Collaborative Research: Strategic Defiance of the U.S. Supreme Court

本研究探讨联邦系统上诉法院对遵循先例原则的偏离。 偏离可以采取微妙的形式，包括区分，限制或避免先例。 研究的目的是确定为什么下级法院违抗（或遵守）上级法院。研究计划是：（1）生成美国最高法院判决的随机样本;（2）跟踪下级法院对这些判决的反应（所有假设的因变量）;（3）收集必要的数据来动画独立变量;（4）实施统计模型，测试理论上关键变量的影响。数据来自各种来源，包括传记材料，NSF支持的数据库，司法判决，和定期指南与PI网站和ICPSR存档的最终数据库。 这里产生的实证研究结果将显示联邦司法设计的具体特征如何推进或延迟垂直遵循先例，揭示，至少部分地，在美国法院的法治的制度基础，并显示由组织的设计和运作创建的各种结构性激励的效果。

This research examines deviation from the principle of stare decisis, or following precedent, by appellate courts in the federal system. Deviation can take subtle forms, including distinguishing, limiting, or avoiding precedents. The goal of the research is to determine why lower courts defy (or comply with) higher courts. The research plan is to: (1) generate a random sample of U.S. Supreme Court decisions; (2) track the responses of lower courts to these decisions (the dependent variable for all the hypotheses); (3) collect data necessary to animate the independent variables; and (4) implement statistical models, testing for the influence of theoretically-critical variables. Data come from a variety of sources, including biographical materials, NSF-supported databases, judicial decisions, and periodical guides-with the final data base archived on the PI web site and with the ICPSR. The empirical findings generated here will show how specific features of the design of the federal judiciary advance or retard vertical stare decisis, revealing, at least partially, the institutional foundations of the rule of law in American courts and showing the effect of various structural incentives created by the design and operation of organizations.