The Dynamics of Optimal Capital Structure and Compensation

最优资本结构与补偿的动态

• 批准号: 0617109
• 负责人: Harold Cole
• 金额: $ 22.23万
• 依托单位: National Bureau of Economic Research Inc
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2006
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2006-08-01 至 2011-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0617109&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Dynamics; Optimal; Capital; Structure; Compensation

This research on a theory of the optimal capital structure of the firm and the optimal compensation of the firm's managers is based on Michael Jensen's hypothesis that a firm's choice of capital structure is determined by a trade-off between agency costs and monitoring costs. The investigators model this tradeoff dynamically. The model assumes that early on in the production process, outside investors face an information friction with respect to withdrawing funds from the firm that dissipates over time. The model assumes that they also face an agency friction that increases over time with respect to funds left inside the firm. These frictions are binding for the duration of an accounting cycle over which the realization of the proceeds of the firm's productive activity is manifest. This simple structure is able to generate a rich theory of the financial structure of the firm. These frictions motivate the division of firm's payout into debt and outside equity payments, and the division of executive compensation into base pay and a performance bonus. The trade-off between the monitoring and agency costs associated with these frictions, along with the impact of shocks to productivity, lead to a theory of the dynamics of capital structure and compensation. To extend this model to a dynamic setting, the investigators assume that there is an information cycle in which outside investors first face an information friction and then face an agency friction. This cycle is repeated indefinitely. The investigators associate this cycle with an accounting or capital budgeting cycle at the firm. They show the qualitative decomposition of the optimal contract into four payments - base pay and performance pay for the manager, and debt and equity-like payments to the outside investors - holds both in a static setting in which there is only one information cycle, and in a dynamic setting in which there are an arbitrary number of information cycles. Thus, repetition of the contracting problem does not change, qualitatively, the interpretation of the efficient contract as a theory of capital structure and executive compensation.The investigators propose a number of extensions to this basic framework which will allow it to generate a surprisingly complete theory of corporate finance. The first extension is the role of financial hedges, which here turns out to be as an aid in fine-tuning the efficient contract when there is noncontingent debt. The second extension allows manager-specific productivity shocks which brings in the retention question and generates a motivation for golden parachute type payments with firing. The third extension allows for stochastic monitoring, which will not overturn the basic qualitative findings. The fourth extension allows for persistent productivity shocks. Finally, the investigators do a quantitative evaluation of a suitably calibrated version of the model. They present some interesting preliminary findings from the one-period model in which they show that the financial components of the efficient contract are much more sensitive to parameter changes than are the efficiency related variables. This finding suggests that their model will have interesting financial implications without also having implausibly large efficiency losses. Hence it may be consistent with the wide range of cross-industry differences in financial structure observed in the developed countries.Broader Impacts: The broader impact of our work is a comprehensive theory of the capital structure of the firm that can be used to address several long-standing questions in corporate finance. This theory is used to study the quantitative impact of financial frictions in macroeconomics.

本文基于Michael詹森的假设，即企业资本结构的选择取决于代理成本和监督成本之间的权衡，对企业最优资本结构和企业经理人最优报酬的理论进行了研究。 研究人员动态地模拟了这种权衡。该模型假设，在生产过程的早期，外部投资者面临的信息摩擦方面撤出资金的公司，随着时间的推移消散。 该模型假设，他们还面临着代理摩擦，随着时间的推移增加的资金留在公司。这些摩擦在一个会计周期内具有约束力，在这个会计周期内，企业生产活动的收益的实现是显而易见的。 这种简单的结构能够产生丰富的企业财务结构理论。 这些摩擦促使公司的支出分为债务和外部股权支付，并将高管薪酬分为基本工资和绩效奖金。与这些摩擦相关的监督和代理成本之间的权衡，沿着生产力冲击的影响，导致资本结构和补偿的动态理论。 为了将这一模型扩展到动态环境，研究人员假设存在一个信息周期，在这个周期中，外部投资者首先面临信息摩擦，然后面临代理摩擦。这个循环无限期地重复。调查人员将这个周期与公司的会计或资本预算周期联系起来。他们展示了最优契约的定性分解为四种支付方式--经理人的基本工资和绩效工资，以及对外部投资者的债务和类似股权的支付--在只有一个信息周期的静态环境和有任意数量的信息周期的动态环境中都成立。因此，合同问题的重复并没有改变，从质的角度来看，有效合同作为资本结构和高管薪酬理论的解释，研究者们对这个基本框架提出了一些扩展，这将使它能够产生一个令人惊讶的完整的公司融资理论。第一个扩展是金融对冲的作用，在这里，它被证明是在非或有债务的情况下，对有效契约进行微调的一种辅助手段。第二个扩展允许管理者特定的生产力冲击，这带来了保留问题，并产生了一个动机，金降落伞式的薪酬与解雇。第三个延伸允许进行随机监测，这不会推翻基本的定性结果。第四个延伸允许持续的生产力冲击。 最后，研究人员对模型的适当校准版本进行定量评估。他们提出了一些有趣的初步调查结果，从一个时期的模型，他们表明，有效的合同的财务组成部分是更敏感的参数变化比效率相关的变量。这一发现表明，他们的模型将有有趣的财务影响，而不会有令人难以置信的大效率损失。因此，它可能是一致的，在发达国家观察到的金融结构的广泛的跨行业差异。更广泛的影响：我们的工作的更广泛的影响是一个全面的理论，可以用来解决几个长期存在的问题，在公司融资的资本结构。 这一理论主要用于研究金融摩擦对宏观经济的定量影响。