Axiomatic and Strategic Analysis of Allocation: Theory and Applications

分配的公理和战略分析：理论与应用

• 批准号: 0214691
• 负责人: William Thomson
• 金额: $ 21.99万
• 依托单位: University of Rochester
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2002
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2002-09-15 至 2005-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0214691&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Axiomatic; Strategic; Analysis; Allocation; Theory

The aim of this project is the identification and the construction of allocation rules enjoying properties of fairness and non-manipulability. Central to the study are the following: all agents benefit from an enlargement of resources held in common, more generally of opportunities open to society as a whole; each agent benefits from an enlargement of his endowment, or of his productivity; the welfare of all agents is affected in the same direction by changes in the environment over which no one in particular has control (they all gain or they all lose as a result of the change); the arrival of additional agents, when it is socially costly, implies a welfare loss for all agents initially present; the desirability of an allocation is not affected by the departure of some agents with their assignments; finally, if for two economies having a group of agents in common, two allocations are chosen at which these agents receive the same aggregate resource, then each of them individually receives the same thing in both. The strategic component of the program focuses on the requirement that agents should never gain by misrepresenting the information they control, and it includes related properties of implementability in the face of incomplete information.The possible applications of our allocation problem are the following: dividing a resource as a function of claims agents have on it (equivalently, assessing tax liabilities as a function of individual resources agents control); allocating the cost of a public facility when agents' needs are nested and when the facility has to be built so as to accommodate the agents with the greatest need (exemplified by the so-called ``airport" problem); allocating the cost of a public facility when agents' needs overlap, such as when they are distributed in space (businesses along a road) or time (overlapping generations); allocating the cost of a network, such as a road network or an electrical network; allocating a service over time (sequencing and scheduling); allocating private goods in standard economies.

本课题的目的是识别和构造具有公平性和不可操纵性的分配规则。研究的核心是：所有代理人都受益于共同拥有的资源的扩大，更广泛地说，是对整个社会开放的机会的扩大；每个代理人从他的天赋或他的生产力的扩大中受益；所有代理人的福利受到没有人特别控制的环境变化的同一方向的影响(他们都因这种变化而获得或都失去)；当社会代价高昂时，其他代理人的到来意味着最初在场的所有代理人的福利损失；分配的可取性不受一些代理人及其任务的离开的影响；最后，如果对于拥有一组共同代理人的两个经济体，选择两个分配，在这两个分配处，这些代理人获得相同的总资源，那么他们中的每个人在两者中分别获得相同的东西。该计划的战略部分集中于这样一个要求，即代理人永远不应该通过歪曲他们控制的信息而获得利益，它包括在不完全信息面前的可实施性的相关性质。我们的分配问题的可能应用如下：将资源作为代理人对其的索赔的函数来划分(相当于，作为代理人控制的单个资源的函数来评估纳税义务)；当代理人的需求嵌套时以及当公共设施必须建造以容纳最需要的代理人时(以所谓的‘机场’问题为例)，分配公共设施的成本；当代理人的需求重叠时，例如在空间上(沿路的企业)或时间上(世代重叠)，分配公共设施的成本；分配网络的成本，如道路网络或电力网络；随时间分配服务(排序和调度)；在标准经济中分配私人物品。