POWRE: An Experimental Study of Cost Sharing and Rationing Mechanisms

本研究的目的是通过实验测试旨在共享公共资源和成本的机制。这个项目是PI对定价机制理论研究的自然延伸。 在NSF支持的这项先前工作中，为一种特定的机制开发了一个框架，即“序列成本分摊规则”，以实现拍卖。 由于其强大的激励属性，串行成本分摊规则可以用来定价和分配稀缺资源的方式，准确地反映了根本的需求。 然而，当资源有限且代理人之间存在竞争时，需要结合成本分摊来采用配给。 理论上发展的成本分摊和配给机制通常没有经过实验检验。对理论的贡献将是推广概率配给机制。PI将把受试者带入实验室，观察和研究他们在共享和支付共同资源时对现实激励和制度的反应。受试者将在面对特定的成本分摊或配给规则时决定数量。受试者的选择和决定将与理论模型的预测进行比较。大型和复杂的组织面临着高效和有效地分配共同共享资源的持续挑战。 当这些共享资源稀缺时，分配问题对于规划者来说是复杂的。 如果需求者为了确保获得资源而夸大其对所需资源的需求，这种情况可能会进一步恶化。 因此，负责分配资源的决策者可能无法准确反映实际需求。 已经对制定费用分摊和配给机制给予了很大的关注。 然而，这部分工作实际上忽略了一个关键问题，即这些数学机制在多大程度上可以在实际决策环境中实现和测试。 因此，本研究有可能在理论与实验研究的接口上做出重大贡献。PI是一名助理教授，致力于将理论与实验研究结合起来进行机械设计。为了实现这一目标，她将使用密西西比实验研究实验室（MERL）新创建的设施。访问该设施将允许PI进行研究，这将补充和推进她以前的理论工作。 有了这个POWRE奖，PI将获得实验经济学的新技能。

The goal of this research is to test experimentally mechanisms designed to share common resources and costs. This project is a natural extension of theoretical research by the PI on pricing mechanisms. In this previous work supported by NSF, a framework for a particular mechanism, the "Serial Cost Sharing Rule," was developed to be implemented as an auction. Because of its powerful incentive properties, the serial cost-sharing rule can be used to price and allocate scarce resources in a way that accurately reflects the underlying needs. When resources are limited and there is contention among agents, however, rationing needs to be employed in conjunction with cost sharing. Theoretically developed cost sharing and rationing mechanisms are not typically tested experimentally. Contributions to the theory will be to generalize probabilistic rationing mechanisms. The PI will bring subjects into the laboratory to observe and study their responses to realistic incentives and institutions when sharing and paying for a common resource. The subjects will decide about the quantities when confronted with a specific cost sharing or rationing rule. The subjects' choices and decisions will be compared with predictions from the theoretical models. Large and complex organizations face a continual challenge of allocating common shared resources efficiently and effectively. The allocation problem is complicated for the planners when these shared resources are scarce. This can be further aggravated if demanders overstate their case for desired resources in order to ensure access. As a result, the decision-makers charged with the task of allocating the resources may not have an accurate representation of actual needs. A great deal of attention has been devoted to developing mechanisms for cost sharing and rationing. However, this body of work has virtually ignored the crucial question of to what extent can these mathematical mechanisms be implemented and tested in an actual decision environment. Thus, this research has potential to make a significant contribution in the interface between theory and experimental research.The PI is an assistant professor who is working on combining theoretical and experimental research in mechanism design. To accomplish this, she will use the newly created facilities at the Mississippi Experimental Research Laboratory (MERL). Access to this facility will allow the PI to conduct research that will complement and advance her previous theoretical work. With this POWRE award the PI will acquire new skills in experimental economics.