Coordination and Information Design

该奖项资助经济理论研究，考虑如何使用信息披露，以说服个人协调行动，使每个人受益。例如，假设一家银行面临潜在的银行挤兑，而存款人保险却不可用。在这种情况下，政府政策披露有关银行全部贷款组合和出色的长期盈利能力的信息，可能会说服储户继续留在银行。研究小组希望了解在两种不同情况下披露信息的最佳方式;第一，当所有人都看到披露时，第二，当披露可以向某些人而不是其他人进行时。该项目与银行业和金融业的许多应用有关，可以帮助改善旨在促进金融稳定的政策，例如所谓的“压力测试”。该项目研究市场中的说服力，其中大量代理人必须选择是否协调社会可取的行动或采取行动反对现状。代理人被赋予了关于潜在经济基本面的异质私人信息。分析的重点是最佳信息披露的属性，无论是在机制设计者必须向所有参与者披露相同的信息，以及私人披露的情况下。该项目结合了经济理论不同领域的思想：稳健的机制设计，说服游戏和协调游戏。该小组还将扩展他们的分析，考虑在政策制定者不确定市场参与者之间信念的初始分布的情况下，披露政策的设计。他们还将考虑重复攻击的可能性以及市场中最佳政策的特征，在这些市场中，设计者必须在与市场沟通之前从受审查的实体那里征求信息。

This award funds research in economic theory that considers how to use information disclosures in order to persuade individuals to coordinate actions to benefit everyone. For example, suppose a bank faces a potential bank run and depositor insurance is not available. In this case, a government policy disclosing information about the bank's full portfolio of loans and excellent long-run profitability could convince depositors to stay with the bank. The research team wants to understand the best ways to disclose information under two different circumstances; first, when all individuals see the disclosures and second, when disclosures can be made to some people but not to others. The project is relevant to many applications in banking and finance and could help to improve policies designed to promote financial stability such as so-called 'stress-tests'.The project studies persuasion in markets in which a large number of agents must choose whether to coordinate on a socially-desirable action or else take action against the status quo. Agents are endowed with heterogeneous private information about the underlying economic fundamentals. The analysis focuses on properties of optimal information disclosures, both in the case in which the mechanism designer must disclose the same information to all participants as well as the case of private disclosures. The project combines ideas from separate areas of economic theory: robust mechanism design, persuasion games, and coordination games. The team will also extend their analysis to consider the design of disclosure policies in settings in which the policy maker is uncertain about the initial distribution of beliefs among market participants. They will also consider the possibility of repeated attacks and the characterization of optimal policies in markets in which the designer must solicit information from the entity under scrutiny prior to communicating with the market.