CAREER: The Organization and Reputation of Firms
CAREER: The Organization and Reputation of Firms
批准号:
0239844
负责人:
Steven Tadelis
金额:
$40.0万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Continuing Grant
财政年份:
2003
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2003-03-01 至 2005-09-30
中文摘要
现代经济呈现出广泛多样的组织形式:从小型业主经营的公司到业主拥有的合伙企业、合作社、非营利组织,最后是投资者拥有的公司。一个企业拥有的两项重要资产是它的组织形式和功能,以及它的市场声誉。经济学中的一个基本问题是理解导致这些不同组织形式的力量,以及是什么决定了这两种无形资产的价值。本课题提出以组织形态和企业声誉为中心,研究组织经济学的经济学框架。建议的第一部分研究伙伴关系及其在专业服务中的作用。该方法强调了有利于形成合伙关系的三个要素:(1)人力资本在生产中的重要性;(2)客户缺乏信息,这可能导致他们担心他们将获得的服务质量;(3)合伙关系和公司在雇用和选择高级员工方面的不同激励。开发的理论模型将解释为什么伙伴关系是典型的专业服务,其中人力资本是生产的主要投入和所提供的服务的性质可能是相当困难的消费者准确评估,但很少观察到在制造业,技术,或低技能的服务行业。 与这一项目相关的是一系列丰富的政策问题,涉及法律和监管政策应适应哪些组织形式。没有一个统一的框架来理解合伙企业和公司之间的区别,也没有一个统一的框架来理解导致这种特殊组织形式的专业服务的具体经济学。本课题将为更广泛地研究专业服务业的市场结构、研究这些行业的法律的和监管问题、解释有关专业组织结构的经验证据提供一个起点。第二部分研究企业声誉的经济价值,以及企业家行为和企业声誉的动态是如何联系在一起的。基于我之前对公司声誉的研究,我建议使用结合所有权变化和声誉动态的餐馆数据,对我的理论工作对市场的明确预测进行实证检验。该提案还概述了一些新的理论思想,这些思想将导致更丰富的经验预测,并将企业声誉与动态创业选择联系起来。特别是,“企业家精神”可能与专门从事创建新企业的特定类型的人有关,然后将成功的企业传给其他专门从事维持现有企业的人。了解企业声誉的动态之间的联系,以及它对企业创建和营业额的影响,可能有助于我们理解创业活动的动态。此外,该框架还可能对所有权周转方面的信息披露产生一些政策影响。
英文摘要
Modern economies exhibit a broad diversity of organizational forms: from small owner-operated firms to employee-owned partnerships, cooperatives, non-profits, and finally investor-owned corporations. Two important assets that a firm has are its organizational form and function, and its market reputation. A fundamental problem in economics is to understand both the forces that lead to these different forms of organization and what determines the value of these two intangible assets. This project proposes an economic framework for studying the economics of organizations, with focus on organizational form and firm reputation. The first part of the proposal studies partnerships and their role in the professional services. The approach highlights three ingredients that favor the formation of partnerships: (1) the importance of human capital in production; (2) a lack of information on the part of clients that leads them potentially to be concerned about the quality of the service they will obtain; and (3) the differing incentives of partnerships and corporations in the hiring and selection of senior employees. The theoretical model developed will explain why partnerships are typical in the professional services, where human capital is primary input to production and the nature of the service provided may be quite difficult for consumers to accurately assess, but rarely observed in manufacturing, technology, or lower-skill service industries. Associated with this project is a rich set of policy questions concerning which forms of organization the law and regulatory policy should accommodate. There is no single coherent framework for understanding the differences between partnerships and corporations, or for understanding the specific economics of professional services that have led to this particular form of organization. This project will offer a starting point for a broader investigation of market structure in the professional services, for examining legal and regulatory issues in these industries, and for interpreting empirical evidence about the structure of professional organizations.The second part of the proposal investigates the economic value of a firm's reputation, and how the dynamics of entrepreneurial behavior and firm reputation are linked. Building heavily on the insights I have gained from my previous work on firm reputation, I propose to empirically test the clear predictions of my theoretical work on the market for names using data on restaurants that combines both changes in ownership and reputation dynamics. The proposal also outlines some new theoretical ideas that would lead to a richer set of empirical predictions, and relate firm reputation to dynamic entrepreneurial choices. In particular, the "entrepreneurial spirit" may be related to particular types of people who specialize in creating new businesses, and who then pass on the successful ones to other people who specialize in maintaining ongoing enterprises. Understanding the link between the dynamics of a firm's reputation, and its effect on the creation and turnover of businesses, may help us understand the dynamics of entrepreneurial activity. Furthermore, the framework may offer some policy implications regarding the disclosure of information with respect to ownership turnover.
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会议论文
Bilateral Bargaining through the Lens of Big Data
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批准号:1629060
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$40.3万
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财政年份:2016
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负责人:Steven Tadelis
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依托单位:
CAREER: The Organization and Reputation of Firms
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批准号:0542344
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项目类别:Continuing Grant
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资助金额:$27.68万
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财政年份:2005
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负责人:Steven Tadelis
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依托单位:
Market Monitoring and Organizational Form
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批准号:0214555
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$6.48万
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财政年份:2002
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负责人:Steven Tadelis
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依托单位:
Reputation, Incentives, and Transaction Costs in Firms
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批准号:0079876
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$8.84万
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财政年份:2000
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负责人:Steven Tadelis
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依托单位:
Reputation with Hidden Information
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批准号:9818981
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$3.08万
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财政年份:1999
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负责人:Steven Tadelis
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依托单位:
海外基金