Adverse Selection in Durable Goods Markets

耐用品市场的逆向选择

• 批准号: 9711355
• 负责人: Alessandro Lizzeri
• 金额: $ 13.03万
• 依托单位: Princeton University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1997
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1997-08-01 至 2000-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9711355&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Adverse; Selection; Durable; Goods; Markets

Adverse selection is an important source of market inefficiency and markets for durable goods are particularly likely to suffer from adverse selection. Indeed the used car market is the prototypical example of a market subject to adverse selection. In any of these markets adverse selection is a potential problem because first owners learn the quality of the good and then decide whether to trade them in the used market. This research will analyze a market where a flow of output of new units arrives every period, consumers self-select into buying new or used cars. Thus, in contrast to the previous literature on adverse selection, the ownership of cars is endogenous. Preliminary results indicate that incorporating in the analysis the market for new goods has important consequences. First, the volume of trade in the used market is always less than 100%, but the used market never closes. This is a consequence of the fact that, in contrast with the previous literature, in this model a seller of a used car gets to buy a new car instead of being left with nothing. Second, this research suggests that there are new dimensions in the analysis of social welfare that put in question some `common wisdom` concerning adverse selection. In particular, an example shows that welfare can be higher under adverse selection than when all consumers are required to trade or, alternatively, when there is no quality uncertainty. Third, this framework allows consideration of the effects of adverse selection on the market for new durable goods and, therefore, on manufacturer incentives to influence the behavior of consumers in the presence of adverse selection. It is possible that a worsening of adverse selection may benefit a monopolist, who may then produce unreliable cars. This research will then analyze contractual arrangements that the manufacturers can employ to affect the behavior of consumers: the transferability of warranty coverage between owners, manufacturers refurbishment and certification of the used, and the structure of leasing contracts.

逆向选择是市场效率低下的一个重要原因，耐用品市场尤其容易遭受逆向选择。事实上，二手车市场是逆向选择市场的典型例子。在这些市场中，逆向选择都是一个潜在的问题，因为首先所有者了解了商品的质量，然后决定是否在二手市场上交易它们。本研究将分析这样一个市场，在这个市场中，每一段时间都会有源源不断的新车产出，消费者会自主选择购买新车或二手车。因此，与以往关于逆向选择的文献相反，拥有汽车是内生的。初步结果表明，将新产品市场纳入分析具有重要意义。首先，二手市场的交易量总是低于100%，但二手市场从不关闭。这是一个事实的结果，与之前的文献相反，在这个模型中，二手车的卖家可以买一辆新车，而不是一无所有。其次，这项研究表明，在社会福利分析中存在新的维度，这对一些关于逆向选择的“普遍智慧”提出了质疑。特别是，一个例子表明，在逆向选择下，福利可能比所有消费者都被要求进行交易或没有质量不确定性时更高。第三，这个框架允许考虑逆向选择对新耐用品市场的影响，因此，在逆向选择存在的情况下，对制造商激励影响消费者行为的影响。逆向选择的恶化可能对垄断者有利，而垄断者可能生产出不可靠的汽车。然后，本研究将分析制造商可以用来影响消费者行为的合同安排：所有者之间保修范围的可转移性，制造商对二手产品的翻新和认证，以及租赁合同的结构。