Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: An Experimental Study of Contest Games with Asymmetry and Heterogeneous Groups

本研究以实验的方法探讨不同竞赛游戏中的个体行为。竞赛游戏被定义为个人或团体通过扩大努力或成本来赢得特定奖品的情况。例子包括大学录取和晋升竞争，以及不同国家和政党花费资源游说自己利益的全球关系。第一部分针对不同支付者之间的非对称估值问题和竞争中的时间效应。竞争理论预测，更多的非对称竞争比对称竞争产生更高的竞争。研究还发现，时机的影响关键取决于球员作出决定的顺序。这些预测是用实验室实验来检验的。这个项目的第二部分研究异质群体之间的竞争。现有的文献大多是建立在投票模型中，一个主题的选择空间是有限的二元决策：是否投票或不。相比之下，在这个项目中，受试者可以在连续的策略空间上做出他们的决策。群体之间的异质性来自于每个群体中参与者之间的差异。该理论推导出以下可检验的假设：只有每个组中具有最高估值的参与者才在均衡中扩大积极努力;贡献水平和竞赛博弈的结果与参与者的数量无关;贡献不取决于组中估值的分布，而只取决于每个组中的最高估值。最后，该项目的第三部分使用实验室实验来研究几种替代竞赛的效率和潜在的浪费努力：四种同时进行的竞赛和三种连续的竞赛。同时举行的比赛包括一场大比赛，两个多奖项设置（平等和不平等的奖品），以及一场由两个子比赛组成的比赛。顺序竞赛是顺序淘汰竞赛、两阶段树竞赛和带有结转的两阶段树竞赛。其他的理论和行为模型，如不平等厌恶理论和量子反应平衡被用来解释受试者偏离理论预测

This project uses experimental methods to investigate individual behavior in different contest games. A contest game is defined as a situation in which individuals or groups compete with one another by expanding effort or cost to win a specific prize. Examples range from college admissions and competition for a promotion, to global relationships in which different countries and political parties expend resources to lobby their own interests.This project consists of three parts. The first part targets the issue of asymmetric valuations between different payers and the effect of timing in contests. Contest theory predicts that more asymmetric contests generate higher competition than symmetric contests. It is also found that the effect of timing crucially depends on the order in which players make their decisions. These predictions are tested using laboratory experiments.The second part of this project studies competition between heterogeneous groups. The existing literature is built mostly on voting models in which a subjects' choice space is limited to a binary decision: whether to cast a vote or not. By contrast, in this project subjects can make their decisions on continuous strategy space. The heterogeneity between groups arises from the differences between the players within each group. The following testable hypothesis are derived from the theory: only players with the highest valuation in each group expand positive efforts in the equilibrium; contribution levels and the outcome of the contest game are independent of the number of players; and contributions do not depend on the distribution of the valuations in the group, but only on the highest valuation in each group. Finally, the third part of the project uses laboratory experiments to investigate the efficiency and potentially wasteful efforts of several alternative contests: four simultaneous and three sequential contests. The simultaneous contests include a grand contest, two multiple prize settings (equal and unequal prizes), and a contest which consist of two subcontests. The sequential contests are a sequential elimination contest, a two-stage tree contest, and a two-stage tree contest with carryovers. Alternative theoretical and behavioral models such as inequality-averse theory and quantal response equilibrium are used to explain subjects' deviations from the theoretical predictions