CAREER: Government Policy Responsiveness in Multiparty Parliamentary Democracies

职业：多党议会民主国家的政府政策反应

• 批准号: 0748824
• 负责人: Lanny Martin
• 金额: $ 62.48万
• 依托单位: William Marsh Rice University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2008
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2008-02-15 至 2015-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0748824&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: CAREER; Government; Policy; Responsiveness; Multiparty

This project addresses fundamental questions in the study of representative democracy: What impact, if any, does public opinion have on democratic governance? Do policymakers actually do what citizens want them to do? If public sentiment changes direction, will the actions of elected officials follow? A fundamental normative claim in favor of liberal democracy is that the recurrence of competitive elections promotes an ongoing connection between citizen preferences and government policy. In other words, electoral competition is designed to encourage governments to be responsive to the policy demands of the public throughout their time in office. Although scholars have shown enormous interest in this question, almost all their efforts thus far have been confined to examining responsiveness in the context of the United States Congress. This is unfortunate for a number of reasons. Most especially, the majority of established democracies in the world differ quite markedly from the United States in terms of their institutional structures and patterns of governance. Most democracies are parliamentary in design, which has the effect of giving policymaking power to the government (or cabinet), not the legislature. Further, most parliamentary democracies have more than two major parties. Policymaking typically requires the cooperation of several political parties, why may all simultaneously be attempting to appeal to very different groups of voters. At this point, comparative research is very limited in what it reveals about the connection between citizens and voters in these democracies.In this CAREER award, the principal investigator creates an integrated program of research and education to explore the question of whether policymaking in multiparty parliamentary democracies is responsive to citizen preferences throughout the government's term in office. The investigator proposes a theory of policy responsiveness that focuses on the electoral and office-seeking incentives of politicians in a multiparty setting. The central claim is that these incentives encourage government parties to tailor policy to the wishes of narrow constituencies, whose policy views may or may not accord with those of the majority of voters. To test the argument, the investigator, along with a team of student researchers from both the United States and Europe, will collect original legislative data from seven European democracies on all changes on tax and welfare policy that have been proposed and enacted over the past ten to twenty years. The project contains a strong educational component. It is expressly designed to help aspiring young scholars wishing to do comparative legislative research to overcome many of the practical difficulties associated with it. The investigator proposes three innovations in education and training. First, he proposes to take a number of students abroad, over the course of four summers, to perform archival legislative research. A novel feature of this activity is that these students will be working in collaboration with a team of students from universities in Europe who are also engaged in legislative research. The investigator also proposes to teach yearly practicum courses in legislative research to graduate and undergraduate students at Rice University in which they will be encouraged to use the data from the project, as it is being collected, in their own research. Finally, the investigator will host three annual week-long workshops that bring students at Rice University together with students from across the country and Europe who are working on questions in comparative legislative research.

该项目解决代议制民主研究中的基本问题：公众舆论对民主治理有什么影响？政策制定者真的做了公民希望他们做的事情吗？如果公众情绪改变方向，当选官员的行动会随之而来吗？支持自由民主的一个基本规范主张是，竞争性选举的重现促进了公民偏好与政府政策之间的持续联系。换句话说，选举竞争的目的是鼓励政府在其任职期间对公众的政策要求作出反应。尽管学者们对这一问题表现出极大的兴趣，但迄今为止，他们几乎所有的努力都局限于考察美国国会的回应性。这是不幸的，原因有几个。特别是，世界上大多数已建立的民主国家在体制结构和治理模式方面与美国有着明显的不同。大多数民主国家在设计上都是议会制的，其效果是将决策权赋予政府（或内阁），而不是立法机构。此外，大多数议会民主国家都有两个以上的主要政党。决策通常需要几个政党的合作，为什么所有政党都可能同时试图吸引非常不同的选民群体。在这一点上，比较研究是非常有限的，它揭示了公民和选民之间的联系，在这些民主国家。在这个职业生涯奖，首席研究员创建了一个研究和教育的综合计划，探讨是否在多党议会民主制的决策是响应公民的偏好在整个政府任期的问题。调查员提出了一个理论的政策响应，侧重于选举和办公室寻求激励的政治家在多党设置。其核心主张是，这些激励措施鼓励执政党根据狭窄选区的意愿制定政策，这些选区的政策观点可能与大多数选民的观点雅阁，也可能不一致。为了验证这一论点，研究人员沿着一组来自美国和欧洲的学生研究人员，将收集七个欧洲民主国家在过去10到20年中提出和颁布的所有税收和福利政策变化的原始立法数据。该项目包含一个强有力的教育部分。它的目的是帮助有志从事比较立法研究的青年学者克服与此相关的许多实际困难。首先，他建议在四个夏天的课程中，带一些学生出国进行档案立法研究。这一活动的一个新特点是，这些学生将与来自欧洲各大学的一个也从事立法研究的学生小组合作。调查员还建议每年向莱斯大学的研究生和本科生讲授立法研究方面的实习课程，鼓励他们在自己的研究中使用正在收集的项目数据。最后，调查员将举办三个为期一周的年度研讨会，将莱斯大学的学生与来自全国各地和欧洲的学生聚集在一起，他们正在研究比较立法研究的问题。