences for the solidarity individuals experience in social interaction. The Theory of Relational Cohesion and attendant research indicate that equal power relations generate feelings of excitement or pleasure, and these emotions cause the relationship to become a valued object in its own right. Based on these principles, it is predicted that the combined effect of network density and distribution of power should produce "group-wide" feelings of solidarity that transcend local exchange ties.The theory will be tested in a fully computerized experimental setting wherein persons negotiate with partners over a pool of profit points that can be redeemed for cash. This is a form of negotiated social exchange where persons in relations must agree on the division of profit or earn nothing at all. The theory predicts that certain network configurations will lead to interactions and perceptions that bind members together and to the group as a whole. The project calls for four experiments, manipulating network density and the distribution of power, to determine how network structures foster (1) emotional attachments to the larger group as a distinct object and (2) behavioral acts of commitment directed at other group members. Two distinct forms of commitment behavior will be studied: a symbolic gesture with little extrinsic value (i.e., the giving of small token gifts) and a non-symbolic form of pecuniary self-restraint (i.e., the division of profit in a dictator game). Four experiments will measure both forms of behavior under a variety of network configurations.This project has broader implications for group solidarity and cohesion. Whether the setting involves corporate agents in commercial enterprise, salary negotiations between professional ball players and team owners, or the buyers and sellers of black-market goods, the structure of network relations largely determines who interacts with whom and the extent to which power is used to promote self-interest. The Theory of Network Cohesion predicts that under favorable network configurations, interactions and exchanges will be distributed across all group members and the distributions of profit will tend toward equality. The result will be that people experience mild everyday positive emotions, develop a sense of common experience and group identity, and refrain from opportunism or malfeasance.