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Collaborative Research: Economies with Dispersed Information

Collaborative Research: Economies with Dispersed Information
合作研究:信息分散的经济
批准号:
0721048
负责人:
Alessandro Pavan
金额:
$0.0万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Continuing Grant
财政年份:
2007
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2007-08-15 至 2011-07-31

项目摘要

项目成果

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中文摘要
翻译
该项目研究经济体的均衡、效率和政策,这些经济体的信息分散,涉及共同相关的经济基本面,如新技术的盈利能力、金融资产的回报率或总生产率和需求状况。 以前的工作研究了信息的均衡使用,以及它对福利的影响,假设所有的信息都是外生的。 目前的项目扩展的理论,以适应内源性渠道的信息汇总,如观察数据的过去的总活动,在金融市场的价格,以及内源性收集的私人信息。然后,该项目通过识别信息均衡处理方式中潜在的低效率,并研究可能纠正这种低效率的政策,而不允许政府集中信息。 这里考虑的政策实践是新颖的,与哈耶克的观点一致,即“社会的经济问题是...这是一个利用知识的问题,而知识并不是全部给予任何人的。“更广泛的影响这项研究的更广泛的影响是:(一)加深对一类重要模型的积极和规范性质的理论理解;(二)使理论更接近现实世界的应用;(三)确定金融市场、投资或商业周期中波动和低效率的潜在来源;(四)确定金融市场、投资或商业周期中波动和低效率的潜在来源。(iv)指导政策,以改善分散的信息在分散的市场经济中的使用方式。
英文摘要
This project studies equilibrium, efficiency and policy in economies with dispersed information about commonly-relevant economic fundamentals, such as the profitability of new technologies, returns to financial assets, or aggregate productivity and demand conditions. Previous work studied the equilibrium use of information, and its implications for welfare, assuming that all information is exogenous. The current project extends the theory so as to accommodate endogenous channels of information aggregation, such as the observation of data on past aggregate activity, prices in financial markets, as well as endogenous collection of private information. The project then proceeds by identifying potential inefficiencies in the way information is processed in equilibrium and studying policies that may correct such inefficiencies, without allowing the government to centralize information. The policy exercise considered here is novel and is consistent with Hayek's view that "the economic problem of society is ... a problem of the utilization of knowledge which is not given to anyone in its totality."Broader impactsThe broader impacts of this research are to (i) deepen the theoretical understanding of the positive and normative properties of an important class of models; (ii) bring the theory closer to real-world applications; (iii) identify potential sources of volatility and inefficiency in financial markets, investment, or the business cycle; and (iv) guide policy towards improving the way dispersed information is used in decentralized market economies.
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Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms: Theory and Applications
  • 批准号:
    2315652
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $27.84万
  • 财政年份:
    2023
  • 负责人:
    Alessandro Pavan
  • 依托单位:
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  • 批准号:
    1730483
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $27.6万
  • 财政年份:
    2017
  • 负责人:
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Dynamic Matching: Experimentation, and Cross-Subsidization
  • 批准号:
    1530798
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
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  • 财政年份:
    2015
  • 负责人:
    Alessandro Pavan
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Price Discrimination and Competition in Many-to-Many Matching Markets
  • 批准号:
    1156077
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $26.68万
  • 财政年份:
    2012
  • 负责人:
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  • 依托单位:
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海外基金
Research on Quantum Field Theory without a Lagrangian Description
  • 批准号:
    24ZR1403900
  • 项目类别:
    省市级项目
  • 资助金额:
    --
  • 批准年份:
    2024
  • 负责人:
    SATOSHI NAWATA
  • 依托单位:
Cell Research
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