Collaborative Research: Emperical Analyses of Competitive Bidding

合作研究：竞争性招标的实证分析

• 批准号: 0003352
• 负责人: Matthew Shum
• 金额: $ 6.14万
• 依托单位: Johns Hopkins University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2000
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2000-08-01 至 2004-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0003352&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Emperical; Analyses; Competitive

This proposed project consists of four empirical studies of competitive bidding behavior in several different auction markets. We develop a sequence of estimation and testing methods for bidding models, focusing on common value environments where the competing bidders are assumed to be differentially and incompletely informed about the value of the object(s) for which they are vying. The second study involves on-going joint research with Professor Phil Haile in the University of Wisconsin.A distinguishing feature of common value auctions, and a recurring theme in the analysis, is the winner's curse, which arises because the winner in an auction will tend to be the bidder who has "overestimated" the object's value the most. Rational bidders will avoid this undesirable outcome by bidding less aggressively. In the first project, we use data from procurement auctions run by the New Jersey Department of Transportation in order to address whether equilibrium bidding becomes more or less aggressive as the number of bidders increases and, therefore, whether attracting additional bidders will lower equilibrium procurement costs.In the second project, we formalize a nonparametric statistical test for the presence of common value elements by exploring the variation in the number of bidders which is present in many auction datasets. This test relies on detecting the effects of the winner's curse, which are present only in common value environments.In the first two projects, a symmetric model of competitive bidding has been assumed. In the third project, we extend our estimation method to allow for ex ante bidder asymmetries and use this method to analyze the auctions used by the United States Department of the Interior since the late 1950s to allocate offshore oil and gas drilling rights in the outer continental shelf of the Gulf of Mexico.While the first three studies focus on bidding in single-object common value auctions, the fourth project is an empirical analysis of double auction markets. Using data from milk quota auctions administered in the province of Ontario, Canada, we investigate, first, whether common values are present in these auctions (arising from producer uncertainty and private information about future milk prices) and, if so, whether the implied winner's curse is leading to more conservative bidding for producers who wish to transact large amounts of quota. Second, we measure the extent of market power possessed by large bidders in this market by developing a structural model of bidding behavior.The results of this research have potentially important policy implications given the prevalence of auctions as allocation mechanisms in practice. Government agencies at the municipal, state, and federal levels routinely procure services through a competitive bidding process. Similarly, across many states, there are plans to allow for competitive demand and supply bidding in deregulated electricity markets via uniform-price double auctions. Finally, agricultural subsidies--of which milk production quotas are one example--are a perennial bone of contention amongst the G7 countries. While the fourth project does not directly address the desirability of these subsidies, it does shed light on the efficiency of a competitive bidding environment in allocating these subsidies. More broadly, the ideas of increasing competition and lower prices are often inseparable in competi-tion and regulatory policy, but this research highlights the possibility that when market participants have imperfect information about their environment, increasing competition might be associated with higher prices, if winner's curse effects are strong enough. In short, there appear to be important efficiency and revenue lessons to be learned from the proposed projects.

这个项目包括四个实证研究的竞争性投标行为在几个不同的拍卖市场。 我们开发了一系列的估计和测试方法的投标模型，专注于共同的价值环境中的竞争投标人被假定为差异和不完全了解的对象（S），他们争夺的价值。 第二项研究涉及与威斯康星大学菲尔·海尔教授正在进行的联合研究。共同价值拍卖的一个显著特征，也是分析中反复出现的主题，是赢家的诅咒，这是因为拍卖中的赢家往往是最“高估”物品价值的投标人。 理性的投标人会通过不那么激进的投标来避免这种不受欢迎的结果。 在第一个项目中，我们使用来自新泽西运输部的采购拍卖数据，以解决随着投标人数量的增加，均衡投标是否变得越来越激进，因此，吸引更多的投标人是否会降低均衡采购成本。我们通过探索许多拍卖数据集中存在的投标人数量的变化，形式化了一个非参数统计检验。这个测试依赖于检测赢家的诅咒，这是目前只在共同的价值environments.In前两个项目，一个对称的竞争性投标模型已被假定的影响。在第三个项目中，我们扩展了我们的估计方法，以考虑到事先竞标者不对称，并使用该方法分析美国内政部自20世纪50年代末以来分配海上石油和天然气开采权的拍卖墨西哥湾外大陆架。前三项研究重点关注单对象共同价值拍卖中的竞标，第四个项目是双边拍卖市场的实证分析。使用数据牛奶配额拍卖管理的安大略省，加拿大，我们调查，首先，是否共同的价值观存在于这些拍卖（产生的生产商的不确定性和私人信息对未来的牛奶价格），如果是这样的话，是否隐含的赢家的诅咒是导致更保守的投标生产商谁希望交易大量的配额。 第二，通过建立投标行为的结构模型，对大型投标者在该市场中的市场势力进行了测算。鉴于拍卖作为分配机制在实践中的普遍性，本研究的结果具有潜在的重要政策意义。 市、州和联邦各级政府机构通常通过竞争性招标程序采购服务。 同样，在许多州，也有计划通过统一价格的双重拍卖，允许在放松管制的电力市场中进行竞争性需求和供应招标。最后，农业补贴--牛奶生产配额就是一个例子--是七国集团之间长期争论的焦点。 虽然第四个项目没有直接讨论这些补贴的可取性，但它确实说明了竞争性投标环境在分配这些补贴方面的效率。更广泛地说，增加竞争和降低价格的想法在竞争和监管政策中往往是不可分割的，但这项研究突出了这样一种可能性，即当市场参与者对其环境的信息不完全时，如果赢家的诅咒效应足够强大，增加竞争可能与更高的价格有关。简而言之，似乎可以从拟议项目中汲取重要的效率和收入经验教训。