Collaborative Research on Dynamic Antitrust Policy: Predatory and Limit Pricing in a Model of Learning-by-Doing and Organizational Forgetting

动态反垄断政策合作研究：边做边学和组织遗忘模型中的掠夺性定价和限制定价

• 批准号: 0615615
• 负责人: Ulrich Doraszelski
• 金额: $ 8.65万
• 依托单位: Harvard University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2006
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2006-08-01 至 2008-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0615615&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Dynamic; Antitrust; Policy

This project examines the extent to which predatory pricing and limit pricing arise in the Markov-perfect equilibrium of a model of industry dynamics in which firms face the prospect of learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting. A variety of standards for predatory pricing are applied, including the traditional Areeda & Turner (1975) standard of pricing below average variable cost and economic tests proposed by a number of scholars (e.g., Ordover & Willig (1981) and Cabral & Riordan (1997)). To date, there has been no work showing how economic and legal definitions of predatory pricing can be operationalized in a dynamic model of price competition with entry and exit, nor has there been a comprehensive analysis of the extent to which predation arises in equilibrium in such a model. In addition, there has been no work on the welfare effects of a ban on predatory pricing in a fully dynamic model. This research attempts to fill these gaps.Predatory pricing has been a contentious area of antitrust policy, with some scholars (e.g., McGee 1980) suggesting that predatory pricing is rare and ineffective, and other scholars (most notably, Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson in several papers) showing that predatory behavior can arise as an equilibrium phenomenon if firms are concerned with establishing a reputation for toughness. When learning economies are present, distinguishing predatory from non-predatory behavior is especially challenging because firms have both predatory and non-predatory reasons to charge a price below out-of-pocket cost. The non-predatory reason is that below-cost pricing makes it more likely that the firm moves further down its learning curve; even a monopolist may engage in below-cost pricing for this reason. The predatory reason is that by moving down its learning curve faster than its rivals, a firm may induce its rivals to exit the industry and make it unattractive for new entrants to come into the industry. The difficulty distinguishing predatory from non-predatory pricing was an issue in evaluating the pricing behavior of Japanese firms in the market for DRAM chips in the 1980s and 1990s (Flamm 1996).Broader impacts: This research is expected to have a broader social impact beyond its contributions to the theoretical literature in industrial organization (IO). Over the past few years, the IO literature has made considerable progress in analyzing the dynamics of an industry, and the equilibria of large dynamic stochastic games can now be computed fairly easily (even when there are multiple equilibria). In addition, scholars have made great advances in estimating the primitives of such dynamic models. In light of these advances, this analysis is expected to be an important step forward in providing agencies charged with developing and enforcing antitrust policy with a tool to determine in particular cases whether firms are likely to engage in predatory behavior and what the welfare consequences of a policy intervention are likely to be. More generally, this research is a step toward the goal of making dynamic analysis a standard methodology to answer questions of public policy.

这个项目研究了在何种程度上掠夺性定价和限制定价出现在马尔可夫完美均衡的行业动态模型中，企业面临的前景的学习做和组织遗忘。 掠夺性定价适用了各种标准，包括传统的Areeda Turner（1975）定价低于平均可变成本的标准和一些学者提出的经济测试（例如，Ordover Willig（1981）和Cabral Riordan（1997））。 到目前为止，还没有任何工作表明，如何在一个动态的价格竞争模型与进入和退出的掠夺性定价的经济和法律的定义可以操作，也没有一个全面的分析，在这种模型中的均衡掠夺出现的程度。 此外，在完全动态模型中，还没有关于禁止掠夺性定价的福利效应的研究。 掠夺性定价一直是反垄断政策中一个有争议的领域，一些学者（例如，McGee（1980）认为掠夺性定价是罕见的和无效的，其他学者（最著名的是Kreps，Milgrom，Roberts和Wilson在几篇论文中）表明，如果公司关心建立强硬的声誉，掠夺性行为可以作为一种均衡现象出现。 当学习型经济存在时，区分掠夺性和非掠夺性行为尤其具有挑战性，因为公司有掠夺性和非掠夺性的理由收取低于自付成本的价格。 非掠夺性的原因是，低于成本的定价使公司更有可能进一步沿着其学习曲线移动;甚至垄断者也可能因为这个原因而从事低于成本的定价。 掠夺性的原因是，通过比竞争对手更快地沿着学习曲线向下移动，一家公司可能会诱使竞争对手退出该行业，并使新进入者对该行业失去吸引力。 在20世纪80年代和90年代对DRAM芯片市场上日本企业的定价行为进行评价时，存在着难以区分掠夺性定价和非掠夺性定价的问题（Flamm 1996）。更广泛的影响：本研究除了对产业组织（IO）理论文献的贡献外，还将产生更广泛的社会影响。 在过去的几年里，IO文献在分析行业动态方面取得了相当大的进展，大型动态随机博弈的均衡现在可以相当容易地计算（即使有多个均衡）。 此外，学者们在估计这种动态模型的基元方面也取得了很大的进展。 鉴于这些进展，这种分析有望成为向前迈出的重要一步，为负责制定和执行反垄断政策的机构提供一种工具，以确定在特定情况下企业是否可能从事掠夺性行为以及政策干预可能带来的福利后果。 更一般地说，这项研究是朝着使动态分析成为回答公共政策问题的标准方法的目标迈出的一步。