Axiomatic and Strategic Analysis of Allocation: Theory and Applications

本计画的目标是辨识与建构具有公平性与不可操作性的分配规则。这项研究的核心是：所有行动者都从共同拥有的资源的扩大中受益，更普遍地说，从向整个社会开放的机会的扩大中受益;每个行动者都从他的禀赋或他的生产力的扩大中受益;所有行动者的福利都受到环境变化的影响，而环境的变化没有一个人能够控制（由于变化，他们都获益或都受损）;当社会代价高昂时，新的代理人的到来意味着最初在场的所有代理人的福利损失;分配的可取性不受某些代理人带着任务离开的影响;最后，如果两个经济体有一组共同的行为主体，选择两种分配方式，使这些行为主体获得相同的总资源，那么它们中的每一个在这两种分配方式中都单独获得相同的东西。该计划的战略组成部分侧重于要求代理人不应该通过歪曲他们控制的信息来获得，它包括面对不完整信息的可执行性的相关属性。我们的分配问题的可能应用如下：根据代理对资源的声明来划分资源（同样，根据个别资源代理人的控制评估税务负债）;当代理人的需求是嵌套的，并且当必须建造设施以容纳代理人时，分配公共设施的成本，最需要（以所谓的"机场”问题为例）;当代理人的需求重叠时，例如当它们在空间上分布时，分配公共设施的成本（沿着的生意）或时间（世代重叠）;分配网络的成本，如道路网络或电力网络;随时间分配服务（排序和调度）;在标准经济中分配私人物品。

The aim of this project is the identification and the construction of allocation rules enjoying properties of fairness and non-manipulability. Central to the study are the following: all agents benefit from an enlargement of resources held in common, more generally of opportunities open to society as a whole; each agent benefits from an enlargement of his endowment, or of his productivity; the welfare of all agents is affected in the same direction by changes in the environment over which no one in particular has control (they all gain or they all lose as a result of the change); the arrival of additional agents, when it is socially costly, implies a welfare loss for all agents initially present; the desirability of an allocation is not affected by the departure of some agents with their assignments; finally, if for two economies having a group of agents in common, two allocations are chosen at which these agents receive the same aggregate resource, then each of them individually receives the same thing in both. The strategic component of the program focuses on the requirement that agents should never gain by misrepresenting the information they control, and it includes related properties of implementability in the face of incomplete information.The possible applications of our allocation problem are the following: dividing a resource as a function of claims agents have on it (equivalently, assessing tax liabilities as a function of individual resources agents control); allocating the cost of a public facility when agents' needs are nested and when the facility has to be built so as to accommodate the agents with the greatest need (exemplified by the so-called ``airport" problem); allocating the cost of a public facility when agents' needs overlap, such as when they are distributed in space (businesses along a road) or time (overlapping generations); allocating the cost of a network, such as a road network or an electrical network; allocating a service over time (sequencing and scheduling); allocating private goods in standard economies.