Dissertation Research in Political Science: Political Parties, Economic Policy, and Democratic Consolidation

政治学论文研究：政党、经济政策和民主巩固

• 批准号: 0618047
• 负责人: Herbert Kitschelt
• 金额: $ 1.2万
• 依托单位: Duke University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2006
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2006-07-01 至 2007-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0618047&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Dissertation; Research; Political; Science; Parties

Dissertation Research in Political Science: Political Parties, Economic Policy, and Democratic ConsolidationPrincipal Investigator: Herbert Kitschelt, Duke UniversityCo-Investigator: Daniel Kselman, Duke University The last 15 years have witnessed a flood of research on the political and economic consequences of formal democratic institutions. One of the most prominent research programs within this broad field examines the effect of electoral institutions on a variety of economic policies and outcomes. Though a large and heterogeneous body of work, it has nearly unanimously invoked the following logic: electoral institutions structure the domain of competition between opposing political parties, providing incumbent legislators and electoral candidates varying policy incentives depending on a countrys particular institutional configuration. Despite the importance of this research, its theoretical and empirical findings have been plagued by a series of internal contradictions. The proposed dissertation argues that such contradictions arise from a narrow focus on competition between political parties (inter-party), at the expense of an institutional analysis of competition within political parties (intra-party). Preliminary investigation in this vein (Kselman 2005, 2006) suggests that a simultaneous analysis of inter and intra-party competition permits a more general understanding of electoral institutions consequences for political corruption, economic redistribution, and the size of the public budget. Furthermore, the incorporation of intra-party competition into both formal and empirical models exposes the affect electoral institutions may have on democratic consolidation. Again, preliminary theoretical investigation specifies particular institutional combinations which may be detrimental to democratic stability.The proposed research develops a game theoretic model which generates hypotheses concerning the mutual and interactive affect of electoral institutions on economic policy and democratic stability. To assess the general applicability of the theory in as broad a manner as possible, these hypotheses are tested with cross-national data covering 70-80 democratic countries; with pooled time series data from 18 advanced industrial democracies between 1960 and 2000; and with qualitative case research complemented by 6 months of intensive fieldwork in Turkey. My time in Turkey will be spent gathering locally available data on the internal organization of political parties and the nature of economic policy from 1950 to the present. As well, I will secure and conduct in depth interviews with leaders of the presently ruling Justice and Development Party, a party of Islamic heritage which has recently moved to centralize its internal power structures. Together the theoretical and empirical results help shed light on the institutional foundations of economic prosperity and democratic stability. Furthermore, the fieldwork in Turkey will provide hands on information regarding the sustainability of one of the few successes in the world in integrating political Islam and democratic competition. As such, the proposed research aims to produce results which are both scientifically rigorous and relevant in the promotion of individual and social well-being.

政治学论文研究：政党、经济政策和民主巩固首席研究员：Herbert Kitschelt，杜克大学联合研究员：Daniel Kselman，杜克大学过去 15 年，出现了大量关于正式民主制度的政治和经济后果的研究。这一广泛领域中最著名的研究项目之一研究了选举制度对各种经济政策和结果的影响。虽然工作内容庞大且异构，但它几乎一致地援引了以下逻辑：选举制度构建了对立政党之间的竞争领域，根据国家特定的制度配置为现任立法者和选举候选人提供不同的政策激励。尽管这项研究很重要，但其理论和实证结果却受到一系列内部矛盾的困扰。本论文认为，这种矛盾源于对政党之间（党内）竞争的狭隘关注，而忽视了对政党内部（党内）竞争的制度分析。在这方面的初步调查（Kselman 2005，2006）表明，同时分析党内和党内竞争可以更全面地了解选举制度对政治腐败、经济再分配和公共预算规模的影响。此外，将党内竞争纳入正式和实证模型揭示了选举制度可能对民主巩固产生的影响。再次，初步的理论研究明确了可能不利于民主稳定的特定制度组合。本研究开发了一个博弈论模型，该模型生成了有关选举制度对经济政策和民主稳定的相互影响和相互作用的假设。为了尽可能广泛地评估该理论的普遍适用性，这些假设用涵盖 70-80 个民主国家的跨国数据进行了检验；汇集 18 个先进工业民主国家 1960 年至 2000 年间的时间序列数据；并辅以定性案例研究和土耳其 6 个月的密集实地考察。我在土耳其的时间将用于收集当地有关政党内部组织和 1950 年至今经济政策性质的数据。此外，我还将对目前执政的正义与发展党的领导人进行深入采访，该党是一个具有伊斯兰传统的政党，最近开始集中其内部权力结构。理论和实证结果共同有助于揭示经济繁荣和民主稳定的制度基础。此外，土耳其的实地考察将提供有关世界上为数不多的将政治伊斯兰与民主竞争相结合的成功之一的可持续性的实际信息。因此，拟议的研究旨在产生既具有科学严谨性又与促进个人和社会福祉相关的结果。