Mechanism Design for Profit Maximization

第0635147号提案摘要：利润最大化的机制设计互联网以其不同程度的协作和竞争，已成为大规模分布式计算的事实上的平台。这激发了大量的研究设计的协议，资源分配和电子商务的各方之间的不同和自私的利益。研究人员继续这条研究路线，重点研究机制设计，也被称为激励工程。机制是一种协议（或算法），它被明确设计，以便理性的参与者，完全由他们的自身利益驱动，最终实现设计者的目标。研究私有价值优化问题的机制设计对于系统的设计和有效运行具有重要意义，如网络和对等系统、基于软件代理的系统等（如人工智能所研究的），以及数据挖掘和电子商务系统。正在进行的主要智力挑战包括：（1）设计和分析新的、更有效的和可有效实施的技术，以在机制设计中实现利润最大化，特别是在在线和重复设置中;（2）发展利润基准理论;（3）利润最大化定价方案的设计和分析;（4）替代解决方案概念和适当的相应分析框架的开发和研究;（5）将效用的新方面纳入机制设计的研究中;（6）在重复博弈中探索新的设计和分析技术，如使用低内部后悔策略来实现近似相关均衡;（7）声誉理论的发展;（8）对具有有趣激励结构的其他实际问题的理论和实证研究，包括无线网络中的广告拍卖、路由和退避。

Abstract for Proposal No. 0635147:Mechanism Design for Profit MaximizationThe Internet, with its varying degrees of collaboration and competition, has become the de facto platform for large scale distributed computing. This has motivated a great deal of research into the design of protocols for resource allocation and electronic commerce among parties with diverse and selfish interests. The investigators continue this line of research, focusing on the study of mechanism design, also known as incentive engineering. A mechanism is a protocol (or algorithm) that is explicitly designed so that rational participants, motivated solely by their self-interest, end up achieving the designer's goals. Research into mechanism design for private value optimization problems is fundamental to the design and effective functioning of systems, such as networks and peer-to-peer systems, systems based on software agents (as studied in artificial intelligence), and systems for data mining and electronic commerce.The major intellectual challenges being undertaken include: (1) the design and analysis of new, more effective and efficiently implementable techniques for profit maximization in mechanism design, especially in online and repeated settings; (2) the development of a theory of profit benchmarks; (3) the design and analysis of profit-maximizing pricing schemes; (4) the development and study of alternative solution concepts and appropriate corresponding analysis frameworks; (5) the incorporation of new aspects of utility into the study of mechanism design; (6) the exploration of new design and analysis techniques in repeated games such as the use of low internal regret strategies to achieve approximate correlated equilibria; (7) the development of a theory of reputation; and (8) the theoretical and empirical study of other practical problems with interesting incentive structures, including ad auctions, routing, and backoff in wireless networks.