Collaborative Research: Investigating Bidding Behavior in Sealed Bid Auctions: Regret, Learning, and Risk Aversion

合作研究：调查密封投标拍卖中的投标行为：遗憾、学习和风险规避

• 批准号: 0338731
• 负责人: Elena Katok
• 金额: $ 8.4万
• 依托单位: Pennsylvania State Univ University Park
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2004
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2004-04-01 至 2006-03-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0338731&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Investigating; Bidding; Behavior

Over the past two decades auction theory has been used extensively to help design real world auctions and exchanges. Examples of these new auctions include the FCC auctions for spectrum licenses, electric power auctions, auctions for transportation services, and different types of procurement auctions. These mechanisms are complex, and designers must make decisions about many aspects of auction rules that are likely to have a profound effect on the auction's efficiency, the sellers' revenue and the buyers' profits. Good auction theory is essential if we are to design good auction mechanisms, yet there are important instances in which observed behavior in auctions differs from what would be expected based on auction theory. One important example of this is overbidding (i.e., bidding above the Risk Neutral Nash Equilibrium) observed in Sealed Bid First Price (SBFP) auctions. This result has been replicated many times by different researchers at different laboratories and in a variety of environments, but the reason for overbidding has never been fully understood. Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989) suggests that participants may overbid in these auctions to avoid feelings of regret. Although the theory of regret has been used to explain some well-known anomalies in expected utility theory, this notion has never been applied to auctions prior to Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989), and has never been tested in the auction context. The aim of our research is to systematically test the Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989) theory of regret in auctions in the laboratory, with the specific objective of separating the role of regret from that of risk aversion. As we gain a better understanding of behavior in SBFP auctions, we will also extend and refine the theory to incorporate our new insights and to explain other puzzles involving auctions.

在过去的二十年里，拍卖理论被广泛地用于帮助设计真实的世界拍卖和交易。这些新拍卖的示例包括FCC频谱许可证拍卖、电力拍卖、运输服务拍卖以及不同类型的采购拍卖。 这些机制是复杂的，设计者必须对拍卖规则的许多方面做出决定，这些方面可能对拍卖的效率、卖方的收入和买方的利润产生深远的影响。好的拍卖理论是必不可少的，如果我们要设计好的拍卖机制，但有一些重要的情况下，观察到的行为在拍卖不同于预期的基础上拍卖理论。 这方面的一个重要例子是出价过高（即，投标高于风险中性纳什均衡）观察密封投标第一价格（SBFP）拍卖。不同的研究人员在不同的实验室和不同的环境中多次重复了这一结果，但出价过高的原因从未被完全理解。Engelbrecht-Wiggans（1989）认为，参与者可能会在这些拍卖中出价过高，以避免后悔的感觉。 虽然后悔理论被用来解释预期效用理论中一些著名的反常现象，但在恩格尔布雷希特-威根（Engelbrecht-Wiggans，1989）之前，这一概念从未被应用于拍卖，也从未在拍卖背景下得到过检验。 我们的研究目的是在实验室系统地检验Engelbrecht-Wiggans（1989）的拍卖后悔理论，具体目标是将后悔的作用与风险规避的作用分开。 随着我们对SBFP拍卖中的行为有了更好的理解，我们还将扩展和完善该理论，以纳入我们的新见解，并解释涉及拍卖的其他难题。