A Laboratory Exploration of Networked Markets

网络市场的实验室探索

• 批准号: 0351801
• 负责人: Daniel Friedman
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: University of California-Santa Cruz
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2004
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2004-11-01 至 2010-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0351801&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Laboratory; Exploration; Networked; Markets

Many economic models assume that markets are frictionless - they operate at 100% efficiency and require little interaction between the buyer and the seller. Actual markets, however, face moderate to severe trading frictions, and reuly on various sorts of links between buyers and sellers. Theorists have recently developed new models to deal with these issues, but there is as yet very little empirical knowledge about the effects of networks on market performance.This project will gather such knowledge using a controlled laboratory market. The PIs will introduce two important market frictions into a highly efficient auction trading procedure. They will create two separate settings. In the first, sellers may cheat buyers on product quality. In the second, buyers may not be aware of all seller prices, so buyers may miss some low cost purchase opportunities. They will then "link" buyers and sellers through a network that is designed to mimic social network links. Buyers and sellers withing the same network know who else in the network is a cheater and who is a low cost seller. The goal is to determine how frictions affect market outcomes and whether networks can overcome these frictions to again achieve efficiency.Better knowledge of how networks affect market performance will provide a sounder basis for policy reform in several fields. Policy makers interested in increasing the volume of domestic trading in electronic marketplaces or in financial assets will benefit from these results. In addition, networks among a social group have been posited as an explanation for differences in how immigrants assimilate to American society. This study will help to understand how networks could have such effects. A diverse and global community of undergraduates at three different institutions -- Mt. Holyoke College, the University of San Francisco, and the University of California at Santa Cruz -- will participate as research assistants.

许多经济模型假设市场是无摩擦的--它们以100%的效率运行，买家和卖家之间几乎不需要互动。然而，实际市场面临着中等到严重的贸易摩擦，以及买家和卖家之间的各种联系。理论家们最近开发了新的模型来处理这些问题，但关于网络对市场表现的影响的经验知识还很少。这个项目将使用受控的实验室市场来收集这些知识。私人投资倡议将在一个高效率的拍卖交易程序中引入两个重要的市场摩擦。他们将创建两个独立的设置。首先，卖家可能会在产品质量上欺骗买家。在第二种情况下，买家可能不知道所有的卖家价格，所以买家可能会错过一些低成本的购买机会。然后，他们将通过一个模仿社交网络链接的网络将买家和卖家“联系起来”。拥有相同网络的买家和卖家知道网络中还有谁是骗子，谁是低成本卖家。其目标是确定摩擦如何影响市场结果，以及网络是否能够克服这些摩擦以再次实现效率。更好地了解网络如何影响市场绩效将为几个领域的政策改革提供更坚实的基础。有兴趣增加国内电子市场或金融资产交易量的政策制定者将从这些结果中受益。此外，一个社会群体之间的网络被认为是移民如何融入美国社会的差异的解释。这项研究将有助于理解网络如何产生这样的影响。由三所不同院校的本科生组成的多元化的全球社区--Mt.霍利奥克学院、旧金山大学和加州大学圣克鲁兹分校--将作为研究助理参加。