CAREER: Mechanism Design for Resource-Bounded Agents: Indirect Revelation and Strategic Approximations

跨开放网络的分布式计算系统与经济共享许多特征，单个计算设备在很大程度上是自治的，代表多个用户（包括个人和企业）的自身利益。一个基本的挑战是设计有用的机制来解决这些开放系统中的分布式问题，尽管个体代理具有自身利益。这项工作提出了一个基础研究的问题，出现在计算有界代理的计算机制设计。一个组成部分提出了间接启示机制的研究，在这种机制中，代理人能够参与而不计算或透露有关其偏好或局部约束的完整信息。另一个组成部分提出了提供近似博弈论期望的机制的研究，如策略证明。在这两种情况下，研究议程都需要新的理论和新的计算方法，在系统中建设性地利用理论。这项工作的广泛影响保证了博弈论和经济方法在计算系统中的持续整合，其应用范围从电子市场中的自动中介到开放系统中设备之间的自动协商。一个重要的组成部分涉及创新的研究生和本科课程的发展，以帮助教育学生在计算机科学和经济学之间的接口问题。

Systems with distributed computation across open networks share many characteristics with economies, with individual computational devices that are largely autonomous and represent the self-interest of multiple users, including both individuals and businesses. A fundamental challenge is to design useful mechanisms to solve distributed problems in these open systems despite the self-interest of individual agents. This work proposes a foundational study into the issues that arise in computational mechanism design with computationally-bounded agents. One component proposes the study of indirect revelation mechanisms, in which agents are able to participate without computing, or revealing, complete information about their preferences or local constraints. Another component proposes the study of mechanisms that provide approximations to game-theoretic desiderata, such as strategy proofness. In both cases, the research agenda calls both for new theories and for new computational methods, that leverage the theory constructively within systems. The broader impact of the work promises the continued integration of game-theoretic and economic methods into computational systems, with applications ranging from automated mediation in e-marketplaces, to automated negotiation between devices in open systems. An important component involves the development of innovative graduate and undergraduate curricula, to help to educate students about problems at the interface between computer science and economics.