Disaster Prevention and Mitigation: Protecting the Nation's Critical Infrastructure from Natural, Technological, and Deliberate Disasters

防灾减灾：保护国家关键基础设施免受自然灾害、技术灾害和人为灾害的影响

• 批准号: 0329546
• 负责人: Charles Perrow
• 金额: $ 7.94万
• 依托单位: Yale University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2003
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2003-07-01 至 2004-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0329546&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Disaster; Prevention; Mitigation; Protecting; Nation

In the U.S. the concentration of urban areas, of populations in areas vulnerable to hurricanes and floods, of production and storage sites of toxic and explosive substances, all make us vulnerable to natural, industrial, and deliberate disasters. In addition, our response and recovery systems are unnecessarily inflexible and poorly funded at the local, first responder, level. Natural, industrial, and deliberate disasters have increased in the last 2 decades. This research explores the possibilities of deconcentrating targets and decentralizing response efforts. Current theory argues that deconcentration and decentralization of areas, organizations, and facilities is likely to be inefficient and expensive. However, I will examine four examples of highly decentralized systems that are very efficient, flexible, adaptive, and reliable. They provide guidance for the redesign of vulnerable areas and organizations. They are the national power grids, the Internet, networks of small firms in several nations, and (alas), terrorist networks. These systems manage to reduce two types of interdependencies that have negative system effects - physical interdependency (e.g. a railroad engine needs coal) and spatial interdependency (bundling unrelated systems together, so that if a highway bridge collapses it also brings down the power lines that it carries). These interdependencies are low because the four systems have multiple inputs (suppliers), and outputs (products) available, reducing physical interdependencies, and extensive redundancies that make spatial interdependency less problematical. The four systems maximize, however, the two forms of interdependency that facilitate safety: logical interdependency (compatible infrastructures, dependable reputations, stable governance regimes), and cyber (or communication) interdependency, where information rather than material is the commodity that is transmitted. Both of these promote resiliency and safety, and are inexpensive for the four systems. Based on these cases, recommendations will be made for reducing the vulnerability of systems with catastrophic potential, and for improving homeland security and disaster response agencies.

在美国，城市地区、易受飓风和洪水影响的地区的人口、有毒和爆炸性物质的生产和储存地点的集中，都使我们容易受到自然灾害、工业和故意灾难的影响。此外，我们的反应和恢复系统不必要地缺乏灵活性，地方一级的第一反应人员资金不足。在过去的20年里，自然灾害、工业灾难和蓄意灾难都有所增加。这项研究探索了分散目标和分散应对努力的可能性。当前的理论认为，地区、组织和设施的分散和分散可能效率低下，成本高昂。但是，我将研究高度分散的系统的四个示例，它们非常高效、灵活、自适应和可靠。它们为重新设计脆弱地区和组织提供了指导。它们是国家电网、互联网、几个国家的小企业网络，还有(唉)恐怖主义网络。这些系统设法减少了两种对系统产生负面影响的相互依赖--物质上的相互依赖(例如，铁路发动机需要煤炭)和空间上的相互依赖(将不相关的系统捆绑在一起，以便如果一座公路桥坍塌，它也会摧毁它所承载的输电线)。这些相互依存性较低，因为四个系统有多个输入(供应商)和输出(产品)可用，从而减少了物质上的相互依存性，并减少了大量冗余，从而使空间相互依存性的问题更小。然而，这四个系统最大限度地促进了促进安全的两种形式的相互依存：逻辑上的相互依存(兼容的基础设施、可靠的声誉、稳定的治理制度)和网络(或通信)相互依存，在网络(或通信)中，信息而不是材料是被传输的商品。这两者都提高了弹性和安全性，而且对这四个系统来说都是廉价的。根据这些案例，将提出建议，以降低具有灾难性潜力的系统的脆弱性，并改进国土安全和灾害应对机构。