Political Institutions and Economic Policy

政治制度和经济政策

• 批准号: 0318161
• 负责人: Alessandro Lizzeri
• 金额: $ 13.67万
• 依托单位: New York University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2003
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2003-08-15 至 2005-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0318161&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Political; Institutions; Economic; Policy

This is an interdisciplinary project at the intersection of economics, history, and political science. It integrates research from these disciplines to understand some fundamental issues concerning democratic government and the functioning of political institutions. More precisely, the issues that are addressed concern the role of the right to vote (the franchise) and the transparency of political institutions.The extent of the franchise is one of the key features of a political system. It largely determines the degree to which political system can be considered democratic and it affects the scale and scope of government activity. The franchise changed dramatically in the West in the century preceding World War I. Can such changes account for some of the transformations in the role of government during this century? The project considers this question and asks how it came to happen that countries with very narrow electorates (most countries at the beginning of the 19th century) offered the right to vote to a much larger group of citizens. Recent models have interpreted this democratization as the outcome of conflict between elites and the disenfranchised. This project explores the power of an alternative explanation. Under some circumstances, the shift in the mode of political competition caused by the extension of the franchise more than compensates the elite for the dilution of their influence. The theory is used to interpret some aspects of the British ``Age of Reform'' that include a major increase in spending on local public goods The research will have broader on our understanding of how the franchise is extended from elites to full democratic participation. This is a fundamental issue for constitutional design and political science development. Additionally, the insights gained from this research could be applicable to the issue of the European Union expansion. The transparency of the political system is another important element of democratic government since information about policy is essential for voters to have an influence. If voters are imperfectly informed on government policy, what are the consequences for government debt, the size of government, the form of government transfers to voters, and the (in)efficiency of government policy? The novel feature of the analysis is the form of information imperfection. The lack of transparency leads to government debt and to inefficient taxation. It also leads to the choice of inefficient instruments of redistribution if such instruments are less transparent. The model also suggests a resolution of the `fiscal churning' puzzle, namely, the fact that a large number of individuals are both taxpayers and recipients of government transfers. Fiscal churning is inefficient because it would often be more effective to `net out' the fiscal positions of such individuals. The model offers an explanation for this phenomenon and points to a way to reform fiscal institutions to improve the functioning of the political system. A study of the relationship between transparency and debt could have policy impacts, particularly if greater transparency can imply a reduction in the public debt.

这是一个在经济学，历史学和政治学交叉的跨学科项目。它整合了这些学科的研究，以了解有关民主政府和政治机构运作的一些基本问题。更确切地说，所讨论的问题涉及选举权（选举权）的作用和政治机构的透明度，选举权的范围是政治制度的关键特征之一。它在很大程度上决定了政治制度的民主程度，并影响政府活动的规模和范围。在第一次世界大战前的世纪，选举权在西方发生了巨大的变化。这些变化能否解释本世纪政府角色的某些转变？该项目考虑了这个问题，并提出了一个问题，即选民人数非常少的国家（世纪初的大多数国家）是如何向更大的公民群体提供投票权的。最近的模式将这种民主化解释为精英与被剥夺权利者之间冲突的结果。这个项目探索了另一种解释的力量。在某些情况下，扩大选举权所引起的政治竞争模式的转变，不仅补偿了精英们影响力的削弱。该理论被用来解释英国“改革时代”的某些方面，其中包括大幅增加地方公共产品支出。该研究将使我们更广泛地理解选举权如何从精英扩展到全面民主参与。这是宪政设计和政治学发展的根本问题。此外，从这项研究中获得的见解可以适用于欧盟扩大的问题。政治制度的透明度是民主政府的另一个重要因素，因为有关政策的信息对于选民发挥影响力至关重要。如果选民不完全了解政府政策，那么政府债务、政府规模、政府向选民转移的形式以及政府政策的效率会有什么后果？分析的新特点是信息不完全的形式。缺乏透明度导致政府债务和税收效率低下。它还导致人们选择效率低下的再分配工具，如果这些工具透明度较低的话。该模型还提出了解决“财政搅动”难题的办法，即大量个人既是纳税人又是政府转移支付的接受者。财政搅动效率低下，因为“净出”这些人的财政状况往往更为有效。该模型为这一现象提供了解释，并指出了一条改革财政机构以改善政治体系运作的途径。对透明度与债务之间关系的研究可能会产生政策影响，特别是如果提高透明度意味着减少公共债务的话。