Collaborative Research: The Instruments for Political Control of Bureaucracy in Parliamentary and Separation of Powers Systems

合作研究：议会和分权制度中官僚政治控制的工具

• 批准号: 9904844
• 负责人: John Huber
• 金额: $ 8.71万
• 依托单位: Columbia University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1999
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1999-08-01 至 2002-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9904844&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Instruments; Political; Control

Bureaucratic expertise, if harnessed effectively, can play a crucial role in helping elected officials to achieve their goals. The political environment, however, can make it difficult for elected officials to influence bureaucratic behavior, thereby creating the possibility that this expertise will go to waste or be used by bureaucrats against elected officials. In order to understand how the preferences of elected officials get reflected in public policy, it is crucial to explore the mechanisms that facilitate or inhibit political control of agency policymaking. The project begins by developing an explicitly comparative theoretical explanation of political control. The basis for this theory is the expectation that politicians respond rationally to their political environment when deciding whether and how to control bureaucracies. If there is variation in the relevant features of this political environment across time or place, then there should be systematic variation in the institutions that politicians adopt to facilitate control. The theoretical arguments (which are developed as formal models) and the empirical tests focus on interactions between factors affecting incentives to control vureaucrats (that is, factors affecting the degree of conflict betwseen politicians and bureaucrats) and those affecting the costs of ex ante and ex post control strategies. Political and institutional factors that should affect the degree of conflict include the specific form of divided government in separation of powers systems, the heterogeneity of governing coalitions in parliamentary systems, and the institutions that govern the selection and promotion of civil servants. The form of divided government, the nature of the governing coalition, and the extent of legislative professionalism should affect the cost of ex ante control. Electoral volatility, cabinet instability, and institutional arrangements regarding the choice of judges, the prerogative of courts vis-a-vis agencies, and the ability of legislatures or parliaments to review or veto agency decisions should influence the cost of ex post control. The data for the empricial tests consist of instruments for control as dependent variables and information about the political and institutional environment as explanatory variables. Data are collected to permit analysis of variation in the instruments of control within separation of powers systems (through an analysis of control across advanced parliamentary democracies), and variation across parliamentary and separation of powers systems (through a comparison of control processes in the two types of systems). For each type of system, the project examines how political and institutional variables affect conflict of interest, ex ante strategies for control, and ex post strategies for control. This project promises several benefits. First, by examining the impact of the political environment on strategies for control, the project lays the foundation for a broadly comparative understanding of how politicians respond to their political environment when making decisions about how to delegate authority to bureaucrats. In so doing, the study refines existing debates about not only the logic of delegation, but also the limits and possibilities of control over the state in different types of political systems. Second, the study involves the creation of a number of novel datasets of use to a wide range of scholars. Students of state and comparative politics benefit from data that systemtically code institutional and political differences among states and countries. Students of institutions and policy are able to use data that systematically demonstrate differences in control across policies, states, and countries.

官僚机构的专门知识如果得到有效利用，可以在帮助当选官员实现其目标方面发挥关键作用。 然而，政治环境可能使当选官员难以影响官僚行为，从而造成这种专业知识被浪费或被官僚用来对付当选官员的可能性。 为了理解民选官员的偏好如何反映在公共政策中，至关重要的是要探讨促进或抑制机构决策的政治控制的机制。该项目首先发展一个明确的比较理论解释的政治控制。 这一理论的基础是期望政治家在决定是否以及如何控制官僚机构时对他们的政治环境做出理性的反应。 如果这种政治环境的相关特征随时间或地点而变化，那么政治家为促进控制而采用的制度也应该有系统性的变化。理论论证（这是发展为正式的模型）和实证检验的重点之间的相互作用的因素影响的激励控制vureaucrats（即，影响程度的冲突betwseen政客和官僚）和那些影响成本的事前和事后控制策略。 影响冲突程度的政治和体制因素包括三权分立制度中政府分立的具体形式、议会制度中执政联盟的异质性以及管理公务员选拔和晋升的机构。 分裂政府的形式、执政联盟的性质以及立法专业化的程度都会影响事前控制的成本。 选举的不稳定性、内阁的不稳定性、关于法官选择的制度安排、法院相对于行政机关的特权、立法机关或议会审查或否决行政机关决定的能力，都应影响事后控制的成本。实证检验的数据包括作为因变量的控制工具和作为解释变量的政治和制度环境的信息。 收集数据是为了分析权力分立制度中控制手段的变化（通过分析先进的议会民主国家的控制），以及议会和权力分立制度中的变化（通过比较两种制度中的控制过程）。 对于每一种类型的系统，该项目研究了政治和制度变量如何影响利益冲突，事前控制策略，以及事后控制策略。这个项目有几个好处。 首先，通过研究政治环境对控制战略的影响，该项目奠定了基础，为广泛的比较了解政治家如何应对他们的政治环境时，决策如何授权给官僚。 在这样做的过程中，研究细化现有的辩论，不仅授权的逻辑，而且在不同类型的政治制度控制国家的限制和可能性。 其次，这项研究涉及到创建一些新的数据集，供广泛的学者使用。 国家和比较政治学的学生受益于系统地编码国家和国家之间的制度和政治差异的数据。 机构和政策的学生能够使用系统地展示跨政策，州和国家的控制差异的数据。