Axiomatic and Strategic Analysis of Resource Allocation

该项目支持指导研究生和研究资源分配的公理和战略分析。 研究者是经济学这一子领域的领导者。 他的研究目标是严格地从基本公理中推导出社会选择的规则，这些规则具有理想的规范性和战略性。 所考虑的选择和偏好是标准经济问题中遇到的类型。 本课题的研究是以具体的经济问题为出发点的，因此具有相当的现实意义。本课题旨在探讨不受代理人之间借贷行为影响的公平分配规则。 防借性说，代理人永远不应该通过借用资源来获利。 该项目还制定了通过撤回（不出现以换取回扣），标准问题和公平分配，或通过预先交付，或通过合并捐赠，并通过分裂捐赠的操纵免疫的想法。 这些形式的战略行为以前没有被系统地研究过。 对这些数据的分析将需要新的技术，特别是因为这些数据无法仅根据当地信息加以核实。 更广泛的影响：代理人只要有可能就会采取战略性的行为，并且了解如何阻止他们这样做必须成为分配规则设计的一部分。 通过歪曲代理人控制的资源进行操纵是他们试图获得他们喜欢的结果的一种重要方式。 这些公平分配规则有许多应用。 这个项目研究这些属性在分配，调度，分配私人物品，可分割的或不可分割的，当货币补偿是可能的，当他们不;分配一个好的偏好是单峰;和选择公共物品。 在每一种情况下，研究战略目标与效率和基本分配要求的兼容性。

This project supports the mentoring of graduate students and research in the axiomatic and strategic analysis of resource allocation. The investigator is the leader in this subfield of economics. The goal of his research is to rigorously derive from fundamental axioms rules of social choice that have desirable normative and strategic properties. The alternatives and preferences considered are the kinds encountered in standard economic problems. The research is motivated by concrete economic problems and as a consequence can have considerable practical significance.This project explores rules of fair division that can not be manipulated by borrowing and lending among the agents. Borrowing-proofness says that agents should never gain by borrowing resources. The project also formulates the ideas of immunity to manipulation through withdrawal (not showing up in exchange for a kickback), for standard problems and for fair division, or through pre-delivery, or through merging endowments, and through splitting endowments. These forms of strategic behavior have not been systematically studied before. Their analysis will require new techniques, especially because they cannot be verified on the basis of local information only. Thus, marginal analysis cannot be invoked.Broader Impacts: Agents behave strategically whenever they can, and understanding how they can be prevented from doing so has to be part of the design of allocation rules. Manipulation through misrepresenting the resources agents control is an important way in which they attempt to obtain outcomes they prefer. There are many applications of these fair allocation rules. This project studies these properties in queueing, scheduling, allocating private goods, divisible or not, when monetary compensations are possible or when they are not; allocating a good when preferences are single-peaked; and choosing public goods. In each case, the compatibility of the strategic objective with efficiency and basic distributional requirements are studied.