Mechanism Design for Profit Maximization

提案（0635147）：利润最大化的机制设计互联网具有不同程度的协作和竞争，已成为大规模分布式计算的事实上的平台。这激发了人们对资源分配和电子商务协议设计的大量研究，这些协议是在具有不同和自私利益的各方之间进行的。研究人员继续这条研究路线，重点研究机制设计，也被称为激励工程。机制是明确设计的协议（或算法），以便理性参与者仅受自身利益的驱动，最终实现设计者的目标。研究私人价值优化问题的机制设计是系统设计和有效运行的基础，例如网络和点对点系统，基于软件代理的系统（如人工智能所研究的），以及数据挖掘和电子商务系统。正在进行的主要智力挑战包括：(1)在机制设计中设计和分析新的、更有效和更高效的可实施技术，以实现利润最大化，特别是在在线和重复设置中；(2)制定利润基准理论；(3)利润最大化定价方案的设计与分析；(4)开发和研究备选解决方案概念和相应的适当分析框架；(5)将效用的新方面纳入机制设计的研究；(6)在重复博弈中探索新的设计和分析技术，如使用低内部后悔策略来实现近似相关均衡；(7)声誉理论的发展；(8)对其他具有有趣激励结构的实际问题的理论和实证研究，包括无线网络中的AD拍卖、路由和退让。

Abstract for Proposal No. 0635147:Mechanism Design for Profit MaximizationThe Internet, with its varying degrees of collaboration and competition, has become the de facto platform for large scale distributed computing. This has motivated a great deal of research into the design of protocols for resource allocation and electronic commerce among parties with diverse and selfish interests. The investigators continue this line of research, focusing on the study of mechanism design, also known as incentive engineering. A mechanism is a protocol (or algorithm) that is explicitly designed so that rational participants, motivated solely by their self-interest, end up achieving the designer's goals. Research into mechanism design for private value optimization problems is fundamental to the design and effective functioning of systems, such as networks and peer-to-peer systems, systems based on software agents (as studied in artificial intelligence), and systems for data mining and electronic commerce.The major intellectual challenges being undertaken include: (1) the design and analysis of new, more effective and efficiently implementable techniques for profit maximization in mechanism design, especially in online and repeated settings; (2) the development of a theory of profit benchmarks; (3) the design and analysis of profit-maximizing pricing schemes; (4) the development and study of alternative solution concepts and appropriate corresponding analysis frameworks; (5) the incorporation of new aspects of utility into the study of mechanism design; (6) the exploration of new design and analysis techniques in repeated games such as the use of low internal regret strategies to achieve approximate correlated equilibria; (7) the development of a theory of reputation; and (8) the theoretical and empirical study of other practical problems with interesting incentive structures, including ad auctions, routing, and backoff in wireless networks.