Toward Improved Understanding Of Warnings For Short-Fuse Weather Events

关键基础设施系统的投入产出风险模型对于今天的国家来说，没有比确保关键基础设施的安全性、连续性和可用性更重要的了。现代关键基础设施的特点是极其复杂，具有很强的内部和相互依赖性，以及多重层次结构。我们的关键基础设施所表现出的高度相互依赖——部分归因于它们对现代技术的日益依赖——使它们更容易受到人为灾难的影响，如恐怖主义行为。在评估关键基础设施的脆弱性时，重要的是不仅要分析基础设施本身，还要分析其相互联系及其对其他基础设施的影响。通过对不可操作性在整个关键基础设施系统中传播和扩散的方式进行建模，可以理解这种相互联系。不可操作性被定义为系统无法执行其预期的自然或工程功能。不可操作风险被定义为对系统不可操作程度表示的可能性和后果的度量。研究目标是开发一个能够描述我国关键基础设施固有风险的模型，将主要通过扩展现有的基于leontief的基础设施不可操作性模型来实现。以下是研究工作的组成部分：(1)建立不可操作性风险概念的理论基础，即不可操作性可以通过相互关联的基础设施系统传播的机制；(2)开发不可操作性投入产出风险模型的分层实施，以解决基础设施系统的地理和功能分解问题；(3)研究由初始扰动引起的不可操作性动力学，解决在不同时间体制（如短期、中期或长期）中攻击的级联效应；(4)提出了不可操作性I-O风险模型在电力基础设施中的原型应用。这里开发的不可操作性I-O风险模型是一种最初的尝试，它有助于我们更好地理解这些依赖关系，并随后更经济有效地管理关键基础设施今天遇到的威胁和风险。因此，建议的模型最好被视为雄心勃勃的尝试的第一步，以制定更全面的风险评估和管理框架，以确保国家复杂的关键基础设施的完整性和持续的可操作性。

INPUT-OUTPUT RISK MODEL OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS There is no higher priority for the nation today than assuring the security, continuity, and availability of our critical infrastructures. Modern critical infrastructures are marked by immense complexity, and characterized by strong intra- and interdependencies, as well as multiple hierarchies. The higher degree of interdependencies exhibited by our critical infrastructures-attributable in part to their increased reliance on modern technology-make them more vulnerable to human-caused disasters such as acts of terrorism. In assessing the vulnerability of a critical infrastructure, it is important to analyze not only an infrastructure per se but also its interconnectedness and influences on other infrastructures. Understanding this interconnectedness can be achieved by modeling the way inoperability propagates and proliferates throughout a critical system of infrastructures. Inoperability is defined as the inability of the system to perform its intended natural or engineered functions. Risk of inoperability is defined as a measure of the probability and the consequence expressed as a degree of the inoperability of the system. The research goal to develop a model capable of describing the risks inherent to our Nation's critical infrastructures will be realized primarily through extensions of an existing Leontief-based infrastructure inoperability model. Following are the components of the research effort: (1) Establish the theoretical bases underlying the concept of risk of inoperability, namely the mechanics by which inoperability can propagate through a system of interconnected infrastructures; (2) Develop a hierarchical implementation of the inoperability input-output risk model to address geographical and functional decomposition of the system of infrastructures; (3) Study the dynamics of inoperability due to an initial perturbation, addressing cascading effects of an attack in various temporal regimes (e.g., short-term, intermediate-term, or long-term); and (4) Provide a prototype application of the proposed inoperability I-O risk model to the electric power infrastructure. The inoperability I-O risk model developed here is an initial attempt to contribute to the incredible efforts needed to better our understanding of these dependencies, and subsequently to manage more cost-effectively the threats and risks that critical infrastructures encounter today. Thus, the proposed model is best viewed as a first step in an ambitious attempt to develop a more comprehensive risk assessment and management framework for ensuring the integrity and continued operability of the Nation's complex critical infrastructures.