Axiomatic and Strategic Analysis of Resource Allocation

资源配置的公理和战略分析

• 批准号: 0721107
• 负责人: William Thomson
• 金额: $ 9.7万
• 依托单位: University of Rochester
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2007
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2007-08-15 至 2011-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0721107&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Axiomatic; Strategic; Analysis; Resource; Allocation

This project supports the mentoring of graduate students and research in the axiomatic and strategic analysis of resource allocation. The investigator is the leader in this subfield of economics. The goal of his research is to rigorously derive from fundamental axioms rules of social choice that have desirable normative and strategic properties. The alternatives and preferences considered are the kinds encountered in standard economic problems. The research is motivated by concrete economic problems and as a consequence can have considerable practical significance.This project explores rules of fair division that can not be manipulated by borrowing and lending among the agents. Borrowing-proofness says that agents should never gain by borrowing resources. The project also formulates the ideas of immunity to manipulation through withdrawal (not showing up in exchange for a kickback), for standard problems and for fair division, or through pre-delivery, or through merging endowments, and through splitting endowments. These forms of strategic behavior have not been systematically studied before. Their analysis will require new techniques, especially because they cannot be verified on the basis of local information only. Thus, marginal analysis cannot be invoked.Broader Impacts: Agents behave strategically whenever they can, and understanding how they can be prevented from doing so has to be part of the design of allocation rules. Manipulation through misrepresenting the resources agents control is an important way in which they attempt to obtain outcomes they prefer. There are many applications of these fair allocation rules. This project studies these properties in queueing, scheduling, allocating private goods, divisible or not, when monetary compensations are possible or when they are not; allocating a good when preferences are single-peaked; and choosing public goods. In each case, the compatibility of the strategic objective with efficiency and basic distributional requirements are studied.

该项目支持研究生的指导和资源分配的公理和战略分析的研究。 研究者是这个经济学子领域的领导者。 他的研究目标是严格从社会选择的基本公理中推导出具有理想的规范和战略属性的规则。 所考虑的替代方案和偏好是标准经济问题中遇到的类型。 这项研究的动机是具体的经济问题，因此具有相当大的现实意义。本项目探讨了代理人之间不能通过借贷来操纵的公平分配规则。 防借用性是指代理人永远不应该通过借用资源来获利。 该项目还提出了通过提款（不出现以换取回扣）、标准问题和公平分配、或通过预交付、或通过合并捐赠和通过分割捐赠来免受操纵的想法。 这些形式的战略行为以前从未被系统地研究过。 他们的分析将需要新技术，特别是因为它们无法仅根据本地信息进行验证。 因此，不能调用边际分析。 更广泛的影响：代理尽可能地采取战略行动，并且了解如何防止他们这样做必须成为分配规则设计的一部分。 通过歪曲代理控制的资源进行操纵是他们试图获得他们喜欢的结果的重要方式。 这些公平分配规则有很多应用。 该项目研究了这些在排队、调度、分配私人物品（可分割与否）、货币补偿可能或不可能的情况下的属性；当偏好为单峰时分配商品；以及选择公共物品。 在每种情况下，都研究了战略目标与效率和基本分配要求的兼容性。