The Effects of Antitrust Laws on Cartel Pricing

反垄断法对卡特尔定价的影响

• 批准号: 0209486
• 负责人: Joseph Harrington
• 金额: $ 21.63万
• 依托单位: Johns Hopkins University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2002
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2002-09-01 至 2006-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0209486&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Effects; Antitrust; Laws; Cartel; Pricing

This research project is designed to increase our understanding of when price-fixing cartels form and how cartels price. The primary modeling innovation is to take account of a key goal of any illegal cartel - to avoid the appearance that there is a cartel. Existing models of collusion will be adapted by introducing a detection technology - whereby the level of prices and the change in prices influence the likelihood of creating suspicions - and antitrust penalties in the form of damages and fines. The analysis is then substantively dynamic in that past prices influence detection and also the level of penalties (as damages are calculated using the prices set by the cartel). Deploying dynamic programming and using both analytical and numerical methods, the properties of cartel pricing dynamics will be characterized. Results will be developed showing how cartel formation and the cartel price path depend on the form of antitrust policy, the method of detection, and industry traits such as market structure, cost and demand variability, demand seasonality, and buyer concentration.As recent cases such as lysine, graphite electrodes, fine arts auction houses, and vitamins exemplify, price-fixing remains a serious antitrust problem. The ultimate implications of this project are in providing the necessary knowledge to more effectively deter the formation of cartels and, in the event they do form, to better detect their presence. Thus far, the antitrust authorities have been largely reactive with respect to price-fixing; responding to customer complaints, internal whistleblowers, and the like. By identifying the properties of cartel pricing dynamics - what to look for - this project will help lay the foundation for a more pro-active antitrust policy that seeks to investigate industries which may be colluding. Furthermore, a more developed understanding of how antitrust policy influences the profitability of collusion will provide the basis for new innovative policies that are more effective at deterring the formation of cartels.

该研究项目旨在增加我们对定价卡特尔何时形成以及卡特尔如何定价的了解。主要的建模创新是考虑到任何非法卡特尔的一个关键目标-避免出现卡特尔。现有的串通模式将加以调整，采用一种检测技术-价格水平和价格变化影响产生怀疑的可能性-并采用损害赔偿和罚款形式的反托拉斯处罚。这种分析实质上是动态的，因为过去的价格影响到侦查，也影响到处罚的程度（因为损害是使用卡特尔确定的价格计算的）。部署动态规划，并使用分析和数值方法，卡特尔定价动态特性的特点。结果将显示如何卡特尔的形成和卡特尔的价格路径取决于反垄断政策的形式，检测的方法，和行业特点，如市场结构，成本和需求的变化，需求的季节性，和买方concentration.As最近的情况下，如赖氨酸，石墨电极，美术拍卖行，维生素的，价格固定仍然是一个严重的反垄断问题。这一项目的最终影响是提供必要的知识，以便更有效地阻止卡特尔的形成，并在卡特尔确实形成的情况下更好地发现其存在。到目前为止，反垄断当局在价格操纵方面基本上是被动的;对客户投诉、内部举报人等作出反应。通过确定卡特尔定价动态的特性-寻找什么-该项目将有助于为更积极主动的反垄断政策奠定基础，该政策旨在调查可能存在串通的行业。此外，更深入地了解反托拉斯政策如何影响共谋的利润，将为更有效地阻止卡特尔形成的新的创新政策提供基础。