Collaborative Research: Social Value of Information and Coordination

协作研究：信息与协调的社会价值

• 批准号: 0518810
• 负责人: Alessandro Pavan
• 金额: $ 4.32万
• 依托单位: Northwestern University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2005
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2005-08-01 至 2006-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0518810&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Social; Value; Information

This project examines how public and private information affect equilibrium allocations and welfare in economies with strategic complementarities. It aims at providing a framework to address important questions such as: what is the optimal transparency in the information disseminated by economic statistics or announcements by policy makers? Does aggregate volatility decrease, and welfare improve, as agents privately collect more information? And, what policies may help enhance coordination by reducing non-fundamental volatility?The main contribution is in showing how these issues can be addressed by investigating the relationship between the social value of information and coordination. When coordination is socially valuable as in the case of markets with investment complementarities or demand spillovers, an increase in the precision of public information increases welfare despite the fact that it may lead to more volatility in aggregate activity. On the contrary, when the coordination motive is not warranted from a social perspective, as in the case of asset markets that are best described as beauty contests, more transparent public information may reducewelfare, whereas more precise private information is welfare-enhancing. Similarly, constructive ambiguity is optimal when there is a high risk that more precise public information will facilitate coordination on socially undesirable outcomes, such as a currency crisis or a bank run.The results deriving from this research are expected to be relevant for both theoretical and applied research concerning economies with strategic complementarities such as production, network or demand externalities, incomplete financial markets, and Keynesian frictions. They are also expected to play an important role in the understanding of crises phenomena, such as currency attacks, bank runs, debt crises, or political change.

本项目研究公共和私人信息如何影响战略互补经济体的均衡分配和福利。其目的是提供一个框架，以解决一些重要问题，例如：经济统计数据或决策者的公告所传播的信息的最佳透明度是多少？当代理人私下收集更多的信息时，总的波动性是否会降低，福利是否会改善？哪些政策可以通过减少非基本面波动来帮助加强协调？主要的贡献是在显示这些问题可以通过调查信息和协调的社会价值之间的关系来解决。当协调具有社会价值时，如在具有投资互补性或需求外溢效应的市场中，提高公共信息的准确性会增加福利，尽管这可能导致总体活动的更大波动。相反，当协调动机从社会的角度来看是没有道理的，如在资产市场的情况下，最好的描述为选美比赛，更透明的公共信息可能会减少福利，而更准确的私人信息是福利增强。同样，当更准确的公共信息将促进对社会不良后果的协调（如货币危机或银行挤兑）的风险很高时，建设性模糊是最佳的。这项研究的结果预计将与关于具有战略互补性的经济体（如生产、网络或需求外部性、不完全金融市场、和凯恩斯主义摩擦他们还预计将发挥重要作用，在危机现象的理解，如货币攻击，银行挤兑，债务危机，或政治变革。