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Auctions, Negotiations and Hybrid Mechanisms in Procurement

采购中的拍卖、谈判和混合机制

基本信息

批准号：
182496901
负责人：
Professor Dr. Achim Wambach
金额：
--
依托单位：
The University of Texas at Dallas
依托单位国家：
德国
项目类别：
Research Units
财政年份：
2011
资助国家：
德国
起止时间：
2010-12-31 至 2017-12-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/182496901?language=en
关键词：
Auctions Negotiations Hybrid Mechanisms Procurement

项目摘要

With the advances in information technology, auctions were in widespread use in procurement since the late 1990s. However, in recent years, the use of auctions decreased and hybrid mechanisms, combining features of (standard) auctions and negotiations, have more and more become the norm. These hybrid mechanisms are the focus of our subproject. In the first funding period we developed a better understanding of buyer-determined reverse auctions (BDRA), where the buyer decides on the winning bid, taking other criteria beside the price like quality into account. We could show that dynamic BDRAs, which play an important role in practice, are prone to tacit collusion. In BDRAs there is usually uncertainty about the buyer’s final decision rule and it is this uncertainty that enables collusive behavior. We also investigated in how far BDRAs lead to a different degree in the level of trust and cooperation between buyers and suppliers than auctions. We found significant differences between the two procurement formats. These results were organized by the application of a model that incorporates other-regarding preferences. We also analyzed in how far favoritism, i.e. the special treatment of a favorite bidder, is possible if non-transparent negotiations are used for procurement instead of auctions with clear rules. We could show that the common perception that auctions are less prone to favoritism does not hold in general, as in auctions the scope of the procurement process has to be defined by the agent in charge, thus allowing for favoritism. In the second funding period, we will widen the scope of our project by analyzing another commonly used feature of hybrid mechanisms, the “request-for-quote” (RFQ). RFQs potentially provide information about the number of bidders and the costs or cost distribution of bidders. The implications of this information on auction and negotiation design are the contents of our project. In two subprojects the influence of the RFQ on the subsequent negotiation design will be analyzed theoretically, experimentally and with field data. Two other subprojects extend the work done in the first funding period. In cooperation with projects P1, P2 and P5 we will investigate the influence of the negotiation protocol on the degree of trust between buyer and seller. In another subproject, we continue to investigate in how far auctions are more or less prone to favoritism than negotiations, now considering the situation where the agent in charge can bend the rules of the auction (rather than the scope) to favor one bidder.

随着信息技术的进步，自1990年代后期以来，拍卖在采购中得到广泛使用。然而，近年来，拍卖的使用有所减少，结合（标准）拍卖和谈判特点的混合机制越来越成为常态。这些混合机制是我们子项目的重点。在第一个融资期，我们更好地理解了买方决定的反向拍卖（BASY），即买方决定中标，同时考虑价格以外的其他标准，如质量。我们可以证明，在实践中发挥重要作用的动态BDRA容易发生默许共谋。在布雷顿森林机构和区域机构中，买方的最终决策规则通常存在不确定性，正是这种不确定性促成了串通行为。我们还调查了BDRA在多大程度上导致了买家和供应商之间的信任和合作水平与拍卖不同。我们发现这两种采购形式之间存在重大差异。这些结果是由一个模型，结合其他有关的偏好的应用程序。我们还分析了如果在采购中使用不透明的谈判而不是有明确规则的拍卖，那么偏袒，即对最喜欢的投标人的特殊待遇，可能在多大程度上发生。我们可以表明，认为拍卖较不容易出现偏袒的普遍看法一般并不成立，因为在拍卖中，采购过程的范围必须由负责代理人界定，从而允许偏袒。在第二个资助期内，我们将通过分析混合机制的另一个常用功能“请求报价”（Request-for-Quote，简称“询价”）来扩大项目的范围。询价单可能提供关于投标人数目和投标人成本或成本分布的信息。这些信息对拍卖和谈判设计的影响是我们项目的内容。在两个子项目中，将从理论、实验和现场数据分析谈判策略对后续谈判设计的影响。另外两个子项目扩展了第一个资助期内完成的工作。在与项目P1，P2和P5的合作中，我们将研究谈判协议对买方和卖方之间的信任程度的影响。在另一个子项目中，我们继续研究拍卖比谈判更倾向于偏袒的程度，现在考虑负责的代理人可以弯曲拍卖规则（而不是范围）以偏袒一个投标人的情况。