NSCC/SA: Collaborative Research: Predicting the Nature of Conflict - An Evolutionary Analysis of the Tactical Choice

NSCC/SA：合作研究：预测冲突的性质 - 战术选择的演化分析

• 批准号: 0904695
• 负责人: Laura Razzolini
• 金额: $ 12.93万
• 依托单位: Virginia Commonwealth University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2009
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2009-09-15 至 2014-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0904695&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: NSCC; SA; Collaborative; Research; Predicting

This award was funded through the Social and Behavioral Dimensions of National Security, Conflict, and Cooperation competition, a joint venture between NSF and the Department of Defense.This research examines the relationship and dependence between the type of conflict or insurgency that exists in a country, and the type of government present in the country from which the conflict originates. An innovative dual approach is proposed to study conflict in which an evolutionary game theoretical model is paired with an experimental analysis in the laboratory. Evolutionary game theory predicts that individuals making the "fittest" choices will survive, multiply, and characterize the population. In the spirit of this approach, rebels in a country will be modeled as agents interacting among themselves and with the rest of the population in the country, repeatedly over time. The rebels' choice of tactic will be the action that performs the best (with the highest fitness) given on the type of political and social environment faced in the country. Therefore, over time, an equilibrium characterized by a particular type of conflict will emerge. Experimental methods will be used to investigate how groups learn to cooperate and coordinate over the best tactic over time, as they interact with each other. The objective will be to determine how the choice of an action or tactic evolves over time under different environments, mimicking different types of regimes and governments. The proposed evolutionary model looks at the evolution of tactical responses in conflict situations as a function of the power of a state. This connects the nature of future -- and, therefore, unobservable -- conflict to the current and observable nature of government, and provides a means for predicting the nature of conflict. This predictability can then be used to develop responses specific to the nature of the expected conflict.

该奖项是通过国家安全、冲突与合作的社会和行为维度竞赛资助的，该竞赛是美国国家科学基金会和国防部的合资项目。这项研究考察了一个国家中存在的冲突或叛乱类型与冲突起源国的政府类型之间的关系和依赖性。提出了一种创新的双重方法来研究冲突，其中进化博弈理论模型与实验室的实验分析相结合。进化博弈论预测，做出“最适者”选择的个体将生存、繁殖并成为群体特征。本着这种方法的精神，一个国家的叛乱分子将被建模为代理人，他们之间以及与该国其他人口之间随着时间的推移反复互动。叛军选择的策略将是针对该国面临的政治和社会环境类型表现最好（具有最高适应性）的行动。 因此，随着时间的推移，将会出现一种以特定类型的冲突为特征的均衡。实验方法将用于研究群体在彼此互动时如何随着时间的推移学会合作和协调最佳策略。目标是确定行动或策略的选择如何在不同环境下随着时间的推移而演变，模仿不同类型的政权和政府。所提出的进化模型将冲突情况下战术反应的演变视为国家权力的函数。 这将未来（因此是不可观察的）冲突的性质与政府当前和可观察的性质联系起来，并提供了预测冲突性质的方法。然后，这种可预测性可用于针对预期冲突的性质制定具体的应对措施。