Veto Bargaining and Legislative Outcomes

美国国家政府最显著的特点之一是，分散的机构，特别是国会和总统，分享制定公共政策的权力。例如，行政部门执行立法部门制定的法律；参议院批准或拒绝总统对最高法院的任命。最引人注目的是，总统可以通过行使否决权来阻止国会通过的法案，然后国会可能会试图推翻否决权。虽然三权分立制度是美国公共政策制定的关键要素，但政治学家对其中的许多部分知之甚少。例如，考虑一下总统的否决权：法案被否决后会发生什么？它在什么情况下会死亡？当国会重新通过一项被否决的法案时，国会会对总统做出让步吗？特许权在什么情况下是大的，什么时候是小的？更广泛地说，是什么原因导致一项法案被否决？尽管否决是罕见的事件，但许多都涉及到当时的重大立法问题。因此，这些问题的答案将有助于我们理解美国分权制度的一个重要方面。不幸的是，尽管政治学家对否决权的频率相当了解，但他们并不知道上述问题的答案。这有两个原因。首先，这些问题从一个不同寻常的角度谈到了否决权。他们认为，单一的否决权并不是一个孤立的事件，而只是国会和总统之间讨价还价过程的一个阶段。他们对否决权采取了一种循序渐进的讨价还价方式。大多数政治学家倾向于将每一次否决都视为单独的事件，模糊了政府两个部门之间的讨价还价动态。其次，回答这些问题需要单个被否决法案的数据，甚至需要所有法案的随机样本，而不仅仅是每个时间段的否决总数。这些类型的数据从未被收集过，收集它们的过程既繁琐又耗时。本研究项目针对这两个问题展开研究。首先，调查人员从顺序讨价还价的角度审查否决权。其次，他们收集个人账单的数据。研究人员将收集约150项具有否决权的法案的数据，包括400项被否决法案的随机样本(约占1946年以来所有否决法案的55%)，以及约400项一般法案的随机样本；总共约900项法案(允许样本之间存在一些重叠)。通过将理论和数据相结合，调查人员将大大加强我们对否决权程序及其在政策制定中所起作用的理解。

One of the most distinguishing features of the American national government is the way separated institutions, especially Congress and president, share the power to make public policy. For example, the executive branch implements the laws the legislative branch creates; the Senate approves or rejects the president's appointments to the Supreme Court. Most striking, the president can block a bill passed by Congress by exercising the veto power and Congress may then attempt to override the veto. Although the separated powers system is a critical element of public policy making in the United States, many parts of it are only poorly understood by political scientists. For example, consider the presidential veto: what happens to a bill after it is vetoed? Under what circumstances does it die? When Congress repasses a vetoed bill, does Congress make concessions to the president? Under what circumstances are the concessions large, and when are they small? More broadly, what causes a bill to be vetoed? Although vetoes are rare events, many involve the great legislative issues of the day. So, answers to these questions would help us understand an important aspect of the American system of separated powers. Unfortunately, although political scientists know quite a lot about the frequency of vetoes, they do not know the answers to the above questions. Thre are two reasons for this. First, these questions approach vetoes from an unusual perspective. They assume a single veto is not an isolated event but just one stage in a bargaining process between Congress and president. They assume a sequential bargaining approach to the veto. Most political scientists have tended to approach each veto as a separate event, obscuring the bargaining dynamic between the two branches of government. Second, answering these questions requires data on individual vetoed bills, or even a random sample of all bills, rather than simply the aggregate number of vetoes per time period. These types of data have never been collected, and the process of collecting them is tedious and time consuming. This research project targets both of these problems. First, the investigators examine vetoes from a sequential bargaining perspective. Second, they collect data on individual bills. The researchers will collect data on about one hundred fifty bills in veto "chains" (bills vetoed and repassed), a random sample of four hundred vetoed bills (about fifty five per cent of all vetoes since 1946), and a random sample of about four hundred general bills; a total of about nine hundred bills (allowing for some overlap among the samples). By combining theory and data, the investigators will substantially enhance our understanding of the veto process and the role it plays in policy formulation.