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Dissertation Research in Political Science: Political Parties, Economic Policy, and Democratic Consolidation

Dissertation Research in Political Science: Political Parties, Economic Policy, and Democratic Consolidation
政治学论文研究:政党、经济政策和民主巩固
批准号:
0618047
负责人:
Herbert Kitschelt
金额:
$1.2万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2006
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2006-07-01 至 2007-06-30

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中文摘要
翻译
论文研究政治学:政党、经济政策和民主团结主要调查者:赫伯特·基舍尔特,杜克大学共同调查者:丹尼尔·凯尔曼,杜克大学在过去的15年里,人们对正式民主制度的政治和经济后果进行了大量研究。这一广泛领域中最突出的研究项目之一是研究选举机构对各种经济政策和结果的影响。尽管这是一项庞大而多样的工作,但它几乎一致援引了以下逻辑:选举机构安排了对立政党之间的竞争领域,根据一个国家的特定机构配置,向在任议员和选举候选人提供不同的政策激励。尽管这项研究很重要,但其理论和实证结果一直受到一系列内部矛盾的困扰。本文认为,这种矛盾产生于狭隘地关注政党之间的竞争(党间),而忽视了对政党内竞争(党内)的制度分析。这方面的初步调查(Kselman 2005,2006)表明,通过同时分析党内和党内竞争,可以更全面地了解选举机构对政治腐败、经济再分配和公共预算规模的影响。此外,将党内竞争纳入正式和经验模型,暴露了选举机构可能对民主巩固产生的影响。再次,初步的理论研究指明了可能损害民主稳定的特定制度组合。拟议的研究开发了一个博弈论模型,该模型产生了关于选举制度对经济政策和民主稳定的相互作用和相互影响的假设。为了以尽可能广泛的方式评估该理论的普遍适用性,用覆盖70-80个民主国家的跨国数据、1960年至2000年18个先进工业民主国家的汇集时间序列数据和土耳其6个月的密集实地考察补充了定性案例研究,对这些假设进行了检验。我在土耳其的时间将用于收集当地现有的关于1950年至今政党内部组织和经济政策性质的数据。此外,我还将确保并深入采访目前执政的正义与发展党的领导人,正义与发展党是一个具有伊斯兰传统的政党,最近采取行动集中其内部权力结构。理论和经验结果共同有助于阐明经济繁荣和民主稳定的体制基础。此外,在土耳其的实地考察将提供有关世界上在融合政治伊斯兰和民主竞争方面为数不多的成功之一的可持续性的实际信息。因此,拟议的研究旨在产生既具有科学严谨性又与促进个人和社会福祉相关的结果。
英文摘要
Dissertation Research in Political Science: Political Parties, Economic Policy, and Democratic ConsolidationPrincipal Investigator: Herbert Kitschelt, Duke UniversityCo-Investigator: Daniel Kselman, Duke University The last 15 years have witnessed a flood of research on the political and economic consequences of formal democratic institutions. One of the most prominent research programs within this broad field examines the effect of electoral institutions on a variety of economic policies and outcomes. Though a large and heterogeneous body of work, it has nearly unanimously invoked the following logic: electoral institutions structure the domain of competition between opposing political parties, providing incumbent legislators and electoral candidates varying policy incentives depending on a countrys particular institutional configuration. Despite the importance of this research, its theoretical and empirical findings have been plagued by a series of internal contradictions. The proposed dissertation argues that such contradictions arise from a narrow focus on competition between political parties (inter-party), at the expense of an institutional analysis of competition within political parties (intra-party). Preliminary investigation in this vein (Kselman 2005, 2006) suggests that a simultaneous analysis of inter and intra-party competition permits a more general understanding of electoral institutions consequences for political corruption, economic redistribution, and the size of the public budget. Furthermore, the incorporation of intra-party competition into both formal and empirical models exposes the affect electoral institutions may have on democratic consolidation. Again, preliminary theoretical investigation specifies particular institutional combinations which may be detrimental to democratic stability.The proposed research develops a game theoretic model which generates hypotheses concerning the mutual and interactive affect of electoral institutions on economic policy and democratic stability. To assess the general applicability of the theory in as broad a manner as possible, these hypotheses are tested with cross-national data covering 70-80 democratic countries; with pooled time series data from 18 advanced industrial democracies between 1960 and 2000; and with qualitative case research complemented by 6 months of intensive fieldwork in Turkey. My time in Turkey will be spent gathering locally available data on the internal organization of political parties and the nature of economic policy from 1950 to the present. As well, I will secure and conduct in depth interviews with leaders of the presently ruling Justice and Development Party, a party of Islamic heritage which has recently moved to centralize its internal power structures. Together the theoretical and empirical results help shed light on the institutional foundations of economic prosperity and democratic stability. Furthermore, the fieldwork in Turkey will provide hands on information regarding the sustainability of one of the few successes in the world in integrating political Islam and democratic competition. As such, the proposed research aims to produce results which are both scientifically rigorous and relevant in the promotion of individual and social well-being.
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