Dynamic Strategic Corporate Finance

动态战略企业融资

• 批准号: 2117068
• 负责人: Ulrich Doraszelski
• 金额: $ 31.4万
• 依托单位: National Bureau of Economic Research Inc
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2021
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2021-08-01 至 2024-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2117068&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Dynamic; Strategic; Corporate; Finance

AbstractThis research develops a new benchmark theoretical model to understand how imperfections in financial markets impact the strategic interactions between individual firms and the long run dynamics of different industries. The interplay between limited access to capital markets and strategic behavior by firms can have a significant impact on prices, corporate investment and the degree of industrial concentration. The project will show that financial frictions are consequential for the industrial organization. The findings will have important implications for corporate finance by taking into account the strategic interplay between firms.This project will explore how financial market imperfections impact dynamic strategic interactions between firms and industry. The project will develop a new benchmark theoretical setting that integrates core insights about the impact of financial frictions on investment with dynamic industrial organization. The first project constructs a parsimonious baseline tug-of-war theoretical setting in which two firms compete to enjoy a dominant position. The second project develops a workhorse settings used in applied corporate finance to analyze the impact of financial frictions on investment. Baseline model yields three preliminary findings: (i) Financial frictions often lead firms charge lower prices in equilibrium; (ii) Financial frictions may slow down industry concentration; and (ii) Even when financial frictions lead to a more concentrated industry in the long run, there is higher investment along the way. The project, on the overall suggests that financial frictions may act as a pro-competitive force.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

摘要本研究发展了一个新的基准理论模型，以了解金融市场的不完善性如何影响单个企业之间的战略互动和不同行业的长期动态。有限的资本市场准入与公司战略行为之间的相互作用，可能对价格、公司投资和产业集中度产生重大影响。该项目将表明，金融摩擦是产业组织的后果。本研究将探讨金融市场的不完善性如何影响企业与产业之间的动态战略互动。该项目将开发一种新的基准理论设置，将有关金融摩擦对投资的影响的核心见解与动态产业组织相结合。第一个项目构建了一个简约的基线拔河理论设置中，两个公司竞争享有主导地位。第二个项目开发了应用企业融资中使用的主力设置，以分析金融摩擦对投资的影响。基线模型得出三个初步结论：（一）金融摩擦往往导致企业收取较低的价格在均衡;（二）金融摩擦可能会减缓产业集中度;（二）即使金融摩擦导致一个更集中的行业在长期来看，有较高的投资沿着。总体而言，该项目表明，金融摩擦可能会成为一种促进竞争的力量。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。