Collaborative Research: Procurement Mechanism Design

这笔赠款为分析和实验工作提供资金，以便更好地了解一类将联合收割机与非竞争性合同相结合的采购机制。 这些机制在实践中得到了广泛使用，因为它们承诺保留拍卖所提供的优势（透明度、竞争性价格），同时允许买受人保留对其最终供应商身份的控制，并与这些供应商保持较长期的关系。但这些机制的理论和实践特点还没有得到很好的理解。 机制中，买方和供应商可以选择拍卖和非竞争性合同将正式建模和分析。这些机制的理论特性将在简单的设置，以及在设置与协同作用和多属性的产品进行检查。涉及人类受试者和真实的金钱激励的实验室实验将被用于验证分析结果。实验室设置将被设计为实现理论假设，并实现高水平的内部有效性，而在同一时间的供应链采购环境将被用来实现外部有效性的措施。 一些关键的实验性治疗将使用在采购和sourcing.If成功的领域的管理专业知识的参与者复制，这项研究的结果将导致在供应链内的采购机制的设计改进，以及更好地理解的理论和实践属性的机制，结合联合收割机和非竞争性合同。 这项工作的主要目标是就如何改进采购机制提出建议，以便在复杂的环境中增加贸易收益。 这项研究还将使人们更好地了解在具有协同作用和复杂的多属性产品的环境中进行竞争性投标，这对整个社会的商业和政府机构都是一个重要问题。 该软件和实验方案将可供其他研究人员使用。 拟议的工作将有助于发展用于向各级学生讲授采购和市场设计问题的基础设施。

This grant provides funding for the analytical and experimental work required to better understand a class of procurement mechanism that combine auctions with non-competitive contracts. These mechanisms are widely used in practice because they offer a promise to preserve the advantages that auctions offer (transparency, competitive price) while allowing the buyers to retain control over the identities of their ultimate suppliers, and maintain longer term relationships with those suppliers. But theoretical and practical characteristics of these mechanisms are not well-understood. Mechanisms in which buyers and suppliers can choose between auctions and non-competitive contracts will be formally modeled and analyzed. The theoretical properties of these mechanisms will be examined both in simple settings, as well as in settings with synergies and multi-attribute products. Laboratory experiments involving human subjects and real monetary incentives will be used to validate the analytical results. The laboratory setting will be designed to implement theoretical assumptions and achieve a high level of internal validity, while at the same time the supply-chain procurement context will be used in order to achieve a measure of external validity. Some key experimental treatments will be replicated using participants with managerial expertise in the area of procurement and sourcing.If successful, the results of this research will lead to improvements in the design of procurement mechanisms within supply chains, as well as to a better understanding of theoretical and practical attributes of mechanisms that combine auctions and non-competitive contracts. The primary goal of this work is to provide recommendations on how procurement mechanisms can be improved to enhance gains from trade in complex environments. The research will also provide a better understanding of competitive bidding in environments with synergies and complex multi-attribute products, which is an issue of importance to commercial and government institutions throughout society. The software and experimental protocols will be available for use to other researchers. The proposed work will contribute to the development of infrastructure used to teach issues in procurement and market design to students at all levels.