Toward Improved Understanding Of Warnings For Short-Fuse Weather Events

关键基础设施系统的投入产出风险模型今天，对国家来说，没有什么比确保关键基础设施的安全性、连续性和可用性更重要的了。现代关键基础设施的特点是极其复杂，具有很强的内部和相互依赖性，以及多层次结构。我们的关键基础设施表现出更高的相互依存程度--部分原因是它们对现代技术的依赖增加--使它们更容易受到诸如恐怖主义行为等人为灾难的影响。在评估关键基础设施的脆弱性时，重要的是不仅要分析基础设施本身，而且还要分析其相互联系及其对其他基础设施的影响。了解这种互连关系可以通过对不可操作性在整个关键基础设施系统中传播和扩散的方式进行建模来实现。不可操作被定义为系统无法执行其预期的自然或工程功能。不可操作风险被定义为对系统不可操作程度所表示的概率和后果的度量。开发一种能够描述我国关键基础设施固有风险的模型的研究目标将主要通过扩展现有的基于Leontief的基础设施不可操作模型来实现。以下是研究工作的组成部分：(1)建立不可操作风险概念的理论基础，即不可操作可通过相互连接的基础设施系统传播的机制；(2)开发不可操作输入-输出风险模型的分层实施，以处理基础设施系统的地理和功能分解；(3)研究由于初始扰动而导致的不可操作的动态，处理各种时间机制(例如，短期、中期或长期)中攻击的级联影响；(4)给出了不可操作I-O风险模型在电力基础设施中的原型应用。这里开发的不可操作I-O风险模型是一种初步尝试，旨在帮助我们做出令人难以置信的努力，以更好地了解这些依赖关系，并随后以更具成本效益的方式管理当今关键基础设施遇到的威胁和风险。因此，最好将拟议的模式视为制定更全面的风险评估和管理框架的雄心勃勃的第一步，以确保该国复杂的关键基础设施的完整性和持续可操作性。

INPUT-OUTPUT RISK MODEL OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS There is no higher priority for the nation today than assuring the security, continuity, and availability of our critical infrastructures. Modern critical infrastructures are marked by immense complexity, and characterized by strong intra- and interdependencies, as well as multiple hierarchies. The higher degree of interdependencies exhibited by our critical infrastructures-attributable in part to their increased reliance on modern technology-make them more vulnerable to human-caused disasters such as acts of terrorism. In assessing the vulnerability of a critical infrastructure, it is important to analyze not only an infrastructure per se but also its interconnectedness and influences on other infrastructures. Understanding this interconnectedness can be achieved by modeling the way inoperability propagates and proliferates throughout a critical system of infrastructures. Inoperability is defined as the inability of the system to perform its intended natural or engineered functions. Risk of inoperability is defined as a measure of the probability and the consequence expressed as a degree of the inoperability of the system. The research goal to develop a model capable of describing the risks inherent to our Nation's critical infrastructures will be realized primarily through extensions of an existing Leontief-based infrastructure inoperability model. Following are the components of the research effort: (1) Establish the theoretical bases underlying the concept of risk of inoperability, namely the mechanics by which inoperability can propagate through a system of interconnected infrastructures; (2) Develop a hierarchical implementation of the inoperability input-output risk model to address geographical and functional decomposition of the system of infrastructures; (3) Study the dynamics of inoperability due to an initial perturbation, addressing cascading effects of an attack in various temporal regimes (e.g., short-term, intermediate-term, or long-term); and (4) Provide a prototype application of the proposed inoperability I-O risk model to the electric power infrastructure. The inoperability I-O risk model developed here is an initial attempt to contribute to the incredible efforts needed to better our understanding of these dependencies, and subsequently to manage more cost-effectively the threats and risks that critical infrastructures encounter today. Thus, the proposed model is best viewed as a first step in an ambitious attempt to develop a more comprehensive risk assessment and management framework for ensuring the integrity and continued operability of the Nation's complex critical infrastructures.