Collaborative Research: Investigating Bidding Behavior in Sealed Bid Auctions: Regret, Learning, and Risk Aversion

合作研究：调查密封投标拍卖中的投标行为：遗憾、学习和风险规避

• 批准号: 0338731
• 负责人: Elena Katok
• 金额: $ 8.4万
• 依托单位: Pennsylvania State Univ University Park
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2004
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2004-04-01 至 2006-03-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0338731&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Investigating; Bidding; Behavior

Over the past two decades auction theory has been used extensively to help design real world auctions and exchanges. Examples of these new auctions include the FCC auctions for spectrum licenses, electric power auctions, auctions for transportation services, and different types of procurement auctions. These mechanisms are complex, and designers must make decisions about many aspects of auction rules that are likely to have a profound effect on the auction's efficiency, the sellers' revenue and the buyers' profits. Good auction theory is essential if we are to design good auction mechanisms, yet there are important instances in which observed behavior in auctions differs from what would be expected based on auction theory. One important example of this is overbidding (i.e., bidding above the Risk Neutral Nash Equilibrium) observed in Sealed Bid First Price (SBFP) auctions. This result has been replicated many times by different researchers at different laboratories and in a variety of environments, but the reason for overbidding has never been fully understood. Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989) suggests that participants may overbid in these auctions to avoid feelings of regret. Although the theory of regret has been used to explain some well-known anomalies in expected utility theory, this notion has never been applied to auctions prior to Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989), and has never been tested in the auction context. The aim of our research is to systematically test the Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989) theory of regret in auctions in the laboratory, with the specific objective of separating the role of regret from that of risk aversion. As we gain a better understanding of behavior in SBFP auctions, we will also extend and refine the theory to incorporate our new insights and to explain other puzzles involving auctions.

在过去的二十年中，拍卖理论已被广泛使用，以帮助设计现实世界的拍卖和交流。这些新拍卖的例子包括频谱许可证的FCC拍卖，电力拍卖，运输服务拍卖以及不同类型的采购拍卖。 这些机制很复杂，设计师必须就拍卖规则的许多方面做出决定，这些方面可能会对拍卖的效率，卖方的收入和买家的利润产生深远影响。如果我们要设计良好的拍卖机制，那么良好的拍卖理论至关重要，但是在某些重要情况下，观察到的拍卖行为与基于拍卖理论的预期有所不同。 一个重要的例子是在密封竞标第一名（SBFP）拍卖中观察到的超过风险中性NASH均衡的竞标（即竞标）。在不同的实验室和各种环境中，不同的研究人员多次复制了这一结果，但是从未完全理解过度企业的原因。 Engelbrecht-Wiggans（1989）认为，参与者可能会在这些拍卖中超越，以避免遗憾。 尽管遗憾理论已被用来解释预期效用理论中的一些众所周知的异常情况，但该概念从未在恩格布雷希特 - 威格加斯（Engelbrecht-Wiggans）之前应用于拍卖（1989），并且从未在拍卖中受过测试。 我们研究的目的是系统地测试恩格布雷希特 - 威格加斯（Engelbrecht-Wiggans）（1989）在实验室拍卖中的遗憾理论，其具体目的是将遗憾的作用与风险规避的作用分开。 随着我们对SBFP拍卖中的行为有更好的了解，我们还将扩展并完善理论，以结合我们的新见解并解释涉及拍卖的其他难题。