Estimating the Settlement Process in Environmental Litigation: A Game-theoretic Approach

环境诉讼和解过程的估算：博弈论方法

• 批准号: 0214195
• 负责人: Andrew Kleit
• 金额: $ 6万
• 依托单位: Pennsylvania State Univ University Park
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2002
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2002-08-01 至 2004-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0214195&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Estimating; Settlement; Process; Environmental; Litigation

Enforcement of environmental regulations takes three forms: inspection, detection, and finally the accessing of penalties. While the first two aspects have been extensively studied, the final stage has received little attention. Accessing penalties for violations of environmental statutes and regulations is a crucial part of regulatory policy. Most penalty assessment at the federal level is done through litigation; most of that litigation results in a mutually agreed-upon settlement between the Department of Justice (acting at the behest of the Environmental Protection Agency) and the defendant in the case. This research explores a simple game-theoretic model of the process that leads to settlement in civil environmental litigation. The researchers then test an econometrically tractable model of the attributes of the settlement process. Understanding the settlement process in civil environmental litigation is particularly important. The litigation process has been extensively studied in civil matters between private parties, and in criminal litigation where one branch of the government acts as prosecutor and another as judge. In contrast, very little has been done on civil environmental actions, which share the charter of criminal prosecutions in that the government is the plaintiff, but where the possibility of incarceration is remote. There are important reasons to believe that the government behaves differently when it is a plaintiff in civil litigation. First, the government has different incentives than do private litigants. Because the government is a repeat player in the courts it is likely to be more concerned with its reputation than most private litigants. Second, the government is interested not only in the money received from the litigation but also in the political return. This research advances the relevant literature in three separate ways. First, it represents an investigation into an area of environmental policy that has not yet been previously studied. Second, the project fills the void relating to empirical work on bargaining problems. Finally, this project investigates the differences in how the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Justice view the enforcement of cases against violators of the environmental laws.

环境法规的执行有三种形式：检查、检测，最后是处罚。虽然前两个方面已得到广泛研究，但最后一个阶段很少受到注意。对违反环境法规和条例的行为进行严厉处罚是监管政策的重要组成部分。联邦一级的大多数处罚评估是通过诉讼进行的;大多数诉讼的结果是司法部（在环境保护局的要求下行事）和案件被告之间达成双方同意的和解。本研究探讨了一个简单的博弈论模型的过程中，导致解决民事环境诉讼。然后，研究人员测试了一个易于处理的结算过程属性的计量经济模型。了解民事环境诉讼中的和解程序尤为重要。诉讼程序在私人当事人之间的民事事项中，以及在政府的一个分支担任检察官而另一个分支担任法官的刑事诉讼中得到了广泛的研究。相比之下，在民事环境诉讼方面做得很少，这类诉讼与刑事诉讼一样，政府是原告，但监禁的可能性很小。有重要的理由相信，当政府是民事诉讼的原告时，它的行为会有所不同。首先，政府与私人诉讼当事人有不同的动机。由于政府是法庭上的常客，它可能比大多数私人诉讼当事人更关心自己的声誉。第二，政府不仅对从诉讼中获得的金钱感兴趣，而且对政治回报感兴趣。本研究以三种不同的方式推进相关文献。首先，它代表了对以前尚未研究过的环境政策领域的调查。第二，该项目填补了与讨价还价问题的实证工作有关的空白。最后，本研究探讨环境保护署与司法部对于环境违法案件执行的不同看法。