Collaborative Research: Purchasing and Inventory Management in Disrupted Supply Chains: The Reverse Bullwhip Effect

合作研究：供应链中断中的采购和库存管理：反向牛鞭效应

• 批准号: 0726822
• 负责人: Lawrence Snyder
• 金额: $ 23.44万
• 依托单位: Lehigh University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2007
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2007-08-01 至 2011-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0726822&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Purchasing; Inventory; Management

This project postulates the existence of a reverse bullwhip effect (RBWE) in which demand (order) variability increases as one moves downstream in a supply chain. (The classical bullwhip effect (BWE) describes the opposite phenomenon.) The RBWE is caused by supply uncertainty, as supply signals are distorted as they travel downstream. It may co-exist with the BWE, causing variability to be largest in the middle of the supply chain. This project examines the causes of the RBWE, studies strategies for mitigating it, and explores the relationship between the RBWE and the BWE. The first component will build theoretical and simulation models to determine the conditions under which the RBWE occurs, its effect on costs, and strategies for mitigating it. A behavioral study, based on the well known "beer game," will test players' ordering behaviors during supply disruptions. The second component will formulate models that describe purchasing behavior in a shortage situation when demand and price are interdependent. It will examine the impact of disruption characteristics on the RBWE and the effectiveness of pricing as a strategy for mitigating it. This research will enable a clearer understanding of ordering patterns in a supply chain during periods of supply uncertainty and provide a set of tools for reducing both types of bullwhip effects and their negative impacts on both supply chains and their customers. The RBWE is likely to be most pronounced during humanitarian crises and natural and man-made disasters, and a deeper understanding of the RBWE, and techniques for mitigating it, may be critical for meeting demand for emergency supplies, food, energy, and relief services. The models developed in this research will also be incorporated into a supply chain simulation software package written by one of the PIs; that software and the "beer game" software will be freely disseminated for research and educational purposes.

该项目假设存在反向牛鞭效应（RBWE），其中需求（订单）可变性随着供应链下游的移动而增加。（经典的牛鞭效应（BWE）描述了相反的现象。）RBWE是由供应不确定性引起的，因为供应信号在向下游传播时被扭曲。它可能与BWE共存，导致供应链中间的可变性最大。本项目探讨了RBWE的原因，研究了减轻RBWE的策略，并探讨了RBWE和BWE之间的关系。第一部分将建立理论和模拟模型，以确定RBWE发生的条件、其对成本的影响以及减轻RBWE的策略。一项基于著名的“啤酒游戏”的行为研究将测试玩家在供应中断时的订购行为。第二部分将建立模型，描述在需求和价格相互依赖的短缺情况下的购买行为。它将研究中断特征对RBWE的影响，以及作为缓解这种影响的策略的定价有效性。本研究将使我们更清楚地了解供应链在供应不确定时期的订购模式，并提供一套工具，以减少这两种类型的牛鞭效应及其对供应链和客户的负面影响。在人道主义危机以及自然和人为灾害期间，RBWE可能最为明显，因此，更深入地了解RBWE以及减轻RBWE的技术，对于满足对紧急物资、食品、能源和救济服务的需求可能至关重要。本研究中开发的模型也将被纳入由其中一个pi编写的供应链仿真软件包中；该软件和“啤酒游戏”软件将免费传播用于研究和教育目的。