Collaborative Research: CT-T: DoS Prevention in Shared Channels

提案编号：0524269标题：PI：Carl Gunter分析和预防拒绝服务（DoS）威胁的方法对于设计健壮的Internet协议具有重要价值。已经做了很多工作，制定务实的解决方案，以协议特定的拒绝服务威胁，但缺乏现实的理论模型研究拒绝服务和广泛的范例设计拒绝服务弹性协议。该项目开发了基于“共享信道模型”的理论模型，该模型描述了对手和有效攻击者如何共享攻击目标的网络带宽。它利用这个模型来设计对策的基础上的一个范例，在该范例中，被对手利用的协议工作负载的不对称性被系统地转换为受信任方的优势。具体的项目目标包括开发（1）获得可用于调整现有协议或创建新协议的DoS弹性的一般技术;（2）自动化协议的DoS分析的方法，以减少在理论上确认实际可用性属性和在部署协议之前发现意外攻击所需的工作量;（3）基于现有的代数技术和新的概率技术的完整性、机密性和可用性的统一模型。

Proposal Number: 0524269Title: DoS Prevention in Shared ChannelsPI: Carl GunterMethods for analyzing and preventing Denial of Service (DoS) threats are of fundamental value for designing robust Internet protocols. Much work has been done to develop pragmatic solutions to protocol-specific DoS threats, but there is a lack of realistic theoretical models for studying DoS and of broad paradigms for designing DoS-resilient protocols. This project develops theoretical models based on a "shared channel model" which describes how adversaries and valid senders share the network bandwidth of attack targets. It exploits this model to design counter-measures based on a paradigm in which asymmetries in protocol workloads that are exploited by adversaries are systematically converted to the advantage of trusted parties. Specific project goals include developing (1) general techniques for obtaining DoS-resilience that can be used to adapt existing protocols or create new ones; (2) ways to automate DoS analysis of protocols to reduce the effort required to confirm practical availability properties theoretically and find unexpected attacks before protocols are deployed; and (3) a unified model of integrity, confidentiality, and availability based on both existing algebraic techniques and new probabilistic techniques.