NSCC/SA: Collaborative Research: Predicting the Nature of Conflict - An Evolutionary Analysis of the Tactical Choice

该奖项由国家安全、冲突和合作竞赛的社会和行为维度资助，该竞赛是国家科学基金会和国防部之间的合资企业。本研究考察了一个国家存在的冲突或叛乱类型与冲突起源国的政府类型之间的关系和依赖关系。本文提出了一种创新的冲突研究方法，即进化博弈理论模型与实验室实验分析相结合。进化博弈论预测，做出“最适合”选择的个体将生存、繁殖，并成为种群的特征。在这种方法的精神下，一个国家的反叛者将被建模为代理人，在他们之间以及与该国其他人口之间反复互动，随着时间的推移。叛军所选择的战术将是在该国所面临的政治和社会环境中表现最好（最适合）的行动。因此，随着时间的推移，一种以特定类型的冲突为特征的平衡将会出现。实验方法将用于研究小组如何学习合作和协调最佳策略，随着时间的推移，因为他们彼此互动。目标将是确定在不同的环境下，模仿不同类型的政权和政府，行动或策略的选择如何随着时间的推移而演变。提出的进化模型将冲突情况下战术反应的演变视为国家权力的函数。这将未来冲突的性质（因此是不可观察的）与当前政府的可观察性质联系起来，并为预测冲突的性质提供了一种方法。这种可预测性可以用来制定针对预期冲突性质的具体响应。

This award was funded through the Social and Behavioral Dimensions of National Security, Conflict, and Cooperation competition, a joint venture between NSF and the Department of Defense.This research examines the relationship and dependence between the type of conflict or insurgency that exists in a country, and the type of government present in the country from which the conflict originates. An innovative dual approach is proposed to study conflict in which an evolutionary game theoretical model is paired with an experimental analysis in the laboratory. Evolutionary game theory predicts that individuals making the "fittest" choices will survive, multiply, and characterize the population. In the spirit of this approach, rebels in a country will be modeled as agents interacting among themselves and with the rest of the population in the country, repeatedly over time. The rebels' choice of tactic will be the action that performs the best (with the highest fitness) given on the type of political and social environment faced in the country. Therefore, over time, an equilibrium characterized by a particular type of conflict will emerge. Experimental methods will be used to investigate how groups learn to cooperate and coordinate over the best tactic over time, as they interact with each other. The objective will be to determine how the choice of an action or tactic evolves over time under different environments, mimicking different types of regimes and governments. The proposed evolutionary model looks at the evolution of tactical responses in conflict situations as a function of the power of a state. This connects the nature of future -- and, therefore, unobservable -- conflict to the current and observable nature of government, and provides a means for predicting the nature of conflict. This predictability can then be used to develop responses specific to the nature of the expected conflict.