Collaborative Research: Group Decision-Making in Strategic Market Games

协作研究：战略市场博弈中的群体决策

• 批准号: 9819031
• 负责人: Stephen Hayne
• 金额: $ 9.95万
• 依托单位: Arizona State University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 1999
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1999-04-01 至 2000-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9819031&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Group; Decision; Making

Many important economic, political, scientific, cultural, and military decisions are made by groups. Decision-making groups have many forms including families, committees, boards of directors, and legislatures. Many of these group decisions, especially the economic, military and political ones, are made in risky strategic environments in which the benefits or costs that result from a group's decisions depend on the decisions made by opponent groups.But why is decision-making responsibility often assigned to groups, rather than individuals? Are important pieces of information possessed by different individual members who combine to form a group? Are groups inherently more rational decision-makers than individuals? Do groups make better decisions than individuals in some or all environments? And if so, does this reflect an advantage from having more information available? These are interesting empirical questions.Research supported by this grant compares decisions made by competing groups with decisions made by competing individuals in controlled laboratory experiments conducted in a financially risky, strategic environment. The environment is that of a common value auction in which bidders do not know the value of the items they are bidding on but have one or more estimates of that value. Many naturally-occurring auction markets are characterized by bids for items of uncertain value, submitted by firms in which groups have determined the amounts to bid. In contrast, theory has assumed that the bidder is a single rational individual and most previous common value auction experiments have involved bids by individual decision-makers.In these experiments, group decision-makers variously have more, the same, or less information than individual decision-makers (in different sessions). Group and individual decisions are compared with a quantitative measure of their deviation from minimally-rational decisions that yield the decision-maker zero, rather than negative, expected profit.Beyond comparing group decisions with individual decisions, the research will include experiments designed to provide insight into the processes that competing groups use to arrive at their decisions in risky strategic environments. In one type of experiment, the amount of information or size of the market will be changed during experiments, group discussions will be video- and audio-taped for subsequent transcription and analysis of the reasoning used by groups to respond to these treatments. Previous experiments with individual decision-makers have found that they respond to an increase in the number of competing bidders by increasing their bids. This is in sharp contrast to rational bidding theory, which implies that bids vary inversely with the number of bidders. How will groups respond to these treatments? In another category of experiment, computerized group support systems will be used to control the content of information that members of groups can exchange and to impose alternative decision rules such as simple majority voting and unanimous consent. The experiments of this type are designed to reveal whether group decisions in strategic games can be rationalized by the use of these systems and whether internet communication by groups, rather than face-to-face meetings, could support rational bidding.

许多重要的经济、政治、科学、文化和军事决策都是由群体做出的。 决策团体有多种形式，包括家庭、委员会、董事会和立法机构。许多群体决策，特别是经济、军事和政治决策，都是在风险战略环境中做出的，在这种环境中，群体决策的收益或成本取决于对手群体的决策，但为什么决策责任往往被分配给群体，而不是个人？联合收割机组成一个群体的不同个体成员是否拥有重要的信息片段？ 群体是否天生就比个人更理性？ 在某些或所有环境中，群体是否比个体做出更好的决策？ 如果是这样，这是否反映了拥有更多信息的优势？ 这些都是有趣的实证问题。由该基金支持的研究比较了竞争群体的决策与竞争个体在受控实验室实验中的决策，这些实验在财务风险和战略环境中进行。 这种环境是一种共同价值拍卖，在这种拍卖中，投标人不知道他们投标的物品的价值，但对该价值有一个或多个估计。 许多自然发生的拍卖市场的特点是对价值不确定的物品的出价，由公司提交，其中集团已经确定了出价的金额。 相比之下，理论假设竞标者是单一理性个体，并且大多数之前的共同价值拍卖实验都涉及个人决策者的竞标。在这些实验中，群体决策者拥有的信息不同程度地多于、相同或更少。比个人决策者（在不同的会话中）。 小组和个人的决策进行比较，他们偏离最低限度的理性决策，产生的决策者零，而不是负的，预期profit.Beyond比较群体决策与个人决策的定量措施，研究将包括旨在提供洞察的过程中，竞争群体使用，以达到他们的决策在风险战略环境中的实验。 在一种类型的实验中，信息量或市场规模将在实验过程中改变，小组讨论将被录像和录音，以便随后转录和分析小组对这些处理做出反应的推理。 以前对个人决策者的实验发现，他们对竞争投标人数量的增加做出的反应是增加他们的出价。 这与理性投标理论形成了鲜明的对比，理性投标理论意味着投标与投标人的数量成反比。这些群体将如何应对这些治疗？在另一类实验中，将使用计算机化的群体支持系统来控制群体成员可以交流的信息内容，并实施替代决策规则，如简单多数表决和一致同意。 这种类型的实验的目的是揭示在战略游戏中的群体决策是否可以通过使用这些系统来合理化，以及群体的互联网通信，而不是面对面的会议，是否可以支持理性投标。