Bidding with Securities -- Auctions and Security Design

证券投标——拍卖和安全设计

• 批准号: 0318476
• 负责人: Peter DeMarzo
• 金额: $ 24.24万
• 依托单位: Stanford University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2003
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2003-11-01 至 2006-05-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0318476&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Bidding; Securities; Auctions; Security; Design

In recent years auction theorists have been asked to provide guidance to policymakers in a wide range of important transactions. Current theory focuses on the case when the winning bidder pays a fixed amount at the conclusion of the auction. However, in many real world auctions ranging from broadcasting the olympic games to the rights to drill for oil or the choice of the leading counsel in a class action suit, the winning bidder pays long after the conclusion of the auction. Moreover, the payment is contingent on future events, and depends on the realized cash flows from the object being sold. In this case, the payment can be thought of as a derivative security, where the underlying asset is the future cash-flows. This proposal combines two existing lines of economic research, auction theory and security design, to study auctions in which the bids are securities rather than fixed payments. This type of auction, refered to as a security-bid auction, has a large number of potential applications beyond those given above, including major privatization auctions. Intellectual Merit: This research should advance knowledge and understanding in two major fields: auction theory and security design. This study expands auction theory in a direction that will make it more applicable to an even a larger number of markets. Preliminary work suggests that some of the fundamental results of standard auction theory with fixed payments could be modified. This study also contributes to the understanding of security design. Security design is a basic topic in financial economics. The important questions include (i) why do parties choose to divide future cash flows (and hence risks) in standard forms, such as debt and equity; and (ii) does this choice matter? While a great deal of progress has been made in answering these questions, the existing finance literature primarily considers the case of a single issuer selling a security to competing investors. The auctions examined in this study are important instances in which several issuers compete by offering securities to a single agent. An important example is that of mergers and acquisitions. In this case bidders often offer securities such as equity or preferred stocks in the merged firm. This study provides insight into the optimal choice of securities in these and other transactions. Broader Impact: This study should have useful policy implications: the results may guide practitioners regarding the design of auctions to use in different settings. For example, when bidders promise fixed payments but may default (i.e., bids are debt securities), a second-price auction results in superior revenues for the seller. However, when bidders promise a fixed payment plus a royalty rate, a first-price auction may be superior. Both examples are common in government auctions of public resources. Furthermore, this study will hopefully spur and guide more applied research focused on auction design using security bids in particular markets.

近年来，拍卖理论家被要求在一系列重要交易中为政策制定者提供指导。目前的理论侧重于中标人在拍卖结束时支付固定金额的情况。 然而，在许多真实的世界拍卖中从奥运会转播权到石油开采权，再到集体诉讼中首席律师的选择，中标者在拍卖结束后很久才付款。此外，付款取决于未来事件，并取决于被出售对象的已实现现金流。 在这种情况下，支付可以被认为是一种衍生证券，其基础资产是未来的现金流。 这个建议结合了两个现有的经济研究，拍卖理论和安全设计，研究拍卖中的出价是证券，而不是固定的付款。 这种类型的拍卖，被称为证券投标拍卖，有大量的潜在应用超出上述，包括主要的私有化拍卖。 智力价值：这项研究应该在两个主要领域推进知识和理解：拍卖理论和安全设计。 这项研究扩展了拍卖理论的方向，使其更适用于一个更大的市场数量。初步工作表明，一些基本结果的标准拍卖理论与固定付款可以修改。 这项研究也有助于理解安全设计。证券设计是金融经济学的一个基本课题。重要的问题包括：（1）为什么各方选择以标准形式（如债务和股权）划分未来现金流（以及风险）;（2）这种选择重要吗？虽然在回答这些问题方面已经取得了很大的进展，但现有的金融文献主要考虑单一发行人向竞争投资者出售证券的情况。 在这项研究中，拍卖研究是重要的情况下，几个发行人通过提供证券给一个单一的代理人竞争。 一个重要的例子是合并和收购。 在这种情况下，投标人通常提供被合并公司的股票或优先股等证券。这项研究提供了洞察证券在这些和其他交易的最佳选择。更广泛的影响：这项研究应具有有益的政策影响：研究结果可指导从业人员如何设计在不同环境下使用的拍卖。 例如，当投标人承诺固定付款但可能违约（即，投标是债务证券），第二价格拍卖为卖方带来上级收入。 然而，当投标人承诺一个固定的付款加上一个版税率，一级价格拍卖可能是优越的上级。 这两个例子在政府拍卖公共资源中很常见。此外，本研究将有望刺激和指导更多的应用研究集中在拍卖设计使用证券出价在特定的市场。