Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms: Theory and Applications

这项研究研究了一类广泛的经济情况，在这种情况下，多个设计师通过提供复杂的机制来吸引和服务于多个私人知情的代理人。例如，卖家设计拍卖以吸引竞标者，平台设计支付方案以吸引用户和开发商，地方政府设计税收和补贴以吸引公司进入其市政当局，以及证券交易所设计交易协议和支付方案以吸引买家和卖家到其场所。这项研究探索了在这些环境中机制设计的一个新维度，即以不对称的方式向相关代理告知机制功能的可能性。例如，拍卖商可能会向一些竞拍者披露他们的保留价，同时对其他竞拍者保密，这是一些卖家近年来开始遵循的做法，但其优点尚未得到调查。或者，制造商可以通过不对称地告知普通零售商他们的生产如何对市场状况做出反应来提高他们的利润，接近串通的结果。这项研究开发了一种新的方法来研究这些市场，并将其用于实证和规范分析。在积极的方面，它调查了在合同分散和使用复杂机制的市场中对竞争的限制。在规范方面，分析揭示了现有法规的优点，如强制性披露法律、排他性、透明度和“满足竞争”要求，并调查了新政策干预的福利影响。经济学家、计算机科学家和监管机构预计会对该方法和结果感兴趣。私人披露是机制设计理论的一个新维度，也就是在机制中的代理人采取行动之前，非对称地向代理人披露有关机制要素的信息。它对均衡结果有着深远的影响。例如，当设计者被限制在具有任意丰富的消息空间但没有私人披露的标准机制时，可以维持均衡的分配和回报可能是不稳健的，即当设计者可以从事私人披露时，可能是不可持续的。此外，当允许私人披露时，不能与标准机制保持平衡的分配和回报可以持续下去。这些结果需要一种新的方法来研究在这笔赠款下开发的机制中的竞争。这项研究涉及两个方面。在理论方面，该分析发展了一种新的方法来刻画这些博弈中的均衡分配。它确定了一类可处理的机制，这类机制是“规范的”，因为它支持所有均衡结果。在应用方面，这项研究展示了如何在许多感兴趣的市场具体使用私人披露，以及监管机构在考虑私人披露时应如何重新考虑此类市场的某些政策干预。这一裁决反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的智力优势和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

This research studies a broad class of economic situations in which multiple designers compete by offering sophisticated mechanisms to attract and serve multiple privately-informed agents. Examples include sellers designing auctions to attract bidders, platforms designing payment schemes to attract users and developers, local governments designing taxes and subsidies to attract companies to their municipalities, and stock exchanges designing trading protocols and payment schemes to attract buyers and sellers to their venues. The research explores a novel dimension in the design of mechanisms in these environments, namely the possibility to inform the relevant agents asymmetrically about the functioning of a mechanism. For example, auctioneers may disclose their reserve price to some bidders while keeping it secret from others, a practice that some vendors have started following in recent years but whose merits have not been investigated yet. Alternatively, manufacturers may raise their profits approaching the collusive outcome by informing common retailers asymmetrically of how their production responds to market conditions. The research develops a new methodology to study these markets and uses it for positive and normative analysis. On the positive front, it investigates the limits to competition in markets where contracting is decentralized and sophisticated mechanisms are used. On the normative front, the analysis sheds light on the merits of existing regulations such as mandatory disclosure laws, exclusivity, transparency, and “meet the competition” requirements, and investigates the welfare implications of novel policy interventions. The methodology and results are expected to be of interest to economists, computer scientists, and regulatory authorities. Private disclosures (that is, information about elements of a mechanism disclosed asymmetrically to the agents before the latter act in a mechanism) is a new dimension in the theory of mechanism design. It has profound effects on equilibrium outcomes. For example, allocations and payoffs that can be sustained in equilibrium when the designers are restricted to standard mechanisms with arbitrarily rich message spaces but no private disclosures may not be robust, that is, may not be sustainable when designers can engage in private disclosures. Furthermore, allocations and payoffs that cannot be sustained in equilibrium with standard mechanisms can be sustained when private disclosures are allowed. These results call for a novel approach to the study of competition in mechanisms that is developed under this grant. The research involves two fronts. On the theoretical front, the analysis develops a new approach to the characterization of equilibrium allocations in these games. It identifies a class of tractable mechanisms that is “canonical” in that it supports all equilibrium outcomes. On the applied front, the research shows how private disclosures can be concretely used in many markets of interest and how regulatory authorities should reconsider certain policy interventions in such markets when accounting for private disclosures.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.