Intensity Bias in Temporal Emotional Comparisons

时间情感比较中的强度偏差

• 批准号: 0552120
• 负责人: Leaf Van Boven
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: University of Colorado at Boulder
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2006
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2006-03-01 至 2011-02-28
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0552120&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Intensity; Bias; Temporal; Emotional; Comparisons

How do people make judgments and decisions about the intensity of different emotions experienced over time? How, for example, do people decide upon the allocation of resources toward mitigating different frightening risks they learn about over time? Do they devote more to preventing the kinds of bad things they have recently experienced intense emotion about rather than those that might be more likely but that they have not so recently experienced intensely? Similarly, how do they decide upon the allocation of charitable funds among different distressing humanitarian needs? Do they give more to causes that have distressed them recently rather than some time ago? This research will extend preliminary studies demonstrating that people exhibit an intensity bias when they make such temporal emotional comparisons, judging immediate emotions to be more intense, all else equal, than previous emotions.Nine studies will test the hypothesis that people exhibit an intensity bias because (a) they judge emotional intensity based on the accessibility of detailed information about different emotions experienced over time, and (b) information about immediate emotions is usually more accessible than information about previous emotions. The studies will test, for example, the prediction that people judge risks of terrorism that happen to arouse immediate anxiety to be more dangerous and worthy of mitigation than equivalently severe risks that happen to have aroused previous anxiety. The studies will also test the prediction that people judge humanitarian suffering that happens to arouse immediate distress as more severe and worthy of charitable resources than humanitarian suffering that happens to have aroused previous distress. The proposed studies will advance basic scientific knowledge regarding the interplay between emotion, judgment, and decision-making. Understanding these processes will enable citizens and policy makers to make more informed decisions.

人们如何对随着时间推移经历的不同情绪的强度做出判断和决定？例如，人们如何决定如何分配资源，以减轻他们随着时间推移了解到的不同可怕风险？他们是否更多地致力于防止他们最近经历过强烈情绪的那种糟糕的事情，而不是那些可能更有可能但他们最近没有那么强烈经历的事情？同样，他们如何决定在不同令人苦恼的人道主义需求之间分配慈善资金？他们会更多地投入到最近让他们苦恼的事业上，而不是一段时间之前吗？这项研究将扩展初步研究表明，当人们进行这种短暂的情绪比较时，他们表现出强度偏差，判断当前情绪比以前的情绪更强烈，其他一切都相同。九项研究将测试人们表现出强度偏差的假设，因为(A)他们根据随时间经历的不同情绪的详细信息的可获得性来判断情绪强度，以及(B)关于即时情绪的信息通常比关于先前情绪的信息更容易获得。例如，这些研究将检验这样一种预测，即人们认为碰巧引起直接焦虑的恐怖主义风险比碰巧引起先前焦虑的同等严重的风险更危险，更值得缓解。这些研究还将检验这样一种预测，即人们对碰巧引起立即痛苦的人道主义痛苦的判断，比起碰巧引起先前痛苦的人道主义痛苦更严重，更值得慈善资源。拟议的研究将推进关于情绪、判断和决策之间相互作用的基本科学知识。了解这些过程将使公民和政策制定者能够做出更明智的决定。