Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: An Experimental Study on Forward Induction: Incorporating Some New Thoughts

本研究评估的适用性博弈论的概念，被称为向前归纳，在解决协调失败在一个非常简单的两个球员的情况下，在实验室实验。 如果玩家相信他们的对手是理性的，那么对手在游戏的早期阶段所采取的行动可能会传达他们在游戏的后期阶段所打算采取的行动的信息。这样，参与者就更容易协调，以达到互利的结果。多重均衡情况下的选择问题一直是博弈理论家面临的挑战。 在缺乏协调的情况下，这一问题往往导致有关各方的收益效率低下的结果。 多年来，我们已经看到了不同的方法来完善平衡概念的发展，但几乎没有一个似乎是令人满意的，特别是从实用的角度来看。在这种情况下，前向归纳的概念有潜力成为一个实际的解决方案的协调problem.Broader影响：协调失败是一个关注的任何学科，如管理，市场营销，信息技术和经济学，在那里我们分析战略互动和稳定属性的来源。 前向归纳的概念似乎是解决这个问题的一个相当简单和直观的解决方案，它的使用可以避免协调失败和许多真实的生活情况下的效率损失。 此外，前向归纳的概念是基于对竞争对手的理性的信念。 如果参与者是真正理性的，那么前向归纳应该是解决协调失败的有效方法。 因此，本研究的结果也将是对运动员的理性及其对对手理性的信念的一个间接测试。以往关于前向归纳的实验研究并没有发现太多支持前向归纳的证据，并且遭受了不确定的结果。 这种不确定性可能源于这些早期研究设计中的一些缺陷。 通过改进实验设计，可以避免这一问题，同时可以得出关于前向归纳的有效性和适用性的有效结论。 此外，在以前的研究中使用的游戏是公平游戏。 目前的研究控制的影响，他人关注被混淆与向前诱导效应。 这是通过特殊的治疗来实现的。 总之，在这一领域有许多需要探讨的问题，这将丰富我们的知识。

This study assesses the applicability of a game theoretic concept, known as the forward induction, in resolving coordination failures in a very simple two-player situation in lab experiments. If players believe their opponents to be rational, actions taken by the opponents in the earlier stages of the game might convey information about their intended actions in the later stages of the game. Then it might be easier for the players to coordinate towards a mutually beneficial outcome.The problem of selection in a situation with multiple equilibria has always posed a challenge to game theorists. In the absence of coordination this problem often leads to outcomes that are inefficient in terms of the payoffs of the parties involved. Over the years we have seen the development of different approaches towards the refinement of equilibrium concepts but hardly any of them seems to be satisfactory especially from the practical viewpoint. In this context, the concept of forward induction has the potentiality to be a practical solution for the coordination problem.Broader Impact: Coordination failure is a source of concern in any discipline, such as management, marketing, information technology and economics, where we analyze strategic interaction and the stability properties. The concept of forward induction seems to be a fairly simple and intuitive solution to this problem, and its use could avoid coordination failures and the loss of efficiency in many real life situations. Also, the concept of forward induction is based on the belief about rivals' rationality. If players are truly rational, then forward induction should be an effective solution to coordination failures. Therefore, the results of this study will also be an indirect test of players' rationality and their belief about opponents' rationality.Previous experimental studies on forward induction did not find much support for forward induction and suffered from inconclusive results. This inconclusiveness might arise from some flaws in the design of these earlier studies. With improved experimental design, this problem can be avoided and at the same time valid conclusions on the effectiveness and applicability of forward induction can be drawn. Also, the games used in the previous studies are fairness games. The current study controls for the effects of other-regarding from being confounded with the forward induction effects. This is achieved with particular treatments. In sum, there is much to be explored in this area that will enrich our knowledge.