Doctoral Dissertation in Political Science: Political Competition and the Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment

政治学博士论文：政治竞争与外商直接投资监管

• 批准号: 0720041
• 负责人: Karen Remmer
• 金额: $ 1.18万
• 依托单位: Duke University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2007
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2007-08-01 至 2008-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0720041&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Political; Science; Competition

The research analyzes the effect of regime type on the choice of policies regulating the entry and operation of foreign companies. Despite wide consensus that foreign direct investment (FDI) contributes to economic development, foreign investment regulations in developing countries range from open to very restrictive. Some countries welcome foreign firms with straightforward regulations and generous investment incentives. By contrast, other governments keep in place regulatory barriers and cumbersome requirements that deter the entry of foreign companies. This research investigates these policy differences. It draws upon economic insights into the distributional consequences of FDI and a theory of political coalitions in differ political regimes to argue that democratic countries are more likely to adopt policies that foster foreign investment than non-democratic regimes. The theoretical rationale is relatively straightforward: dictatorships, which have small winning coalitions, use government policies to cater to the interests of those controlling enough instruments of power to keep the leader in office. These are members of the business elite, the army, or the party leadership in one-party systems, and are likely to be part of the wealthier group in society. By contrast, democratic regimes, which must maintain the support of large winning coalitions, choose policies that benefit the majority of the population?owners of labor. Since FDI inflows benefit the owners of factors of production that complement foreign capital and hurt the owners of factors of production for which FDI is a substitute. This theoretical framework and a formal model make specific predictions about the effect of regime type on each of the three different dimensions of FDI regulation?the regulation of foreign entry, taxation, and incentive programs?and on variation among sectoral policies. This research tests these hypotheses on the basis of statistical analysis using an original dataset on postcommunist nations and the in-depth examination of two theoretically important cases, Croatia and Belarus. The research contributes to four bodies of literature in political science, as well as to the very limited pool of quantitative data on national policies regulating FDI. It involves an intensive effort to collect and code information on FDI restrictions, taxation, and incentives for 28 postcommunist countries between 1990-2005. This dataset is the first to code incentives for FDI, as well as the first to combine information on FDI restrictions, taxation, and incentives. The dataset will be instrumental for future research investigating determinants of policy choice and the effect of government regulations on economic outcomes. At the theoretical level, the project has implications for four strands of research. First, it advances the debate over the nexus between regime type and economic growth by emphasizing policy choice as a mediating variable between political institutions and economic performance. Second, the research challenges many conclusions in the literature on economic reform, which suggest that reform is promoted by authoritarian regimes capable of overriding the opposition of concentrated interests that stand to lose from policy change. In contrast, this project advances the proposition that democracies have an inherent bias toward adopting policies that benefit large and diffuse groups in society despite the organized opposition of special interests. Third, the project advances research on the political economy of postcommunist transformations by emphasizing the political sources of policy differences among transition countries. Fourth, the project contributes to the emerging literature on regime type and FDI by advancing a series of hypotheses about the impact of political institutions on policy choice and exploring those hypotheses on the basis of an original dataset of FDI regulations. Finally, the study will also interest policy-makers who shape countries'' policy framework regulating the entry and operations of foreign firms. The FDI regulations dataset will contain a wide range of detailed information that allows for an evaluation of strategic policy choices and best practices in this policy domain.

本研究分析了制度类型对外国公司进入和经营管制政策选择的影响。尽管人们普遍认为外国直接投资有助于经济发展，但发展中国家的外国投资法规从开放到限制性很强不等。一些国家以简单的法规和慷慨的投资激励措施欢迎外国公司。相比之下，其他国家的政府则设置了监管壁垒和繁琐的要求，阻止外国公司进入。本研究探讨了这些政策差异。它借鉴了对外国直接投资的分配后果的经济见解和不同政治制度中的政治联盟理论，认为民主国家比非民主政权更有可能采取促进外国投资的政策。 理论上的基本原理相对简单明了：执政党拥有小规模的获胜联盟，利用政府政策来迎合那些控制着足够多权力工具的人的利益，以使领导人继续执政。这些人是商业精英、军队或一党制下的党的领导层成员，很可能是社会上较富裕群体的一部分。相比之下，民主政权必须保持大的获胜联盟的支持，选择有利于大多数人口的政策？劳动力的主人。因为外国直接投资流入有利于补充外国资本的生产要素的所有者，而损害外国直接投资所替代的生产要素的所有者。这一理论框架和一个正式的模型作出具体的预测制度类型的影响，每一个不同的层面上的外国直接投资监管？外国人进入、税收和激励计划的监管？以及部门政策之间的差异。本研究测试这些假设的统计分析的基础上，使用原始数据集的后共产主义国家和两个理论上重要的情况下，克罗地亚和白俄罗斯的深入研究。 这项研究为政治学中的四个文献机构作出了贡献，也为关于规范外国直接投资的国家政策的数量数据库作出了贡献。它涉及到一个密集的努力，收集和编码信息的外国直接投资限制，税收和激励措施，为28个后共产主义国家在1990年至2005年。该数据集是第一个对外国直接投资激励措施进行编码的数据集，也是第一个将外国直接投资限制、税收和激励措施信息联合收割机结合起来的数据集。该数据集将有助于未来的研究调查政策选择的决定因素和政府法规对经济成果的影响。 在理论层面上，该项目对四个方面的研究产生了影响。首先，它通过强调政策选择作为政治制度和经济绩效之间的中介变量，推进了关于制度类型和经济增长之间关系的辩论。第二，这项研究挑战了经济改革文献中的许多结论，这些结论认为，改革是由威权政权推动的，威权政权能够压倒集中利益集团的反对，而这些利益集团可能会因政策变化而受损。相反，这个项目提出的主张，民主国家有一个固有的偏见，采取有利于大型和分散的社会群体的政策，尽管有组织的特殊利益的反对。第三，该项目通过强调转型国家之间政策差异的政治来源，推进了对后共产主义转型的政治经济学研究。第四，该项目通过提出一系列关于政治制度对政策选择的影响的假设，并在外国直接投资法规的原始数据集的基础上探索这些假设，为有关制度类型和外国直接投资的新兴文献做出了贡献。 最后，这项研究还将使制定国家管制外国公司进入和经营的政策框架的决策者感兴趣。外国直接投资法规数据集将包含广泛的详细信息，以便对这一政策领域的战略政策选择和最佳做法进行评估。