Designing Competitive Markets for Transmission and Generation Expansion

联邦能源监管委员会（FERC）在其《规则制定建议的标准市场设计通知》中概述了三个主要政策目标：（1）确保电网的高效实时运行，（2）监控和缓解市场力量，（3）促进高效输电和发电扩张。FERC已指示区域贸易组织在日前市场和金融输电权中使用基于竞争的位置边际（能源）价格，以努力实现目标（1）和（2）。欧盟委员会希望看到市场力量的影响力扩展到第三个（也是最重要的）目标：高效输电和发电扩展。很明显，如果没有有效和充分的输电和发电扩展，实时能源市场将遭受严重的输电阻塞和发电市场力的行使，导致高能源价格。这些市场的扩张应该采取什么形式，它们与中央计划进程的关系还有待决定，也不确定。可以肯定的是，在考虑竞争性市场的扩张，联邦能源管理委员会正在深入到以前未开发的领域，无论是在理论上还是在实践中。拍卖已被引入并用于日前能源市场的运作。 因此，人们自然会问，他们的成功是否可以延伸到输电和发电扩展领域。虽然拍卖的使用已被应用在越来越多的行业和市场环境中，但拍卖理论的研究却严重滞后。本研究建议的目标是通过推进输电和发电扩展拍卖机制设计中的知识状态来缩小实践与理论之间的差距。通过这个项目，我们打算：o通过描述和研究发电和输电扩展的双边组合拍卖，为组合拍卖的稀缺文献做出贡献。o开发计算机辅助建模工具，以了解拍卖形式选择对性能的影响（公平、效率、均衡和出价通胀）。o了解交易-o探索在发电和输电扩展领域，市场在多大程度上可以有效地取代监管规划过程。本提案中概述的工作的更广泛影响包括发展新的见解和通过市场模拟，这些工具将帮助监管机构应对设计扩张市场的挑战。这个项目的智力价值是联合收割机的研究领域，从运筹学，经济学和电气工程开发一个综合的方法来设计的扩展拍卖。传统上，运筹学和电气工程的文献中有大量的模型，试图捕捉尽可能多的操作和物理细节。与此形成鲜明对比的是，经济学家通常牺牲了操作细节，而更加强调市场中代理人的战略行为。我们的研究目标是融合这两种思想方法在能源拍卖的研究。建立在一个电网的直流潮流近似，我们将开发仿真工具和计算算法，以评估在各种市场情况下的策略投标人行为的存在下，组合扩张拍卖的性能。虽然这种跨学科的方法提出了一个重大的挑战，它拥有更深入地了解的挑战和潜在的回报，在设计组合拍卖有效的传输和发电扩展的巨大回报。

With their Standard Market Design Notice Of Proposed Rulemaking, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has outlined three main policy objectives: (1) ensure efficient real-time operation of the grid, (2) monitor and mitigate market power, and (3) promote efficient transmission and generation expansion. FERC has directed regional trading organization to use competitive-based location marginal (energy) prices in the day-ahead market and financial transmission rights in an effort to achieve objectives (1) and (2). The Commission would like to see the influence of market forces extend to their third (and arguable most important) objective: efficient transmission and generation expansion. It is clear that without efficient and adequate transmission and generation expansion, the real-time energy markets will suffer from significant transmission congestion and the exercise of generation market power, resulting in high-energy prices. The form these markets for expansion should take, and their relationship to centralized planning processes has yet to be decided and is uncertain. What is certain is that in considering competitive markets for expansion, FERC is delving into previously unexplored territory, both in theory and in practice.Auctions have been introduced and used in the operation of the day-ahead energy markets. Therefore, it is natural to ask if their success can extend to the realm of transmission and generation expansion. While the use of auctions has been applied in an increasing variety of industries and market settings, the research in auction theory has severely lagged behind. It is the goal of this research proposal to close the gap between practice and theory by advancing the state of the knowledge in the design of auction mechanisms for transmission and generation expansion. With this project, we intend to:o Contribute to the scarce literature in combinatorial auctions by characterizing and studying a two-sided combinatorial auction for generation and transmission expansion.o Develop computer aided modeling tools to understand the impact of auction format selection on performance (equity, efficiency, equilibrium and bid inflation).o Understand the trade-offs between computational complexity and auction performance under various feedback mechanisms.o Explore to what degree markets can efficiently replace regulatory planning processes in the domain of generation and transmission expansion.The broader impact of the work outlined in this proposal includes the development of new insights and tools that, via market simulation, will aid the regulators as they grapple with the challenges of designing expansion markets. The intellectual merit of this project is to combine fields of study from operations research, economics and electrical engineering to develop an integrative approach to the design of expansion auctions. Traditionally, the literature in operations research and electrical engineering has been rich with models that try to capture as much operational and physical detail as possible. In sharp contrast, economists have generally sacrificed operational details and placed a greater emphasis on the strategic behavior of agents in a market. The goal of our research is to fuse these two ideological approaches in the study of energy auctions. Building on a DC power flow approximation of a grid, we will develop simulation tools and computational algorithms to evaluate the performance of combinatorial expansion auctions in the presence of strategic bidder behavior under various market scenarios. While this interdisciplinary approach presents a significant challenge, it holds the great reward of developing a deeper understanding the challenges and potential rewards in designing combinatorial auctions for efficient transmission and generation expansion.