CAREER: New Dynamic Public Finance -- from Theory to Policy

职业：新动态公共财政——从理论到政策

• 批准号: 0645331
• 负责人: Aleh Tsyvinski
• 金额: $ 40万
• 依托单位: National Bureau of Economic Research Inc
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2007
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2007-01-15 至 2014-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0645331&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: CAREER; New; Dynamic; Public; Finance

One of the central questions in economics is how to design taxation and social insurance policy. This project pursues a broad program at the intersection of macroeconomics and public economics that will both contribute to the theoretical understanding of how policy should be conducted and provide practical recommendations that can be used by policymakers around the world. A recently emerged approach, New Dynamic Public Finance (NDPF), provides new methodology and a framework to answer these questions. However, the NDPF approach has delivered mostly theoretical or suggestive numerical predictions rather than implementable policy recommendations. The primary goal of this project is to move NDPF from theory to policy. Results of the project would be directly relevant for the design of capital and labor taxes, Social Security, and disability insurance system.The main focus of NDPF is the design of policy in dynamic settings, as many taxes such as tax on capital and many social insurance programs such as Social Security are dynamic or intertemporal. The NDPF approach brings two fundamental issues to the forefront of the design of optimal policy in dynamic settings: (1) society desires redistribution or social insurance as agents experience significant adverse shocks during their lifetime, e.g., becoming disabled, and (2) incentives are important because these shocks are private information, e.g., many forms of disability are notoriously difficult to ascertain. This approach has already delivered novel implications for important policy issues that include taxation of capital income and design of disability and social security systems. Specifically, this project achieves two objectives:1. Derive implementable policy implications in realistic quantitative models.2. Design policy that accounts for political economy considerations.Broader Impacts: The first part of the agenda is to study optimal policy using quantitative models that can capture empirically relevant features of the economic environment. Once developed, these models can be used as workhorse models for policy design of taxation and social insurance. The main focus here is quantitative and delivers the determinants and optimal form of capital and labor taxes as well as the form of benefits of optimal social insurance programs such as Social Security. Finally, this project focuses theoretically and quantitatively on a largely unexplored part of the New Dynamic Public Finance - how to optimally design taxes and social insurance over the business cycle. The second part of the research agenda is intimately linked to the first part, as the design of optimal policies would be irrelevant unless it takes into account the constraints that are faced by politicians implementing such policies. This project analyzes how policies should be designed to account for not only the social insurance versus incentives tradeoff but also the incentives of self-interested politicians. Second, this project studies how to design tax systems that are sustainable, i.e., able to mitigate political incentive problems. Finally, it investigates under which conditions markets can achieve superior allocations than those achieved by centralized governments.

经济学的核心问题之一是如何设计税收和社会保险政策。该项目在宏观经济学和公共经济学的交叉点上开展广泛的项目，这将有助于对政策应如何进行的理论理解，并提供可供世界各地政策制定者使用的实用建议。最近出现的新动态公共财政（NDPF）方法为回答这些问题提供了新的方法和框架。然而，国家发展政策框架的方法主要是提供理论性或建议性的数字预测，而不是可执行的政策建议。该项目的主要目标是将国家发展政策基金从理论变为政策。该项目的成果将直接关系到资本和劳动税、社会保障和残疾保险制度的设计。国家发展政策基金的主要重点是在动态环境中设计政策，因为许多税收，如资本税和许多社会保险方案，如社会保障是动态的或跨期的。国家发展政策框架的方法将两个基本问题带到了动态环境中最佳政策设计的最前沿：（1）社会希望重新分配或社会保险，因为行为人在其一生中会经历重大的不利冲击，例如，成为残疾人，以及（2）激励措施很重要，因为这些冲击是私人信息，例如，众所周知，许多形式的残疾很难确定。这一方法已经对重要的政策问题产生了新的影响，包括资本收入的征税以及残疾和社会保障制度的设计。具体来说，本项目实现了两个目标：1.在现实的量化模型中推导出可实施的政策含义。更广泛的影响：议程的第一部分是使用量化模型研究最优政策，这些模型可以捕捉经济环境的经验相关特征。这些模型一旦开发出来，就可以作为税收和社会保险政策设计的主力模型。这里的主要重点是定量的，并提供了资本和劳动税的决定因素和最佳形式，以及最佳社会保险计划（如社会保障）的福利形式。最后，本项目在理论和定量上侧重于新动态公共财政的一个基本上未被探索的部分-如何在商业周期中优化设计税收和社会保险。 研究议程的第二部分与第一部分密切相关，因为除非考虑到政治家在执行这些政策时所面临的制约因素，否则最佳政策的设计将毫无意义。该项目分析了如何设计政策，不仅要考虑社会保险与激励措施的权衡，还要考虑自利政客的激励措施。第二，本项目研究如何设计可持续的税收制度，即，能够缓解政治激励问题。最后，它调查在什么条件下，市场可以实现上级配置比中央政府实现。