Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: An Experimental Study of Imperfect Information and Buyer Search with Differentiated Products

经济学博士论文研究：不完全信息与差异化产品买家搜索的实验研究

• 批准号: 0418177
• 负责人: Timothy Cason
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Purdue University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2004
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2004-08-15 至 2007-01-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0418177&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Economics; Experimental

We use experimental methods to examine the impact of costly information on firms' pricing strategies in a differentiated goods environment. The basic underlying feature of this differentiated goods setup is that consumers care about more than just finding the lowest possible price; they also consider how well the product attributes match their tastes and therefore search for a product with the best price-match combination. The experimental design is structured around Anderson and Renault's (2000) theoretical framework. Their model yields different price and welfare predictions depending on whether the information imparted to the consumer relates to price or product attributes. For instance, providing price information decreases the equilibrium price, while providing information about product characteristics curtails consumer search and raises the price. In fact, the price when consumers are match informed is greater than when they receive no information at all. This is in sharp contrast to a widely accepted proposition of economic theory that improved information leads to lower prices, thereby creating a positive externality for the consumers. Additionally, the timing of information also matters. The price is greatest when consumers are informed about the match values from both firms prior to engaging in costly search. This occurs because informed consumers first visit the firm from which their match value is greater and consequently decrease the demand inelasticity. This dissertation research project will use economic experiments to better understand how information about retail prices affects outcomes in markets where there are only a small number of sellers. The researcher will conduct duopoly experiments employing the posted offer trading institution, which closely resembles the conventional retail trading environments. Four different information environments will be compared. The No-Information treatment (NI) forms a baseline to which two other sets of treatments are compared. In the Price Information (PI) and the Match Information (MI) treatments, after all consumers have searched one of the firms, half of them become costlessly informed about the price or their match values from the second firm. Comparing these two treatments provides insight on how the content of information affects firms' pricing strategies. The impact of the timing of information is measured by comparing the Match information (MI) treatment with the pre-search Match information (PMI) treatment, in which half of the consumers know their match values from both firms before searching. This experimental design will improve our understanding of the mechanisms at work in retail market transactions, which are often plagued by informational asymmetries, and thereby provide a basis for sounder policy choices. For instance, various consumer protection regulations stipulated by the Federal Trade Commission that are aimed towards curbing the harms of "imperfect information" should take into account the nature and market impact of the informational imperfection, and not just its mere existence.

我们使用实验方法来检验在差异化商品环境中，昂贵信息对企业定价策略的影响。这种差异化商品设置的基本基本特征是，消费者关心的不仅仅是找到可能的最低价格；他们还考虑产品属性与他们的品味匹配程度，从而搜索具有最佳价格匹配组合的产品。实验设计是围绕安德森和雷诺(2000)的理论框架进行的。他们的模型根据传递给消费者的信息是与价格还是产品属性相关，产生了不同的价格和福利预测。例如，提供价格信息会降低均衡价格，而提供有关产品特征的信息会减少消费者的搜索并提高价格。事实上，当消费者收到匹配通知时，价格比他们根本没有收到任何信息时要高。这与一个被广泛接受的经济理论命题形成鲜明对比，即改善信息导致更低的价格，从而为消费者创造正的外部性。此外，信息发布的时机也很重要。当消费者在进行昂贵的搜索之前被告知两家公司的匹配价值时，价格最高。这是因为知情的消费者首先访问他们匹配价值较大的公司，从而降低了需求的不弹性。这篇论文的研究项目将使用经济实验来更好地理解关于零售价格的信息如何影响只有少量卖家的市场的结果。研究人员将利用发布要约交易机构进行双寡头实验，这种交易机构非常类似于传统的零售交易环境。将对四种不同的信息环境进行比较。无信息治疗(NI)形成了基线，并与其他两组治疗进行比较。在价格信息(PI)和匹配信息(MI)处理中，在所有消费者搜索了其中一家公司后，他们中的一半从第二家公司获得关于价格或他们的匹配价值的免费信息。通过比较这两种处理方法，可以深入了解信息内容如何影响企业的定价策略。通过比较匹配信息(MI)处理和搜索前匹配信息(PMI)处理来衡量信息定时的影响，其中一半消费者在搜索之前从两家公司知道他们的匹配值。这一实验设计将提高我们对零售市场交易中作用机制的理解，零售市场交易经常受到信息不对称的困扰，从而为更合理的政策选择提供基础。例如，联邦贸易委员会制定的旨在遏制“不完美信息”危害的各种消费者保护条例应考虑到信息不完美的性质和市场影响，而不仅仅是它的存在。