The State, the Family and Redistribution

本研究项目的目标是对婚姻减少的政治后果进行经济分析。可以说，家庭近代史上最重要的发展是婚姻的减少，以及大多数西方国家单身人口比例的上升。在美国，1964年至1996年期间，目前已婚的比例下降了四分之一（从84%下降到58%），而目前离婚的比例增加了三倍（从3%上升到10%）。婚姻是个人之间资源再分配的最重要制度之一，再分配偏好是许多政治选择的核心，因此，研究婚姻的减少如何影响政治结果是有意义的。 我们的研究开发了一个理论模型，该模型表明，在对基本收入分配，婚姻模式和家庭内部收入分配的合理假设下，婚姻程度的变化会改变收入分配，从而改变政治结果。我们使用该模型来确定增加非婚姻如何影响（一）男性和女性的政治偏好的分歧，所谓的性别差距;（二）总需求的再分配;（三）人口和经济状况的摇摆选民;（四）已婚和未婚选民之间的偏好分歧，所谓的婚姻差距。我们分析的一个关键假设是，一般来说，女性嫁给比自己富有的男性。因此，相对于单身，婚姻使男人更穷，女人更富。这表明，婚姻的减少可以解释政治性别差距。对再分配的总体需求的变化不太明显，因为每有一个女人向左转，就有一个男人向右转。我们表明，如果非婚姻首先在穷人中流行，然后“悄悄地”增加收入分配，那么最初的非婚姻减少了对再分配的支持，因为男性以前左倾选民转向支持右翼（参见。里根民主党人）。随着不结婚现象在相对富裕群体中的增加，这一群体中的妇女将开始投票，而这与她们的社会经济状况不一致（参见《妇女权利公约》）。足球妈妈）。这一发现与婚姻差距相一致，即相对于未婚者，已婚者在更大程度上支持这项权利。我们使用美国的数据来验证我们的假设。首先，使用纵向数据的青年父母社会化调查（1973年和1982年波），我们调查是否实现个人的婚姻状况的变化影响他/她的政治偏好在假设的方向。其次，我们研究如何在美国国家的“婚姻市场”在1964年至1996年期间的变化影响了男性和女性的政治偏好。我们通过两种方式来衡量州婚姻市场的变化：第一，通过一个州目前离婚的人数（根据年度当前人口调查计算）;第二，通过州离婚法的变化。我们关于个人政治偏好的信息来自全国选举调查研究（1964-96）。

The goal of this research project is to provide an economic analysis of the political ramifications of the decline in marriage. Arguably, the most significant development in the recent history of the family is the decline in marriage, and the rise in the proportion of single individuals in most Western countries. In the US, between 1964 and 1996, the proportion of currently married individuals fell by a quarter (from 84 to 58 percent) while the fraction currently divorced increased threefold (from 3 to 10 percent). In so far as marriage is one of the most important institutions for resource redistribution between individuals, and redistributive preferences are central to many political choices it is relevant to examine how the decline in marriage has affected political outcomes. Our research develops a theoretical model which demonstrates that under reasonable assumptions on the underlying income distributions, marriage patterns and income-sharing within households, changes in the extent of marriage alter the income distribution and thereby political outcomes. We use the model to identify how increased non-marriage affects (i) the divergence of male and female political preferences, the so called gender gap; (ii) the aggregate demand for redistribution; (iii) the demographic and economic profile of swing voters; and (iv) the divergence in preferences between married and not married voters, the so called marriage gap. A key assumption underlying our analysis is that in general women marry men who are richer then themselves. Hence, relative to being single, marriage makes men poorer and women richer. This suggests that the decline in marriage could explain the political gender gap. The change in the overall demand for redistribution is less clear since for each woman who turns left, a man turns right. We show that if non-marriage is first prevalent amongst poor individuals, and then ``creeps up'' the income distribution, then initially non-marriage reduces the support for redistribution as male erstwhile left-leaning voters shift to supporting the right (cf. Reagan Democrats). As non-marriage increases amongst relatively well off groups, women in this group will start to vote at variance with their socio-economic profile (cf. Soccer moms). This finding is consistent with the marriage gap, i.e. that, relative to unmarried individuals, married individuals support the right to a greater extent. We use US data to test our hypotheses. First, using longitudinal data from the Youth-Parent Socialization survey (1973 and 1982 waves) we investigate whether realized changes in an individual's marital status affect his/her political preferences in the hypothesized direction. Second, we examine how changes in a US state's ``marriage market'' over the period 1964-96 have affected male and female political preferences. We measure changes in the state marriage market in two ways: first, by the stock of currently divorced individuals in a state (computed from the annual Current Population Survey); and second, by state divorce law changes. Our information about individual political preferences in from the National Election Survey studies (1964-96).