Optimal Policy in Dynamic Informationally Constrained Economies

动态信息受限经济中的最优政策

• 批准号: 0551175
• 负责人: Aleh Tsyvinski
• 金额: $ 27.66万
• 依托单位: National Bureau of Economic Research Inc
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2006
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2006-02-15 至 2010-01-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0551175&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Optimal; Policy; Dynamic; Informationally; Constrained

This project merges techniques from public economics that analyze optimal allocations in the presence of informational frictions with the analysis of dynamic economies common in macroeconomics. The questions that motivate this project are on the intersection of macroeconomics and public economics:1. Given an informational friction what is an efficient policy?2. If markets are inefficient (which the investigators show is generally true in the presence of hidden trades) what should be government interventions such as bank regulations, and patents. The investigators have developed a range of techniques in a series of papers on dynamic optimal taxation. In Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2003) they derive a general characterization of the optimum for a dynamic Mirrlees economy. In Golosov and Tsyvinski (2003) they study optimal design of a disability insurance system and its implementation in the presence of dynamic private information and private savings. In Golosov and Tsyvinski (2004) they study optimal tax policy in a dynamic informationally constrained environment in the presence of endogenous private markets and they show that competitive markets with hidden trades are inefficient. This project further develops theoretical implications, describes novel applications, and provides quantitative evaluation for optimal policy in informationally constrained dynamic economies with hidden trades. They consider two questions of policy interest in which hidden trades play an important role: liquidity regulations of banks, and theory of optimal patents. While the applications are seemingly different, they share a similar theoretical structure -- how to design optimal policy in a dynamic environment in the presence of private information and hidden trades. First, they determine a general set of circumstances in which banks provide an inefficient level of liquidity in the presence of financial markets (trades), and show that a liquidity adequacy requirement implements the optimum. Second, they develop a model of innovation in which patents preclude hidden trade and copying and determine an optimal patent policy. The first part of the project studies a model of banks as providers of liquidity and risk sharing. There are two types of informational frictions in the model: unobservable demand for liquidity and the presence of financial markets. The investigators show that banks do not take into account how the contracts they offer affect prices on the financial markets and provide too little liquidity compared to the optimum. They then identify a simple intervention -- liquidity adequacy requirement -- that implements the optimal allocation. The second part of the project develops a theory of optimal patent length in a dynamic model of private innovation. The informational frictions are private information of the valuation of the good and possibility of hidden copying and production of a good. The investigators maintain that patents law, by preventing copying or production of a good, allows the innovator to price discriminate. The investigators show that optimal patent length depends on the tradeoff from the losses of price discrimination versus providing incentives to innovate. The investigators determine the optimal length of the patent for two technologies: good-embodied and externality based innovation. The results differ significantly from the literature on innovation that traditionally assumed linear prices. The investigators then provide a quantitative evaluation of both projects. They develop a calibrated general equilibrium model of liquidity provision by banks in the presence of financial markets that allows to numerically evaluate optimal regulation of financial intermediaries over the business cycle. They then study a quantitative model of innovation to determine optimal patents policy. Broader impact: The proposal will help policymakers to improve design of regulations of financial intermediaries and improve patent policy.

本课题将在存在信息摩擦的情况下分析最优分配的公共经济学技术与宏观经济学中常见的动态经济分析相结合。激发这个项目的问题是在宏观经济学和公共经济学的交叉点：1。在信息摩擦下，什么是有效的策略？2.如果市场是无效率的（调查人员表明，在存在隐藏交易的情况下，这通常是正确的），政府应该采取什么样的干预措施，如银行监管和专利。研究人员在一系列关于动态最优税收的论文中开发了一系列技术。在Golosov，Kocherlakota和Tsyvinski（2003）中，他们得出了动态Mirrlees经济最优的一般特征。在Golosov和Tsyvinski（2003）中，他们研究了在动态私人信息和私人储蓄存在的情况下，残疾保险制度的最佳设计及其实施。在Golosov和Tsyvinski（2004）中，他们研究了在内生私人市场存在的动态信息约束环境中的最优税收政策，他们表明具有隐藏交易的竞争性市场是无效率的。该项目进一步发展了理论含义，描述了新颖的应用，并为具有隐藏交易的信息约束动态经济中的最佳政策提供了定量评估。他们考虑了两个隐藏交易扮演重要角色的政策利益问题：银行的流动性监管和最优专利理论。虽然应用程序似乎不同，但它们具有相似的理论结构-如何在存在私人信息和隐藏交易的动态环境中设计最优策略。首先，他们确定了一套一般的情况下，银行提供了一个低效率的流动性水平，在金融市场（交易）的存在，并表明，流动性充足的要求实现了最佳。第二，他们开发了一种创新模式，在这种模式中，专利排除了隐藏的贸易和复制，并确定了最佳的专利政策。 该项目的第一部分研究银行作为流动性和风险分担提供者的模式。 模型中存在两类信息摩擦：不可观测的流动性需求和金融市场的存在。调查表明，银行没有考虑到他们提供的合同如何影响金融市场的价格，并且与最佳情况相比，提供的流动性太少。然后，他们确定了一个简单的干预-流动性充足率要求-实现最佳配置。 本项目的第二部分在私人创新的动态模型中发展了最佳专利期限理论。信息摩擦是关于商品价值的私人信息，是商品被隐藏复制和生产的可能性。调查人员认为，专利法通过防止复制或生产商品，允许创新者进行价格歧视。研究人员表明，最佳专利期限取决于价格歧视损失与提供创新激励之间的权衡。 研究人员确定了两种技术的最佳专利期限：良好体现和基于外部性的创新。 结果显着不同的文献创新，传统上假设线性价格。 然后，调查人员对这两个项目进行定量评估。他们开发了一个校准的一般均衡模型的流动性提供银行在金融市场的存在，允许数字评估金融中介机构在商业周期的最佳监管。然后，他们研究创新的定量模型，以确定最佳的专利政策。更广泛的影响：该提案将帮助政策制定者改进金融中介监管的设计，并改善专利政策。