Collaborative Research: Investigating Bidding Behavior in Sealed Bid Auctions: Regret, Learning, and Risk Aversion

合作研究：调查密封投标拍卖中的投标行为：遗憾、学习和风险规避

• 批准号: 0338731
• 负责人: Elena Katok
• 金额: $ 8.4万
• 依托单位: Pennsylvania State Univ University Park
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2004
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2004-04-01 至 2006-03-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0338731&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Investigating; Bidding; Behavior

Over the past two decades auction theory has been used extensively to help design real world auctions and exchanges. Examples of these new auctions include the FCC auctions for spectrum licenses, electric power auctions, auctions for transportation services, and different types of procurement auctions. These mechanisms are complex, and designers must make decisions about many aspects of auction rules that are likely to have a profound effect on the auction's efficiency, the sellers' revenue and the buyers' profits. Good auction theory is essential if we are to design good auction mechanisms, yet there are important instances in which observed behavior in auctions differs from what would be expected based on auction theory. One important example of this is overbidding (i.e., bidding above the Risk Neutral Nash Equilibrium) observed in Sealed Bid First Price (SBFP) auctions. This result has been replicated many times by different researchers at different laboratories and in a variety of environments, but the reason for overbidding has never been fully understood. Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989) suggests that participants may overbid in these auctions to avoid feelings of regret. Although the theory of regret has been used to explain some well-known anomalies in expected utility theory, this notion has never been applied to auctions prior to Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989), and has never been tested in the auction context. The aim of our research is to systematically test the Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989) theory of regret in auctions in the laboratory, with the specific objective of separating the role of regret from that of risk aversion. As we gain a better understanding of behavior in SBFP auctions, we will also extend and refine the theory to incorporate our new insights and to explain other puzzles involving auctions.

在过去的二十年里，拍卖理论被广泛用于帮助设计现实世界的拍卖和交易所。这些新拍卖的例子包括FCC频谱许可证拍卖、电力拍卖、运输服务拍卖和不同类型的采购拍卖。这些机制很复杂，设计师必须就拍卖规则的许多方面做出决定，这些规则可能会对拍卖的效率、卖家的收入和买家的利润产生深远影响。如果我们要设计好的拍卖机制，好的拍卖理论是必不可少的，但在一些重要的例子中，拍卖中观察到的行为与基于拍卖理论的预期不同。这方面的一个重要例子是在密封竞价优先(SBFP)拍卖中观察到的过高竞价(即高于风险中性纳什均衡的竞价)。不同的研究人员在不同的实验室和不同的环境中多次重复了这一结果，但竞价过高的原因从未被完全理解。Engelbrecht-Wiggans(1989)建议，参与者可能会在这些拍卖中出价过高，以避免产生后悔情绪。虽然后悔理论已经被用来解释预期效用理论中的一些众所周知的反常现象，但这个概念在恩格尔布雷希特-维根斯()之前从未被应用于拍卖，也从未在拍卖环境中得到检验。本研究的目的是在实验室中系统地检验Engelbrecht-Wiggans(1989)关于拍卖中后悔的理论，具体目的是将后悔的作用与风险厌恶的作用分开。随着我们对SBFP拍卖中的行为有了更好的理解，我们还将扩展和完善该理论，以纳入我们的新见解并解释其他涉及拍卖的谜题。