Laboratory Studies of Transgression, Collective Resistance and social Interactions

越轨、集体抵抗和社会互动的实验室研究

• 批准号: 0516761
• 负责人: Timothy Cason
• 金额: $ 15.1万
• 依托单位: Purdue University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2005
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2005-08-01 至 2008-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0516761&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Laboratory; Studies; Transgression; Collective; Resistance

This study uses experimental methods to study the conflict between a leader and a set of subordinates in a collective resistance game (CR game) that has been influential in the political economy literature and has important applications in organizational economics. Thisgame captures the idea that the leader's decision regarding whether to transgress againstsubordinates' rights depends crucially on his expectation of whether subordinates will succeed in challenging his power when transgression takes place, and how a successful challenge requires the subordinates to solve a coordination problem. The project first studies simple variants of this CR game to understand empirically how well subordinates can solve this coordination problem. It then embeds the CR game in different environments to understand how differences in social contexts-for example, the existence of particular communication opportunities, different types of repeated play, and prior interactions between the players which can potentially foster trust between them-canaffect the subordinates' abilities to solve their coordination problem and the incidence oftransgression. It also represents a serious attempt to develop controlled methods for increasing trust and social capital in the laboratory to better understand how these factors influence later social interactions.Broader Impacts. The research has important implications for practical policy conclusions and prescriptions. Results should provide insights useful for understanding how political and social institutions can affect the incentive and ability of a political leader ("sovereign") to violate citizen rights and expropriate surplus from less powerful members of society. Another important application will be the deterrence of opportunistic behavior by the leader in organizational economics. The leader (such as a CEO) has the power to define the rules of the game that govern interactions within the firm, which leads to a "managerial dilemma" and interests of firm owners to prevent the organizational leader from violating rights of subordinates or otherwise altering the rules of the game to his advantage.The study is also projected to have a broad impact for teaching, learning, participation byunderrepresented groups and for building partnerships. The project will employ over 800undergraduate student subjects drawn from a large and diversified student population at Purdue University and will provide these students with important exposure to modern research methods. Many of these subjects, drawn from economics and management classes, will be non-science majors. Engaging undergraduate students in economics experiments will hopefully motivate their curiosity and it may even stimulate sufficient interest in some of them that they will choose to pursue a research career in the discipline. [It was the introduction to experiments in his undergraduate studies that inspired the principal investigator to make such a career choice.] The VSEEL laboratory at Purdue has an excellent record of involving members of underrepresented minority groups at both the undergraduate and graduate levels and this project is expected to continue this tradition.

本研究采用实验方法，研究领导者和一组下属之间的冲突，在集体抵抗游戏（CR游戏），已在政治经济学文献中有影响力，并在组织经济学中有重要的应用。这个游戏抓住了这样一个观点，即领导者关于是否侵犯下属权利的决定，关键取决于他对下属是否会成功挑战他的权力的期望，以及成功的挑战如何要求下属解决协调问题。该项目首先研究这个CR游戏的简单变种，以了解经验如何以及下属可以解决这个协调问题。然后，它嵌入在不同的环境中的CR游戏，以了解社会背景的差异，例如，存在特定的沟通机会，不同类型的重复播放，以及球员之间的事先互动，可以潜在地培养他们之间的信任，可以影响下属的能力，以解决他们的协调问题和违规的发生率。它也代表了一种认真的尝试，即在实验室中开发增加信任和社会资本的受控方法，以更好地了解这些因素如何影响后来的社会互动。该研究对实际的政策结论和处方具有重要意义。研究结果应提供有用的见解，了解政治和社会制度如何影响激励和能力的政治领导人（“主权”）侵犯公民权利和没收盈余的社会较弱的成员。另一个重要的应用将是组织经济学中领导者对机会主义行为的威慑。领导人（如首席执行官）有权力定义游戏规则，管理公司内部的互动，这导致了“管理困境”和公司所有者的利益，以防止组织领导者侵犯下属的权利或以其他方式改变游戏规则，以他的优势。这项研究也预计将产生广泛的影响，教学，学习，代表性不足的群体的参与和建立伙伴关系。该项目将雇用800多名来自普渡大学庞大而多样化的学生群体的本科生，并将为这些学生提供重要的现代研究方法。这些课程中有许多是从经济学和管理学课程中挑选出来的，将是非理科专业。让本科生参与经济学实验有望激发他们的好奇心，甚至可能激发他们中的一些人的足够兴趣，他们将选择从事该学科的研究事业。[It是他本科学习中实验的介绍，激发了首席研究员做出这样的职业选择。普渡大学的VSEEL实验室在本科和研究生阶段都有涉及代表性不足的少数群体成员的良好记录，预计该项目将继续这一传统。