Veto Bargaining and Legislative Outcomes

否决权谈判和立法结果

• 批准号: 9223396
• 负责人: Charles Cameron
• 金额: $ 5万
• 依托单位: Columbia University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1993
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1993-02-01 至 1994-09-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9223396&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Veto; Bargaining; Legislative; Outcomes

One of the most distinguishing features of the American national government is the way separated institutions, especially Congress and president, share the power to make public policy. For example, the executive branch implements the laws the legislative branch creates; the Senate approves or rejects the president's appointments to the Supreme Court. Most striking, the president can block a bill passed by Congress by exercising the veto power and Congress may then attempt to override the veto. Although the separated powers system is a critical element of public policy making in the United States, many parts of it are only poorly understood by political scientists. For example, consider the presidential veto: what happens to a bill after it is vetoed? Under what circumstances does it die? When Congress repasses a vetoed bill, does Congress make concessions to the president? Under what circumstances are the concessions large, and when are they small? More broadly, what causes a bill to be vetoed? Although vetoes are rare events, many involve the great legislative issues of the day. So, answers to these questions would help us understand an important aspect of the American system of separated powers. Unfortunately, although political scientists know quite a lot about the frequency of vetoes, they do not know the answers to the above questions. Thre are two reasons for this. First, these questions approach vetoes from an unusual perspective. They assume a single veto is not an isolated event but just one stage in a bargaining process between Congress and president. They assume a sequential bargaining approach to the veto. Most political scientists have tended to approach each veto as a separate event, obscuring the bargaining dynamic between the two branches of government. Second, answering these questions requires data on individual vetoed bills, or even a random sample of all bills, rather than simply the aggregate number of vetoes per time period. These types of data have never been collected, and the process of collecting them is tedious and time consuming. This research project targets both of these problems. First, the investigators examine vetoes from a sequential bargaining perspective. Second, they collect data on individual bills. The researchers will collect data on about one hundred fifty bills in veto "chains" (bills vetoed and repassed), a random sample of four hundred vetoed bills (about fifty five per cent of all vetoes since 1946), and a random sample of about four hundred general bills; a total of about nine hundred bills (allowing for some overlap among the samples). By combining theory and data, the investigators will substantially enhance our understanding of the veto process and the role it plays in policy formulation.

美国国民最显著的特征之一 政府是分离机构，特别是国会 和总统分享制定公共政策的权力 比如说， 行政分支执行法律立法分支 参议院批准或拒绝总统的 任命为最高法院法官。 最引人注目的是，总统 可以通过行使否决权来阻止国会通过的法案 然后国会可能会试图推翻否决。 虽然分权制度是一个关键因素， 在美国的公共政策制定中，许多部分都是 政治学家对此知之甚少。 比如说， 考虑总统否决权：法案通过后会发生什么？ 否决了吗 在什么情况下会死亡？ 当国会 重新通过一项被否决的法案，国会是否会对 总统？ 在什么情况下让步较大， 什么时候小？ 更广泛地说，是什么导致一项法案 否决了吗 虽然否决是罕见的事件，许多涉及伟大的 日的立法问题。 这些问题的答案 能帮助我们理解美国体制的一个重要方面 分离的权力。 不幸的是，尽管政治科学家们对 否决权的频率，他们不知道以上的答案 问题. 有两个原因。 首先，这些问题 从一个不寻常的角度来处理否决权。 他们假设一个 否决权不是一个孤立的事件，而只是讨价还价的一个阶段 国会和总统之间的关系。 他们假设一个连续的 对否决权的讨价还价。 大多数政治学家 倾向于将每一次否决作为一个单独的事件来处理， 政府两个部门之间的讨价还价。 第二、 回答这些问题需要关于个别被否决法案的数据， 甚至是所有账单的随机样本，而不仅仅是 每个时期的否决总数。 这些类型的数据 从来没有被收集过，收集它们的过程是 繁琐且耗时。 本研究项目针对这两个问题。 一是 调查人员从一个连续的谈判中审查否决权 perspective. 其次，他们收集个人账单的数据。 的 研究人员将收集大约150张钞票的数据， 否决权“链”（否决和重新通过的法案），随机抽样四个 100项被否决的法案（约占自2005年以来所有否决案的55%） 1946年），以及约四百张普通票据的随机样本; 共约900条法案（允许一些重叠之间 样品）。 通过结合理论和数据，研究人员将 大幅度提高我们对否决权进程和 在政策制定中发挥作用。