Collective Action in Exchange Networks; Coalitions, Identity, and Interest

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Research lines on social exchange and collective action have developed largely in isolation. This project extends the scope of exchange network theory by allowing collective action among structurally disadvantaged actors. It also extends collective action research by embedding the social dilemma in a network of exchange relations and power processes. The proposed experiments are designed to tease apart the relative importance of two factors believed to motivate collective action: shared identity and mutual self-interest. Specifically, we will investigate the use of collective action by low-power actors to overcome structural disadvantages in exchange networks. Our main hypotheses are that (1) coalitions will form among low-power actors, despite individual incentives to free ride, and (2) these coalitions will reduce structural disadvantages. The experimental design holds self-interest constant while manipulating both personal and structural attributes expected to shape identification with similar others. We manipulate personal traits using a variant of the 'minimal group' paradigm, widely applied in social identity research. However, exchange network theory is principally concerned with structural, not personal, determinants of power. We therefore also investigate the formation of coalitions among actors occupying structurally equivalent positions (those identically connected to others in the network). The results will inform a new theory of coalition formation that incorporates both mutual self-interest and shared-identity as catalysts of collective action.