Designing Competitive Markets for Transmission and Generation Expansion

联邦能源管理委员会(FERC)在其拟议规则制定的标准市场设计通知中概述了三个主要政策目标：(1)确保电网的高效实时运行，(2)监测和减轻市场力量，以及(3)促进高效输电和发电扩张。FERC已指示区域贸易组织使用基于竞争的地点、前一天市场的边际(能源)价格和金融传输权，努力实现目标(1)和(2)。欧盟委员会希望看到市场力量的影响延伸到他们的第三个(也是可以说是最重要的)目标：高效输电和发电量扩大。显然，如果没有高效、充足的输电和发电扩容，实时能源市场将遭受严重的输电阻塞和发电市场力量的行使，从而导致高电价。这些市场应该采取什么形式进行扩张，它们与集中规划过程的关系尚未确定，也不确定。可以肯定的是，在考虑竞争性市场进行扩张时，FERC正在挖掘以前从未探索过的领域，无论是在理论上还是在实践中。拍卖已经被引入并用于前一天能源市场的运营。因此，人们很自然地会问，他们的成功能否扩展到输电和扩代领域。虽然拍卖在越来越多的行业和市场环境中得到了应用，但拍卖理论的研究却严重滞后。本研究建议的目标是通过提高拍卖机制设计中的知识状态来缩小实践和理论之间的差距，以实现传输和发电扩展。通过这个项目，我们打算：通过描述和研究发电和输电扩展的双边组合拍卖，对组合拍卖中稀缺的文献做出贡献。开发计算机辅助建模工具，以了解拍卖形式选择对性能(公平、效率、均衡和竞价膨胀)的影响。了解各种反馈机制下计算复杂性和拍卖性能之间的权衡。探索在多大程度上市场可以在发电和输电扩展领域有效地取代监管规划过程。本提案中概述的工作的更广泛的影响包括开发新的见解和工具，通过市场模拟，将帮助监管机构应对设计扩张市场的挑战。这个项目的智力价值是将运筹学、经济学和电气工程学的研究领域结合起来，开发出一种综合的方法来设计扩建拍卖。传统上，运筹学和电气工程的文献中都有大量的模型，试图捕捉尽可能多的操作和物理细节。与之形成鲜明对比的是，经济学家通常会牺牲操作细节，更多地强调市场中代理人的战略行为。我们的研究目标是将这两种思想方法融合到能源拍卖的研究中。基于电网的直流潮流近似，我们将开发仿真工具和计算算法来评估在不同市场场景下存在战略投标者行为的组合扩展拍卖的性能。虽然这种跨学科的方法带来了巨大的挑战，但它获得的巨大回报是，加深对设计组合拍卖以实现有效输电和发电扩展的挑战和潜在回报的理解。

With their Standard Market Design Notice Of Proposed Rulemaking, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has outlined three main policy objectives: (1) ensure efficient real-time operation of the grid, (2) monitor and mitigate market power, and (3) promote efficient transmission and generation expansion. FERC has directed regional trading organization to use competitive-based location marginal (energy) prices in the day-ahead market and financial transmission rights in an effort to achieve objectives (1) and (2). The Commission would like to see the influence of market forces extend to their third (and arguable most important) objective: efficient transmission and generation expansion. It is clear that without efficient and adequate transmission and generation expansion, the real-time energy markets will suffer from significant transmission congestion and the exercise of generation market power, resulting in high-energy prices. The form these markets for expansion should take, and their relationship to centralized planning processes has yet to be decided and is uncertain. What is certain is that in considering competitive markets for expansion, FERC is delving into previously unexplored territory, both in theory and in practice.Auctions have been introduced and used in the operation of the day-ahead energy markets. Therefore, it is natural to ask if their success can extend to the realm of transmission and generation expansion. While the use of auctions has been applied in an increasing variety of industries and market settings, the research in auction theory has severely lagged behind. It is the goal of this research proposal to close the gap between practice and theory by advancing the state of the knowledge in the design of auction mechanisms for transmission and generation expansion. With this project, we intend to:o Contribute to the scarce literature in combinatorial auctions by characterizing and studying a two-sided combinatorial auction for generation and transmission expansion.o Develop computer aided modeling tools to understand the impact of auction format selection on performance (equity, efficiency, equilibrium and bid inflation).o Understand the trade-offs between computational complexity and auction performance under various feedback mechanisms.o Explore to what degree markets can efficiently replace regulatory planning processes in the domain of generation and transmission expansion.The broader impact of the work outlined in this proposal includes the development of new insights and tools that, via market simulation, will aid the regulators as they grapple with the challenges of designing expansion markets. The intellectual merit of this project is to combine fields of study from operations research, economics and electrical engineering to develop an integrative approach to the design of expansion auctions. Traditionally, the literature in operations research and electrical engineering has been rich with models that try to capture as much operational and physical detail as possible. In sharp contrast, economists have generally sacrificed operational details and placed a greater emphasis on the strategic behavior of agents in a market. The goal of our research is to fuse these two ideological approaches in the study of energy auctions. Building on a DC power flow approximation of a grid, we will develop simulation tools and computational algorithms to evaluate the performance of combinatorial expansion auctions in the presence of strategic bidder behavior under various market scenarios. While this interdisciplinary approach presents a significant challenge, it holds the great reward of developing a deeper understanding the challenges and potential rewards in designing combinatorial auctions for efficient transmission and generation expansion.